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Preface to the Second Edition
Two documentaries on political struggles over digital life aptly bookend
the period between the two editions of this book. Laura Poitras’s 2014
documentary, Citizenfour, provided an account of Edward Snowden’s re-
lease of classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA)
about how states and corporations are involved in mass surveillance and
are spying on their own and other countries’ citizens. Karim Amer and
Jehane Noujaim’s 2019 documentary, The Great Hack, covered Christo-
pher Wylie’s disclosure that the personal information of up to 87 million
users was harvested without their permission by a Cambridge academic
and used by Cambridge Analytica to allegedly interfere in the 2016 US
election and 2016 UK referendum. Although the former brought attention
to the surveillance and data accumulation practices of states and corpora-
tions, the latter highlighted how such accumulation is pervasive and in-
cludes not only platform owners but also academics and other third par-
ties. That two whistle-blowers were key to both disclosures is significant
for stressing a central concern of this book: If the Internet, and how we
are acting through it, decisively traverses the borders constituted by
some two hundred states, who then are the subjects of digital politics?
Beyond the spectacular acts of activists, how do subjects perform every-
day acts through the Internet to make claims about its workings that
traverse the orders and borders of modern law and politics? How are we
to understand ourselves as collective political subjects with rights to
speech, access, and privacy, a political subjectivity that expresses being
with others that involves and provokes the cultivation of openness
against closings of the Internet, when our rights are grounded in and
emanate from being citizens of states?
We explicitly call for and signify collective political subjects as ‘digital
citizens’ who make rights claims by acting through the Internet or, as
stated in the closing chapter of the first edition, digital citizens yet to
come. The significance of this reflects the absence of theorizing the politi-
cal subject of the Internet at the time of the first edition. Research was
only then developing on the acts of people demanding digital and data
rights and resisting and subverting the dispossessions and appropria-
tions of states and corporations. That research documented, for example,
how people use the Internet in creative ways to organize movements,
uprisings, protests, and demonstrations; disrupt hegemonic platforms
and develop open alternatives; and challenge authoritative accounts and
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knowledge across borders and orders. But how these transversal acts
signified the emergence of a new political subjectivity remained undevel-
oped and references to the political subject as a citizen were ambiguous.
That has now changed significantly. Although the figure of the citizen
remains an ambiguous and underspecified subject of rights, much re-
search now suggests the outlines of its emergence. Several books and
edited collections, along with articles in major journals, address the polit-
ical subject of the Internet through research that now more fully spans the
Global North and South. Most significant is a growing body of research
on how people act through the Internet to make claims for data and
digital rights and justice. We are convinced that the framing in the first
edition has proven effective and relevant for interpreting the empirical
studies that this research documents. But in addition to providing a way
to conceive of political subjectivity, a second aspect of the framing that
remains relevant is the specification of cyberspace as a transversal space
that people bring into being by acting through the Internet. However,
although many studies seek to understand the space of digital politics,
cyberspace as a transversal space that makes possible citizenship as a
different kind of political subjectivity remains underspecified. If men-
tioned, references continue to be made to ‘online’ space and digital rights
as separate, if not independent from, physical ‘offline’ space and
non-digital rights. Thus, a central aim of this book remains to provide a
theoretical framing of both the figure of the citizen and the figure of
cyberspace to think across the growing research on digital politics for
resignifying digital citizens as political subjects of cyberspace that is dif-
ferent from, but related to, citizens as political subjects of the state.
We now outline the major changes made to chapters 1 to 7 of the first
edition and provide a longer summary of chapter 8, which is new.
We identify in chapter 1 actors such as Cambridge Analytica and
Mark Zuckerberg who, for many people, do not require introduction and
reflect the ubiquity of connected digital lives. These are spectacular ex-
amples of actors who engage in what we refer to as acts of closing the
Internet. Yet, we also draw attention to ordinary acts that have provided
openings, gained prominence, and have become emblematic of digital
politics such as how citizen subjects have resignified hashtags to both
name and mobilize social movements. The chapter discusses some of the
major books published during the past five years that provide sophisti-
cated empirical and conceptual contributions to the development of a
theory of digital citizenship as an emerging transversal political subjec-
tivity.
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framing of the figure of cyberspace
and the figure of the citizen, while chapter 3 does so for digital acts that
we designate as a kind of speech act that performs ‘I, we, they have a
right to’. The main changes to these chapters are new references to re-
search that help exemplify the arguments that underpin these framings.
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Chapter 4, Callings, includes new references to research on issues of the
digital divide and the normalization of surveillance and data accumula-
tion. Updates are also provided on relevant changes to laws such as the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), government pro-
grammes, platforms, and apps. Chapter 5, Closings, includes new refer-
ences to major political struggles during the past five years such as that
concerning Cambridge Analytica and election meddling more generally.
The chapter includes new examples of political struggles over blocking,
trolling, tracking, and the repurposing of data, especially in the field of
international development. The GDPR is critically assessed as a closing
for its focus on the self-management of privacy, and references are added
to research on the emergence of a culture of surveillance and data accu-
mulation. Chapter 6, Openings, provides new references on acts such as
that of witnessing, especially in the Global South, and how the conven-
tion of the hashtag has been resignified to make rights claims. Chapter 7,
which provides a framing for who is the subject of rights claims, has new
references on the inscription of digital rights, such as Brazil’s Marco Civil
da Internet, that have been won by the acts of citizen subjects.
Chapter 8 is new and picks up where chapter 7 ends to further explore
the politics of the digital citizen yet to come. Whereas chapter 7 focuses
on one form of politics—how people perform themselves as political sub-
jects by making digital rights claims in or by what they say in bills,
charters, declarations, and manifestos (inscription)—chapter 8 turns to
how they do so by making digital rights claims in or by saying and doing
something through the Internet (enactment). Some of the acts examined
come from a growing body of research on digital and data activism that
are interpreted as examples of how rights claims are being enacted. Be-
fore developing those examples in detail, three converging concerns
across this research, which afford an opportunity to revisit key theoreti-
cal framings of this book, are first identified. The first concerns the persis-
tence of totalizing accounts of the Internet that are either dystopian or
utopian ideologies. The former characterizes technology corporations as
powerful new hegemons exploiting people for data accumulation, where-
as the latter extolls the virtues of data accumulation to solve global chal-
lenges. Instead, the chapter highlights how critical scholarship docu-
ments both closings and openings that data accumulated through the
Internet affords and, in this way, provides examples of resistance
through, for instance, creative and subversive uses of data for articulating
claims for data justice. The second is the persistence of an artificial differ-
ence and separation between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ struggles over social,
digital, or data justice. We return to our critique in chapter 2 of this
concept to underscore that when people act through the Internet they do
so in, and create, a continuous space of action that is named ‘cyberspace’.
We underscore this concern to also draw attention to a substantive mat-
ter: that making rights claims inescapably involves a continuous relation
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between non-digital rights (i.e., civil, political, social, cultural, economic,
sexual, etc.) and digital rights (i.e., ownership, access, privacy, anonym-
ity, etc.). The third concern is that of individualism or atomism in which
the problems of the Internet are framed as individual responsibilities. We
note this to emphasize our insistence on calling the political subject yet to
come as a ‘citizen’ because, by its very articulation, the citizen is a collec-
tive political subject that requires being and acting with others in the
enactment of rights.
The chapter then turns to how the enactment of rights leads to ten-
sions and paradoxes for political subjects, such as data and digital acti-
vists when organizing to make rights claims through digital acts; al-
though enabling social movements to have unprecedented reach and
scale, digital acts also implicate them in profiling, identification, and
tracking technologies that are then used against them in multiple legal
orders. Acting through the Internet exposes digital citizens because of the
data traces they leave and, thus, activism may also lead to the accumula-
tion of more data about subjects across multiple political borders. That is,
attempts to perform acts of opening against injustice, oppression, repres-
sion, and domination are countered with acts of closing to criminalize,
deceive, exclude, discriminate, intimidate, and eliminate. We draw on
examples from research to show how citizen subjects are engaging with
these tensions between closings and openings in the play of obedience,
submission, and subversion. The examples specifically show that data
activists and digital activists are some of the emerging citizens who strug-
gle to challenge systems and technologies that are being developed to
track, troll, visualize, control, discipline, and surveil their acts and ac-
tions.
From these examples of openings, we return to a discussion of digital
acts of closing and provide some cautionary notes on how these are
sometimes interpreted. For example, we agree with critics who question
claims made by or about Cambridge Analytica that corporations and
states can and do affect behavioural change and political opinion. We
also express caution about regulatory pressures on closed platforms such
as Google, Facebook, and the like to control speech acts performed
through their protocols and suggest that ceding control to these monopo-
lies could further serve to empower them. We then juxtapose China’s
reported use of facial recognition technology in detention centres to op-
press its Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region with Google’s proposal
to build a smart city in Toronto where its inhabitants are expected to
willingly allow massive amounts of data to be accumulated about them
to make the city operate efficiently. Although seemingly a controversial
juxtaposition, we argue that the China example shows how the transfer
of technologies from domains intended for sinister use to those with
more benign objectives not only produces subjects who are accustomed
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to their effects but also that such transference normalizes data accumula-
tion and ensures people are captured as objects and subjects of data.
Although these acts of closing by both states and corporations may
inhibit enactments of digital citizenship and appear daunting, mobiliza-
tions of acting through the Internet provide ample evidence against
drawing such a conclusion. In the remaining sections of the chapter, we
discuss some specific examples of digital and data activism that now
cover an impressive range of countries and movements. We then discuss
three in greater detail. The first concerns the #NiUnaMenos (Not One
Woman Less) movement in Argentina against male violence, which chal-
lenges the production of knowledge that treats women as objects of vio-
lence. Through the collection of data and production of a register, the
movement engages in data activism to transform women into subjects of
violence and enables them to make claims as citizens against femicide.
The second is Ushahidi, a platform launched in Kenya in 2008, which is
now deployed globally for data activism projects to map, report, and
intervene in not only election monitoring but also in environmental dis-
asters, crisis response, and advocacy of human rights. The final example
is from the Citizen Sense project in the UK on how citizen data generated
by monitoring air quality challenges, contests, and accounts for harmful
environmental conditions in the pursuit of the right to clean air. In these
ways, data subjects who might passively accept official data are trans-
formed into data citizens who can ask experiential and grounded ques-
tions about data.
We conclude chapter 8 by explaining the two meanings attached to
digital citizens as citizens yet to come. We insist that because digital acts
that bring digital citizens into being are transversal, making rights claims
traverses multiple political borders and legal orders that involve ‘univer-
sal’ human rights law, international law, transnational arrangements, and
multiple state and non-state actors. The rights of the political subject
emerging across such borders and orders, and their aggregation and inte-
gration, are distinctly and irreducibly transversal and cannot be con-
tained within existing orders and borders. We also insist on naming these
political subjects as ‘citizens’ and, in so doing, connect this political sub-
jectivity to the genealogies of citizenship that embody both openings and
closings. This, we argue, is necessary to distinguish between making
rights claims against injustice, repression, and domination and making
claims that are racist, misogynous, xenophobic, ethnocentric, nativist,
and sexist that perform and enact such injustices and domination.
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1ONE
Doing Things with Words and Saying
Words with Things
That things we say and do through the Internet have permeated our lives
in unprecedented ways is now a cliché that needs not repeating. That this
has happened practically throughout the world despite digital inequal-
ities is also accepted. That both corporations and states have become
heavily invested in harvesting, assembling, and storing data—for profits
or security—about things we say and do through the Internet is practical-
ly the strongest evidence of the significance attached to our connected
digital lives. That for many people Aaron Swartz, Anonymous, distrib-
uted denial-of-service (DDoS), Edward Snowden, Christopher Wiley,
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Julian Assange,
LulzSec, National Security Agency (NSA), Pirate Bay, PRISM, Bitcoin,
Cambridge Analytica, Mark Zuckerberg, or WikiLeaks hardly require
introduction is yet further evidence. That artificial intelligence, augment-
ed reality, autonomous robots, driverless cars, Internet of Things (IoT),
3D sensors, or delivery drones once thought to be the stuff of sci-fi are
now at various stages of adoption attest to the speed, reach, and disrup-
tion of digital technologies. That hashtags such as #BlackLivesMatter,
#NotInMyName, #StopBrexit, #ClimateChange, #BringBackOurGirls,
#MeToo, #HongKong, or #RefugeesWelcome, both name and spread so-
cial movements is emblematic of digital politics. That presidents and
footballers tweet, governments use social media to influence national
elections, hackers leak nude photos, murderers and advertisers use Face-
book, or that people post their sex acts on the Internet are not so contro-
versial as just recognizable events of our times. That Airbnb disrupts the
hospitality industry or Uber and Lyft that of urban transportation is tak-
en for granted. It certainly feels like saying and doing things through the
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Internet has become an everyday experience with dangerous possibil-
ities.
The worldwide debate over the social, economic, and cultural conse-
quences of digital life connected to the Internet has been in full swing for
about twenty-five years now.1 Early and notable books such as Sherry
Turkle’s Life on the Screen (1995) and Nicholas Negroponte’s Being Digital
(1995) were by and large celebrations of digital lives being connected to
the Internet and enabling people to do things through it.2 Yet within
twenty years the mood has decisively changed. Evgeny Morozov’s The
Net Delusion (2011), Turkle’s own Alone Together (2011), or Jamie Bartlett’s
The Dark Net (2014) strike much more sombre, if not worried, moods.
Although Morozov draws attention to the consequences of giving up
data in return for so-called free services, Turkle draws attention to how
people are getting lost in their devices. Bartlett draws attention to what is
happening in certain areas of the Internet when pushed underground
(removed from access via search engines) and, thus, giving rise to new
forms of vigilantism and extremism. Perhaps the spying and snooping by
corporations and states into what people say and do through the Internet
has become normalized.3 Shoshana Zuboff’s characterization of these de-
velopments as The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019) or David Lyon’s
The Culture of Surveillance (2018) warn that ‘watching’ through the Inter-
net has become a way of life and, as such, is a sign of such normalization.
Seen from another angle, novels such as William Gibson’s Neuromancer
(1984) and Dave Eggers’s The Circle (2013) practically bookmark an era.
Although Gibson projects an experimental and explorative, if not separ-
ate and independent, cyberspace, almost like a frontier, Eggers an-
nounces the arrival of the guardians at the gates of the frontier. As Ro-
nald Deibert suggests, while the Internet used to be characterized as a
network of networks it is perhaps more appropriate now to see it as a
network of filters and choke points.4 The struggle over the things we say
and do through the Internet is now a political struggle of our times, and
so is the Internet itself.
If indeed what we are saying and doing through the Internet is dra-
matically changing political life, what then of the subjects of politics? If
the Internet—or, more precisely, how we are increasingly acting through
the Internet—is changing our political subjectivity, what do we think
about the way in which we understand ourselves as political subjects,
subjects who have rights to speech, access, and privacy, rights that consti-
tute us as political, as beings with responsibilities and obligations? Like
those who approach the study of the Internet as remaking social net-
works, identities, subjectivities, or human-technology interactions, we are
interested in how the Internet involves the refashioning of relations not
only between people but also between people and vast arrangements of
technologies and conventions that have become part of everyday lan-
guage, such as tweeting, messaging, friending, emailing, blogging, shar-
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Doing Things with Words and Saying Words with Things 3
ing, and so on. We are specifically interested in the consequences of these
conventions for political life, which we think is being reconfigured in
novel ways. Moreover, with the development of the IoT—our phones,
watches, dishwashers, fridges, cars, and many other devices being al-
ways already connected to the Internet—we not only do things with
words but also do words with things. (We are going to elaborate on this
awkward but necessary phrase ‘saying and doing things through the
Internet’ and its two sides, ‘doing things with words’ and ‘saying words
with things,’ in chapters 2 and 3 when the figures of the citizen and
cyberspace and then speech acts and digital acts are discussed.) These
connected devices generate enormous volumes of data about our move-
ments, locations, activities, interests, encounters, and private and public
relationships through which we become data subjects. When joined up
with other data collected by private or public authorities concerning our
taxes, health, passport, travel, and finance, the data profiles that can be
compiled about people is staggering.5 Who owns the data generated by
the digital traces of people and their devices?6 The Internet has not only
permeated our social, cultural, and economic lives, but it has also resig-
nified political life by creating an interconnected web of relations among
people and things. It has influenced almost every aspect of politics, and
its presence in politics is ubiquitous. It has not only disrupted conven-
tional politics with concerns about shaping voter behaviour (e.g., claims
about Cambridge Analytica) but also created new kinds of politics where
there is ostensibly no previous equivalent. The Internet has also given
rise to new subjects of politics such as Anonymous, cypherpunks, hackti-
vists, influencers, and whistle-blowers.
Along with these political subjects, a new designation has also
emerged: digital citizens. Subjects such as citizen journalists, citizen art-
ists, citizen scientists, citizen philanthropists, and citizen prosecutors
have variously accompanied it.7 Going back to the euphoric years of the
1990s, Jon Katz introduced the term to describe generally the kinds of
Americans who were active on the Internet.8 For Katz, people were in-
venting new ways of conducting themselves politically on the Internet
and were transcending the straitjacket of at least US electoral politics
caught, as it were, between conventional Democratic and Republican par-
ty politics. Considering this as the birth of a new political subjectivity
entirely owing to the Internet, Katz thought that although digital citizens
were libertarian, they were neither alienated nor isolated. Rather, digital
citizens were a political movement struggling to come together with a
common cause mobilized by values of sharing, prosperity, exchange,
knowledge, and openness.9 Katz’s optimism has not been entirely borne
out by our subsequent (and international) experience.10 One website, for
example, calling on people to become digital citizens seems to be more
about personal safety and personal security than Katz’s libertarian politi-
cal subjects dedicated to openness and sharing.11 It promises, for exam-
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ple, that through becoming digital citizens you will ‘learn how to protect
yourself and your family. Be a voice for real solutions. Help us take our
online neighbourhood back from the criminals and predators.’ As this
indicates, these different imaginaries of being or becoming digital citizens
are contested. This contestation is not entirely a product of the Internet,
as we shall see later, and perhaps expresses the paradox of the late mod-
ern citizen with conflicting and ambiguous callings.12 The question that
we face in relation to this contestation or struggle as both an object of
theorizing and of politics is: What kind of political subject, if not a citizen,
is coming into being through the Internet? What are the callings that
mobilize people with ever more force to become digital citizens, and
what are the closings that generate dread and motivate withdrawal?
In posing these questions our focus is thus on the political subject that
arises from acting through the Internet. To state from the outset, we
understand the political subject not as a coherent and unified being but as
a composite of multiple subjectivities that emerge from different situa-
tions and relations. We ask how it is possible for political subjects to
make rights claims about how their digital lives are configured, regulat-
ed, and organized by dispersed arrangements of numerous people and
things such as corporations and states but also by software and devices as
well as people such as programmers and regulators. This question con-
cerns not only well-known activists through their spectacular acts who
are mostly male and Euro-American but also the innumerable and often
anonymous subjects whose everyday acts through the Internet make
claims to its workings and rules. And, as we have already suggested in
the questions raised, how these everyday acts come to produce a political
subjectivity that we call ‘digital citizens’ is our central concern. We have
already implied two key ideas of this book; let us now specify them.
First, by bringing the political subject to the centre of concern, we
interfere with determinist analyses of the Internet and hyperbolic asser-
tions about its impact that imagine subjects as passive data subjects. In-
stead, we attend to how political subjectivities are always performed in
relation to sociotechnical arrangements and interfaces to think about how
they are brought into being through the Internet.13 We also interfere with
libertarian analyses of the Internet and their hyperbolic assertions of sove-
reign subjects. We contend that if we shift our analysis from how we are
being ‘controlled’ (as both determinist and libertarian views agree) to the
complexities of ‘acting’—by foregrounding citizen subjects not in isolation
but in relation to the arrangements of which they are a part—we can
identify ways of being not simply obedient and submissive but also sub-
versive. Although usually reserved for high-profile hacktivists and whis-
tle-blowers, we ask, how do subjects act both in spectacular and ordinary
ways that transgress the expectations of, and go beyond, specific conven-
tions and, in doing so, make rights claims about how to conduct them-
selves as digital citizens?14 Second, by focusing on how digital citizens
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make rights claims through the Internet, we ask, how are their relations
mediated, regulated, and monitored, and how is knowledge generated,
ordered, and disseminated through the Internet? We consider both con-
cerns as objects of struggle and ones through which we might identify
and conduct ourselves otherwise as digital citizens when we engage with
things and others and act through the Internet.
When the sociotechnical arrangements and subjects that make up the
Internet traverse not only national borders but also legal orders, both
borders and orders become permeable and reinforced simultaneously.
The implications of this are evident in struggles over the Internet; from
Anonymous to WikiLeaks, from activists to security professionals alike,
acts can and do cut across national borders and multiple legal orders.15
Some of the Internet’s novel aspects, such as the speed and reach of
interactions and transactions, have spurred concerns about high-frequen-
cy trading, the hacking of financial and banking services, state and corpo-
rate spying on citizens, deliberate cross-border virus attacks, covert
cyberwars among states, and the rise of often anonymous racism, xeno-
phobia, and homophobia along with cyberbullying and issues of freedom
of speech. These are just a few prominent issues of how technical, materi-
al, cultural, ethical, and political matters collide and collude across multi-
ple and overlapping orders.16 The challenge we set for ourselves in this
book is to find ways of investigating how people enact themselves as
citizens by negotiating their rights such as privacy, access, openness, and
innovation and their rights concerning data. We investigate these rights
not in terms of their substance but in relation to who the subject is of
these rights, or more precisely, who is constituting themselves as political
subjects of these rights by saying and doing things—and, thus, making
rights claims—through the Internet.
BETWEEN DIGITAL LIFE AND POLITICAL LIFE
There has been a remarkably limited discussion let alone theorization of
the relationship between citizens and the Internet.17 Although that
started to change over the past five years (which will be detailed), it is
helpful to review two limitations of work on the relation between digital
and political life because these limitations continue to dominate scholar-
ship. First, discussions of the relationship have focused on issues con-
cerning the provision and delivery of public services through the Inter-
net, variously described as e-government and measured by indicators
such as the United Nations e-government readiness index or other indi-
ces and metrics.18 This is also the case for studies of government transpa-
rency and citizen rights to open data that have led to initiatives such as
the International Open Data Charter.19 Although open data and the pro-
vision and delivery of public services through the Internet are important
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aspects of contemporary citizenship, to limit citizenship to these mean-
ings is obviously too narrow for understanding various broader, if not
fundamental, issues we have just mentioned. Second, discussions under
the rubric of ‘digital citizens’ overlook how citizenship itself in contem-
porary societies is undergoing fundamental changes that are related to a
series of other transformations similar yet different from those concern-
ing the Internet. The issues of transnational mobility and migrations,
resurgence of nationalism, assertions of sovereignty, internationalization
of capital, the decline of the social state, and the rise of neoliberalism are
all forcing the boundaries of citizenship as an issue of concern. Just as the
extensity of the Internet enables digital life to flow across state regulatory
jurisdictions, so, too, do the rights claims of citizens increasingly traverse
multiple legal orders.20
To an extent, these issues are addressed in the field of critical digital
studies.21 Questions concerning who shapes the Internet, who uses it,
and who shapes law and regulation regarding it are now being debated.
It is well recognized that digital studies concerns itself with not only
underlying digital technologies but how these technologies are embed-
ded in sociotechnical arrangements and subjects who shape these ar-
rangements both as users and producers, or prosumers.22 More signifi-
cantly, digital studies spans both social sciences and humanities as well
as interdisciplinary fields such as science and technology studies and
asks questions concerning the relation of digital technologies to social
and cultural change. For Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, especially, criti-
cal digital studies revisits the question concerning technology and its
embodiment in political, social, and cultural lives.23 For Kroker and
Kroker, ‘what is truly critical about critical digital studies is the emphasis
on not only understanding the dominant codes of technology, politics,
and culture in the digital era but also on digital studies that excel in
breaking the codes and in introducing new visions of the digital future by
disrupting the codes, disturbing boundaries, and adding uncertainty to
established patterns of (code) behaviour.’24 As we shall see in chapter 6,
breaking codes or conventions is an essential aspect of the performativity
of digital acts, and hence, being critical is inherent in a performative
understanding of acts.
If indeed we want to engage with critical digital studies concerning
the connectivity of people and things through the Internet, our premise is
that even in critical digital studies that explore ‘the politics of the Inter-
net’, the figure of the citizen makes a faint appearance. As we explain, we
do not mean that either the term ‘citizens’ or ‘citizenship’ has been absent
from digital studies. On the contrary, since the 1990s, the terms ‘citizens’
and ‘citizenship’ have been used to describe politics of and on the Inter-
net. The question is, rather, concerned with the faint appearance of the
figure of the citizen as a subject making rights claims. A brief survey of
exceptions to this absence will help us explain what is meant by this.
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An early work by Kevin Hill and John Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen
Activism in the Age of the Internet (1998), explores the role and impact of
the Internet on democratic politics in the United States.25 Hill and
Hughes conclude that ‘politics on the Internet is dominated by a relative-
ly savvy, conservative minority’, and perhaps for this reason, ‘the Inter-
net is not going to radically change politics’.26 A later work, R. J. Mara-
tea’s The Politics of the Internet: Political Claims-Making in Cyberspace and Its
Effect on Modern Political Activism (2013), also explores the politics of mak-
ing claims in cyberspace. Maratea argues that ‘the ability to publicize
claims and have them disperse through cyberspace does not guarantee
that they will connect with prospective supporters, because the Internet
has increased audience fragmentation’.27 Yet for Maratea it is clear that
the increased state surveillance of the Internet has shown that those with
power will use Internet technologies ‘to expand social control and dis-
seminate propaganda’.28 What is important to recognize is that although
the Internet may not have changed politics radically in the fifteen years
that separate these two studies, it has radically changed the meaning and
function of being citizens with the rise of both corporate and state surveil-
lance.29
It is also in the fifteen years that separates these works that several
studies demonstrated that gradually, if not quite significantly, what it
means to be a citizen on the Internet has changed. This includes studies
that continue to monitor and assess the impact of the Internet on citizen
politics, especially in the United States and United Kingdom, as illustrat-
ed in studies of online conduct, participation, and engagement.30 Karen
Mossberger, Caroline Tolbert, and Ramona McNeal, for example, demon-
strate in Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation (2008)
how online participation in society has become a necessary element of
democratic citizenship.31 By defining ‘digital citizens’ as ‘those who use
the internet regularly and effectively—that is on a daily basis’, they have
shown how inclusion in prevailing forms of communication have af-
fected the ability to participate as democratic citizens. Stephen Coleman
and Jay Blumler in The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice
and Policy (2009) have shown that the Internet has a huge potential to
deepen democratic citizenship when invested by imaginative govern-
ments.32 Phillip Howard, by contrast, has shown in New Media Campaigns
and the Managed Citizen (2006) how information technologies are used in
producing a managed digital citizen.33
These studies also started to expand in scope beyond the United States
and United Kingdom to include international developments.34 In part,
this reflects the increased involvement in the politics of the Internet of
social groups such as youth, women, and minorities whose actions in-
creasingly cross national borders and legal orders and have opened up
various meanings and functions of being citizens.35 Mark Poster, for ex-
ample, argues that these involvements are giving rise to new political
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movements in cyberspace whose political subjects are not citizens, under-
stood as members of nation-states, but instead netizens.36 By using the
term ‘digital citizenship’ as a heuristic concept, Nick Couldry and his
colleagues also illustrate how digital infrastructures understood as social
relations and practices are contributing to the emergence of a civic cul-
ture as a condition of citizenship.37 Yet, they argue, it is not quite clear
what kinds of subjects are emerging from these digital citizenship prac-
tices.
We argue that despite this proliferation of the term ‘citizen’, the figure
of the citizen is lost in digital studies by both its presence and absence.
When it is present, the figure of the citizen appears as a recipient of
rights, a figure that already exists, and whose conduct already pertains to
good civic behaviour such as participation. The citizen, it is observed,
engages (or fails to), participates (or fails to), and receives (or fails to)
rights and entitlements. The figure, then, is largely an already present
figure or a problem figure. To put it differently, the figure of the citizen is
a problem of government: how to engage, cajole, coerce, incite, invite, or
broadly encourage it to inhabit forms of conduct that are already deemed
to be appropriate to be a citizen. What is lost here is the figure of the
citizen as an embodied subject of experience who acts through the Inter-
net for making rights claims. We will further elaborate on this subject of
making rights claims, but the figure of the citizen that we imagine is not
merely a bearer or recipient of rights that already exist but one whose
activism also involves making claims to rights that may or may not exist.
The figure of the citizen is also lost in descriptions of the experiences
of subjects who act through the Internet. This absence is evinced by the
fact that the figure of the citizen is rarely, if ever, used to describe the acts
of crypto anarchists, cyberactivists, cypherpunks, hackers, hacktivists,
whistle-blowers, and other political figures of cyberspace. It sounds al-
most outrageous if not perverse to call the political heroes of cyberspace
as citizen subjects because the figure of the citizen seems to betray their
originality, rebelliousness, and vanguardism, if not their cosmopolitan-
ism. Yet the irony here is that this is exactly the figure of the citizen we
inherit as a figure who makes rights claims. It is that figure that has been
betrayed and shorn of all its radicality in the contemporary politics of the
Internet. Instead, and more recently, the figure of the citizen is being lost
to the figure of the human as recent developments in corporate and state
data snooping and spying have exacerbated. As Rikke Jørgensen has doc-
umented, increasingly, rights to privacy, access, and protection are solely
articulated as human rights arguments.38 There are, of course, exceptions
to this, perhaps most famously Edward Snowden’s pseudonym Citizen-
four and scholars such as Timothy Luke and Mark Poster.39 Nevertheless,
the figure of the citizen is dimly visible in these early works and instead
is either a problem subject of government or a problem subject of human
rights.
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The situation in citizenship studies is the opposite of digital studies. It
is the figure of cyberspace that is practically lost in citizenship studies. As
we observed about the citizen in relation to critical digital studies, cyber-
space is both present and absent in critical citizenship studies. When the
figure of cyberspace is present, it often refers to a nebulous space, often
separate if not independent of physical space and one to which only some
people belong. There is a certain mysticism that surrounds the figure. Its
absence is often evinced during major political events such as Occupy
Wall Street, los indignados of 15M, Extinction Rebellion, Black Lives Mat-
ter, or Arab uprisings by the difficulty of accounting for the role of digital
media in them.40 But the figure of cyberspace is also absent in citizenship
studies as scholars have yet to find a way to conceive of the figure of the
citizen beyond its modern configuration as a member of the nation-state.
Consequently, when the acts of subjects traverse so many borders and
involve a multiplicity of legal orders, identifying this political subject as a
citizen becomes a fundamental challenge. So far, describing this travers-
ing political subject as a global citizen or cosmopolitan citizen has proved
difficult if not contentious.41
To summarize, when we say that the figure of the citizen is lost in
digital studies and that the figure of cyberspace is lost in citizenship
studies, our aim is to bring attention to the question concerning political
subjectivity in cyberspace. So, rather than defining digital citizens nar-
rowly as ‘those who have the ability to read, write, comprehend, and
navigate textual information online and who have access to affordable
broadband’ or ‘active citizens online’ or even ‘Internet activists’, we
understand digital citizens as those who make digital rights claims,
which we will elaborate in chapter 2.42
Since 2015, scholars began crossing digital and citizenship studies.
Digital Citizenship in a Datafied Society (2019) focuses on the ‘social, politi-
cal and discursive contexts of digital citizenship and possibilities for dis-
sent and resistance’43; Negotiating Digital Citizenship: Control, Contest and
Culture (2016) maps digital citizenship in relation to policy makers, edu-
cators, and activists to explore varieties of contest and activism44; Citizen
Media and Public Spaces: Diverse Expressions of Citizenship and Dissent
(2016) examines how citizens reclaim public and digital spaces through a
variety of media and practices45; and, Digital Citizenship and Political En-
gagement (2017) examines how advocacy organizations mobilize and or-
ganize citizens into political participation by moving modes of direct
action and social movement tactics into a digital environment.46 This
work is part of a growing literature that seeks to discuss and theorize
who is the citizen subject of the digital.47 It provides rich empirical and
conceptual contributions in developing a theory of digital citizenship as
political subjectivity through the Internet.
To understand what it means to be digital citizens requires theorizing
between digital life (and its digital subjects) and political life (and its
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Chapter 110
political subjects). Both are simultaneously undergoing transformation,
and understanding the dynamics of these changes is a challenge. It is a
challenge that critical citizenship studies amply illustrates by focusing on
citizenship as a site of contestation or social struggle rather than bundles
of given rights and duties.48 We approach rights not as static or universal
but historical and situated things arising from social struggles. The space
of these struggles involves the politics of how we both shape and are
shaped by sociotechnical arrangements of which we are a part. From this
follows that subjects embody both the material and immaterial aspects of
these arrangements where distinctions between online and offline be-
come untenable.49 Who we become as political subjects—or subjects of
any kind, for that matter—is neither given nor determined but enacted by
what we do in relation to others and things. If so, being digital and being
citizens are simultaneously the objects and subjects of political struggle
and understanding the relations between these struggles is the aim of this
book.
Towards developing a theory of digital citizenship as political subjec-
tivity, we draw on a number of scholars who typically study the technical
workings of digital devices and platforms and their social, cultural, and
political effects. We have learned a lot from the burgeoning literature
about the Internet.50 Our goal is not to focus on the specificities of how
technologies like Google or Twitter algorithms work. Although we do
give many examples, our aim is to develop an empirically grounded but
theoretical conception of the digital citizen as a political subject. We also
recognize that our examples are predominantly from Anglo-American
sources, which in part says a lot about the concentration of technologies,
ownership, and the scandals of our digital lives. However, examples and
scholarship from South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East dur-
ing the past five years have expanded and diversified as we discuss in
chapter 8. We mention these issues to especially foreground that our
focus is on theorizing what we call digital acts and being digital citizens
and that such theorizing is necessary to clear the ground for more de-
tailed and penetrating investigations. It is an approach we share with
others and especially with J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words,
work that we take up in chapter 3 to develop our conception of digital
acts drawing on his theory of speech acts.51 Austin understands language
as a means of social action. We take this up to interpret digital acts as a
kind of speech act and means of social struggle. As previously noted,
critical digital studies and empirical analyses of specific digital platforms
are proliferating, yet it is important to understand what these mean for
being digital citizens. Many of the conventional concepts with which we
are familiar, such as online, offline, virtual, and real, for example, do not
hold up to critical scrutiny but instead serve as placeholders in search of
concepts. Yet having concepts is critical because they shape our percep-
tions and imaginaries, and it is through concepts that we make sense of
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our experiences. Our aim, then, is to provide a theoretical framing that
might help us to think across the numerous studies and accounts, so that
when we consider Twitter, for instance, we can ask: How do conventions
such as microblogging platforms configure actions and create possibil-
ities for digital citizens to act?
BECOMING DIGITAL CITIZENS
We use the term ‘critical’ to indicate a tradition that is marked by critical
reflexivity but also by an open, engaging, and political style of thought.
More specifically, however, ‘critical’ designates a style of thought where
we investigate the acts of those who rupture contemporary conventions
of being political and enact creative, autonomous, and inventive ways of
becoming political. Through this approach, we have marked out what we
consider to be several moves in how we theorize being digital citizens.
We outline them here, recognizing that one can grasp their fuller mean-
ing and function only by reading the chapters that follow.
In chapter 2, we develop an understanding of the space of digital life
as the figure of cyberspace and an understanding of the figure of the citizen
that we inherit. Rather than a separate or independent space constituted
by the digital interactions and transactions of people, we define it as a
space of relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet.
We develop our approach to being digital citizens by drawing on Michel
Foucault to argue that subjects become citizens through various process-
es of subjectivation that involve relations between bodies and things that
constitute them as subjects of power. We focus on how people enact
themselves as subjects of power through the Internet and at the same
time bring cyberspace into being. We position this understanding of sub-
jectivation along with interpellation, which signifies that subjects are also
formed and inhabited by external forces. We argue that citizen subjects
are summoned and called on to act through the Internet and, as subjects
of power, respond by enacting themselves not only with obedience and
submission but also subversion. If indeed we understand cyberspace as a
space of relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet,
ways of being digital citizens is a site of struggle between virtuous, mali-
cious, righteous, and indifferent acts. Our performativity always involves
relations between ourselves and others. In this way, conducting our-
selves means to act with others as we place ourselves and take up and
carve out social positions—something that Foucault captured by defining
power as ‘action upon action’ or ‘conduct of conduct’.52
Chapter 3 develops a conception of how we say and do things
through the Internet by defining digital acts as a kind of speech act. We
do this by taking up Austin’s definition of five classes of speech acts that
have performative force: judgements, decisions, commitments, acknowl-
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edgements, and clarifications. To this we introduce a sixth class of speech
act, which we think these classes do not account for: claims. We arrive at
this through our consideration of the citizen subject who articulates ‘I,
we, they have a right to’. Although subjects perform all classes of speech
acts and not only through the Internet, making rights claims are specific
to our definition of citizens as not sovereign rights-bearing but performa-
tive rights-claiming subjects. We argue that making rights claims in-
volves not only performative but also legal and imaginary forces. We
then argue that digital acts involve conventions that include not only
words but also images and sounds and various actions such as liking,
coding, clicking, downloading, sorting, blocking, and querying. If Austin
showed how we do things with words, we also try to show how we do words
with things.53 We argue that these digital acts resignify four political ques-
tions about the Internet: anonymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity.
In chapters 4, 5, and 6 we then specify how these contestations are
enacted through three groupings of digital acts—callings, closings, and
openings—and outline the various conventions and actions that compose
them. Chapter 7, rather than considering the substance of digital rights,
attends to the processes involved in enacting digital rights claims. We do so
by bringing together those political subjects who make digital rights
claims by their acts through the Internet (performativity) and those who
make digital rights claims in or by what they say about those rights in
declarations, bills, charters, and manifestos (imaginary) and call on au-
thorities for the inscription of those rights (legality). Chapter 8 develops
the concept of ‘digital citizens-yet-to-come’ by considering the conditions
under which making rights claims produces citizens as political subjects.
By largely drawing on recent scholarship on ‘digital activism’ or ‘data
activism’ it addresses the question of who is the subject of digital rights.
Collectively, these moves refine our approach to enacting digital citi-
zens. We work through a complex terrain of openings and closings that
cyberspace occasions but also raise a fundamental—and increasingly uni-
versal—question: How do we conduct ourselves through the Internet?
Given the rights cyberspace occasions and we demand, should we em-
brace it without question? Given the perils it elicits, should we avoid it?
Given the dangers it creates, should we abandon it? Given its potential-
ities, should we tout the dawn of a new era? All these questions are being
asked today, yet they may not be the questions that really matter. Given
its pervasiveness and omnipresence, avoiding or shunning cyberspace is
as dystopian as quitting social space; it is also certain that conducting
ourselves in cyberspace requires, as many activists and scholars have
warned, intense critical vigilance. Because there cannot be generic or uni-
versal answers to how we conduct ourselves, every incipient or existing
political subject needs to ask in what ways it is being called on and
subjectified through cyberspace. In other words, to return to the theoreti-
cal framing of this book, the kinds of citizen subjects that cyberspace
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cultivates are not homogenous and universal but fragmented, multiple,
and agonistic. At the same time, the figure of a citizen-yet-to-come is not
inevitable; although cyberspace is a fragile and precarious space, it also
affords openings, moments when thinking, speaking, and acting differ-
ently become possible by challenging and resignifying its conventions.
These are the moments that we highlight to argue that digital rights are
not only a project of inscriptions but also enactment.
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If indeed the premise of this book is that there is an emerging political
subject called ‘the digital citizen’, we cannot assume that this subject is
without history and geography. We cannot simply assume that being a
citizen online already means something (whether it is the ability to partic-
ipate or the ability to stay safe) and then look for those whose conduct
conforms to this meaning.1 The understanding of citizenship and politi-
cal subjectivity associated with it has a complex history and geography
that should not be simplified as participation, safety, security, or access,
although obviously these are arguably important aspects of being a citi-
zen. To say that ‘digital citizenship is the ability to participate in society
online’ leaves out too much to properly understand the impact of the
Internet on a central figure of political life—the citizen.2 So any attempt at
theorizing ‘digital citizens’ ought to begin with the historical figure of the
citizen before even shifting focus to the digital. Moreover, confining the
digital to the Internet or the online overlooks how digital citizens come
into being through the meshing of their online and offline lives.3 For us,
this means developing a robust conception of cyberspace that moves be-
yond this binary trope and ostensibly virtual versus physical or ‘real’
spaces. This chapter aims to accomplish these two objectives. We first
summon a figure of the citizen as a historical and geographical figure by
drawing on critical citizenship studies. Then we summon a figure of
cyberspace as a space of acts—digital acts—by drawing on critical digital
studies. We then develop a first set of propositions on citizens and cyber-
space that guide the following chapters.
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THE FIGURE OF THE CITIZEN WE INHERIT
Over the past three decades, just when the Internet has become promi-
nent, there has also been a growth of studies on citizenship in the social
sciences and humanities. This has led to the development of a field called
‘citizenship studies’ that is large and diverse enough that it is impossible
to outline, let alone discuss its basic tenets.4 The field begins with citizen-
ship defined as rights, obligations, and belonging to the nation-state.
Three rights (civil, political, and social) and three obligations (conscrip-
tion, taxation, and franchise) govern relationships between citizens and
states. Civil rights include the right to free speech, to conscience, and to
dignity; political rights include voting and standing for office; and social
rights include unemployment insurance, universal health care, and wel-
fare. Although conscription is rapidly disappearing as a citizenship obli-
gation, taxation is still fundamental; voting, although declining, remains
vital. The field of critical citizenship studies makes two basic interven-
tions on this understanding. First, it recognizes new rights, such as sexual
rights, cultural rights, and environmental rights, and documents strug-
gles over their institutionalization (e.g., the struggles over same-sex mar-
riage in the United States and Europe).5 Second, it also recognizes that
increasingly, whether traditional (i.e., civil, political, social) or expanded
(cultural, economic, environmental, sexual, transnational, and urban),
rights and obligations are negotiated through supranational institutions
such as the United Nations (e.g., Universal Declaration of Human
Rights), the Council of Europe (e.g., European Court of Human Rights),
and the EU (e.g., European Court of Justice) as well as devolved institu-
tions such as regional parliaments (e.g., Quebec or Scottish parliaments)
and traditions of minority communities (e.g., applications of Sharia law)
that question the assumption that citizenship is membership in only a
nation-state.6 Moreover, critical citizenship studies is distinguished from
conventional citizenship studies by its performative understanding of
rights and that the polities that give rise to and protect those rights are
various. If we begin thinking about citizenship as ‘a membership in the
nation-state’, we are already approaching it in conventional ways. Rath-
er, critical citizenship studies often begins with the citizen as a historical
and geographic figure—a figure that emerged in particular historical and
geographical configurations and a dynamic, changing, and above all,
contested figure of politics that comes into being by performing politics.7
How does the figure of the citizen function in critical citizenship studies?
The figure of the citizen as it is inherited from the European Enlight-
enment is paradoxical. This is born out of two contradictions that it em-
bodies: a contradiction between freedom and obedience and a contradic-
tion between universalism and particularism. Étienne Balibar has drawn
attention to both of these contradictions in his response to Jean-Luc Nan-
cy’s question ‘Who comes after the subject?’8 Nancy asked a question
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about the status of the speaking and acting subject of Enlightenment after
the critique of the sovereign subject—or the Cartesian subject—that was
the linchpin of political theory since the Enlightenment.9 To put it sche-
matically, modern political theory created a divide between modernity
and tradition where a subject to power (tradition) was replaced by a sub-
ject of power (modernity). To put it differently, if on the one side of the
divide stood a subject of the sovereign (subject to power), on the other
side stood the sovereign subject (subject of power). Modern political the-
ory hailed the arrival of the latter as the displacement of the former.10
Critical political theory questions both the divide and displacement.
Instead, it asserts that a subject is a composite of multiple forces, identifi-
cations, affiliations, and associations. The subject is divided by these ele-
ments rather than by tradition and modernity. It also asserts that a sub-
ject is a site of multiple forms of power (sovereign, disciplinary, control)
that embodies composite dispositions (obedience, submission, subver-
sion). The question, then, was if we reject the sovereign subject behind
every act or deed, then how can we understand the acting subject today
composed of, as it were, these multiple identifications, powers, and dis-
positions?
Balibar’s response to this question was surprisingly straightforward:
what comes after the subject has already a name, and it is the citizen.11
Balibar highlighted the paradoxical aspects of the figure of the citizen. To
begin, Balibar thought that the very idea of the rights of the citizen insti-
tutes a historical figure that is not merely subject to power or the subject of
power but embodies both.12 This move is quite significant: if being a sub-
ject to power requires obedience, being a subject of power requires dis-
obedience. But these are not pure forms; rather, the citizen subject em-
bodies these as potentialities. Being a subject to power is marked by the
citizen’s domination by the sovereign, and his or her rights derive from
that which is given to him or her by the (patriarchal) sovereign. Being a
subject of power means being an agent of power, even if this requires
submission. There is an important difference between obedience and sub-
mission. If being subject to power means obedience to the sovereign, then it
requires domination as a mode of power. Whether this is total obedience
or resistant obedience depends on the circumstances. By contrast, being a
subject of power means submission to authority in whose formation the
citizen participates and its potential subversion. What distinguishes the
citizen from the subject is that the citizen is this composite subject of
obedience, submission, and subversion. The birth of the citizen as a sub-
ject of power does not mean the disappearance of the subject as a subject to
power. The citizen subject embodies these forms of power in which he or
she is implicated, where obedience, submission, and subversion are not
separate dispositions but are always present potentialities.
This is, at any rate, our reading of Balibar, and we obviously read him
through Michel Foucault’s rethinking of the transformation from ancient
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to modern forms of power with his emphasis on the simultaneous pres-
ence of obedience, submission, and subversion. Expressing the basic
question that motivated his studies on power, knowledge, and ethics,
Foucault said, ‘How is it that in Western Christian culture the govern-
ment of men demands, on the part of those who are led, not only acts of
obedience and submission but also “acts of truth,” which have the pecu-
liar requirement not just that the subject tell the truth but that he tell the
truth about himself, his faults, his desires, the state of his soul, and so
on?’13 For Foucault, it was ‘acts of truth’ that afforded possibilities for the
subject to constitute himself or herself as a subject of power. For us, this
also means that acts of truth afford possibilities of subversion. Being a
subject of power means responding to the call ‘how should one “govern
oneself” by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of
those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the instru-
ment they employ, and the subject that acts?’14 In describing this as his
approach, Foucault was clear that the ‘development of a domain of acts,
practices, and thoughts’ poses a problem for politics.15 It is in this respect
that we consider the Internet in relation to myriad acts, practices, and
thoughts that pose a problem for the politics of the subject in contempo-
rary societies.
To our knowledge, Balibar is the only scholar who describes Fou-
cault’s contribution as describing ‘the birth of the citizen subject.’16 This
is intriguing. It shifts our attention on how subjects become citizens
through various processes of subjectivation that involve relations be-
tween bodies and things that constitute them as subjects of power.17 If we
focus on how people enact themselves as subjects of power through the
Internet, it involves investigating how people use language to describe
themselves and their relations to others and how language summons
them as speaking beings. To put it differently, it involves investigating
how people do things with words and words with things to enact them-
selves. It also means addressing how people understand themselves as
subjects of power when acting through the Internet. This requires explor-
ing how people come into being through the Internet not only as speak-
ing subjects who use language but also other modes of engaging and
acting. For Balibar ‘the citizen’s becoming-a-subject takes the form of a
dialectic, this is because there are necessary contradictions between
founding a definition of the citizen and the contestations over it.’18 As we
shall see, becoming digital citizens in acting through the Internet is not
free of these contradictions. We will discuss this in more detail in chapter
8 with a focus on data activism and digital activism.
The citizen then bequeaths us a figure of politics that not only is ca-
pable of being obedient but can also be simultaneously a submissive (to
authority) and a subversive (of authority) figure. It also always carries
within it the possibility and danger of the obedient subject of sovereign
power. The citizen is a subject who submits to government in which he or
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she is implicated. This submission makes this figure a subject of subver-
sion capable of questioning the terms of his or her own submission. To
put it differently, the agency of the citizen appears in the gap between the
capacity to submit to authority and yet the ability to act in dissent. This is
not a sovereign subject in the mastery of his or her destiny, but an em-
bodied subject formed through games of multiple affiliations and of sub-
mission and subversion. The rights that the citizen holds are not the
rights of an already-existing sovereign subject but the rights of a figure
who submits to authority in the name of those rights and acts to call into
question its terms. This is the inescapable and inherited contradiction
between submission and subversion of the figure of the citizen that can
be expressed in a paradoxical phrase: submission as freedom.
The second contradiction concerns its universalism against particular-
ism. For the subject to become a citizen, the conditions must be equal for
everyone. To become a citizen is predicated on this equality. This equality
is universal. Who is then the citizen? Balibar says that the citizen is a
person who enjoys rights in completely realizing being human and is free
because being human is a universal condition for everyone.19 We would
say the citizen is a subject who performs rights in realizing being political
because becoming political is a universal condition for everyone. There is,
however, a contradiction here. It is that, historically speaking, although
some subjects are considered capable of conducting themselves as citi-
zens, such as white, male, propertied, able-bodied, Christian, and hetero-
sexual beings, the opposites of each of those subject positions will remain
subjects. As Mark Poster writes, ‘Western concepts and political princi-
ples such as the rights of [hu]man[s] and the citizen, however progressive
a role they played in history, may not provide an adequate basis of cri-
tique in our current, increasingly global condition.’20 Poster says this is
so, among other things, because Western concepts arise out of imperial
and colonial histories and because situated differences are as important
as universal principles.21 This contradiction of the figure of the citizen
can be expressed in another paradoxical phrase: universalism as particu-
larism.
From a critical perspective on citizenship, these contradictions are the
sources of the vitality of the figure of the citizen. These contradictions
constitute the figure of the citizen as a subject of claims for rights. Each
claim that a citizen articulates against an authority puts him or her under
demands of that authority. If rights of citizenship come into being in law,
the citizen comes into being through the performance of that law or per-
formance of the right to claim rights. If the citizen comes into being per-
formatively through rights, the imaginary of citizenship mobilizes this
figure of the citizen as a subversive subject. He or she is a subject of
power whose acts of citizenship are simultaneously of submission and
subversion. Acts of citizenship embody these two contradictions. On the
one hand, acts produce universalism because its subjects claim that eve-
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ryone can act; on the other hand, and simultaneously, acts produce par-
ticularisms against those who are rendered unable or incapable to act or
whose acts cannot be recognized.
If indeed we understand this dynamic of taking up positions as sub-
jectivation, we then identify three forces through which citizen subjects
come into being: legality, performativity, and imaginary. These are nei-
ther sequential nor parallel but simultaneous and intertwined forces of
subjectivation. We will explain why we call these ‘forces’ in more detail
later, in chapter 3. For now, let us briefly describe each in turn. The
legality of citizenship inscribes the figure of the citizen as that person
with the right to claim rights. Since the late eighteenth century in Europe
and postcolonial societies, this figure of the citizen has acquired certain
rights that define it: civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights, such as
the right to free speech, the right to privacy, the right to due process,
freedom from arbitrary power, freedom to associate, the right to dignity,
and the freedom of conscience, are outcomes of social struggles over
these liberties and required simultaneously submission to authority and
its subversion (e.g., dissent, resistance, protest). Similarly, political rights,
such as the right to vote representatives to the parliament, to run for
office, to organize political parties and movements, to protest, to assem-
bly, and to civil disobedience are political rights that overall define the
figure of the democratic citizen. The social rights of citizenship have their
history of struggles, too. The right to universal benefits, welfare, allow-
ances, and health and other social services are not only won through
social struggles but also establish a principle: the figure of the citizen, to
be an effective political figure, must acquire not only a modicum of civil
life but also social existence. The charters, bills, and declarations claiming
rights—with all the symbolic dates associated with them of 1689, 1776,
1789, 1835, 1948—are largely about inscribing again and again rights as
claims through social and political struggles both the origins and effects
of which are the figure of the citizen.22
If making rights claims is performative, it follows that these rights are
neither fixed nor guaranteed: they need to be repeatedly performed.
Their coming into being and remaining effective requires performativity.
The performative force of citizenship reminds us that the figure of the
citizen must be brought into being repeatedly through acts (repertoires,
declarations, and proclamations) and conventions (rituals, customs, prac-
tices, traditions, laws, institutions, technologies, and protocols). Without
the performance of rights, the figure of the citizen would merely exist in
theory and would have no meaning in democratic politics. As Karen Zivi
writes, if we consider citizenship as making rights claims, it is because it
is a performative practice.23 For Zivi, ‘we make rights claims to criticize
practices we find objectionable, to shed light on injustice, to limit the
power of government, and to demand state accountability and interven-
tion.’24 We often focus on the content of these rights rather than rights
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claiming as the performativity of citizenship. As Zivi writes, ‘[T]o ap-
proach rights and rights claiming from the perspective of performativity
means, then, asking questions not simply about what a right is but also
about what it is we do when we make rights claims.’25 So what is it that
people do when making rights claims? We will address this question in
chapter 3. For now, let us note that making rights claims in or by saying
and doing ‘I, we, they have a right to’ involves performing both contra-
dictions inherent in citizenship. We need to make two points here. First,
performing citizenship both invokes and breaks conventions. We shall
characterize conventions broadly as sociotechnical arrangements that
embody norms, values, affects, laws, ideologies, and technologies. As
sociotechnical arrangements, conventions involve agreement or even
consent—either deliberate or often implicit—that constitutes the logic of
any custom, institution, opinion, ritual, and indeed law or embodies any
accepted conduct. Because both the logic and embodiment of conventions
are objects of agreement, performing these conventions also produces
disagreement. Another way of saying this is that the performativity of
conduct such as making rights claims often exceeds conventions. As Zivi
writes, ‘[A]nalyzing [citizenship] from a performative perspective means,
then, appreciating the extent to which our claims both reference and
reiterate social conventions, and yet have forces and effects that exceed
them.’26 We have identified this as the contradiction between submission
and subversion or consent and dissent. Jacques Rancière captures this as
dissensus.27 We will return to dissensus in chapter 7. Second, while artic-
ulating a demand (for inclusion, recognition), performing citizenship en-
acts a universal right to claim rights. This is the contradiction between the
universalism and particularism of citizenship.
Yet for the figure of the citizen to come into being through making
rights claims that are expressed in and through law, there must be an
imaginary of citizenship produced through thought, symbols, images,
ideas, and ideals of the democratic citizen. This imaginary force of citi-
zenship is indispensable for its performative and legal forces, which can-
not be thought without them. The imaginary of citizenship includes a
whole series of statements and utterances about what citizenship is,
ought to be, has been, will have to be, and so on. The imaginary of
citizenship is obviously mobilized by and participates in the formation of
the legality of citizenship and its performativity and yet cannot be re-
duced to them. In a way, how we orient ourselves towards 1689, 1776,
1789, 1835, and 1948 and the contested meanings we attach to them are
part of this imaginary work of citizenship.
Let us make it clear that our sketch of a critical perspective on citizen-
ship that involves legality, performativity, and imaginary as three over-
lapping and yet distinct forces of subjectivation, at least for interpreting
modern democratic citizenship, is open to disagreements, qualifications,
and clarifications. We find it difficult to express it systematically because
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we have assembled it from various dispersed sources, not least our own
writings on the subject. But we hope we make a sufficient case that the
figure of the citizen cannot enter debates about the Internet as a subject
without history and without geography—and without accepting its
contradictions. Rather, a critical approach to the figure of the citizen at a
minimum recognizes that it is both a subject to power and subject of
power and that this figure embodies obedience, submission, and subver-
sion as its dispositions. If indeed the citizen subject comes into being
legally, performatively, and imaginatively through making rights claims,
it inherits these sedimented histories and geographies.
THE FIGURE OF CYBERSPACE
We cannot think, let alone write, without concepts. But concepts are not
merely organizing principles of our experience; they emplace us in that
experience. We experience the world through and with concepts. The
concepts that become dominant parts of discourse shape our perceptions
through which we make sense of our own experience. We, in other
words, live our lives through concepts we have inherited. Cyberspace
became such a concept with which we experience being ‘online’ and
participate in online activities. We mentioned previously that we are criti-
cal of a supposed difference between online and offline lives and politics.
This is in part because connected devices such as phones, tablets, and
wearable technologies render that difference problematic, as people do
not need to use a computer or a device to become connected. It is not only
our bodies that are connected through the Internet but also our devices in
which our lives are embodied. To put it differently, while being online
may be a discontinuous activity, being connected is almost always con-
tinuous. For these reasons, the concept of cyberspace is a challenge for
theorizing being digital citizens not because we make that choice but
because it is a concept that already functions in contemporary discourse.
Yet despite its dominance, the concept of cyberspace is usually used in
a way that makes it difficult to theorize being digital citizens. Just consid-
er how ubiquitous three of its derivatives have become: cyberwar, cyber-
security, and cybercrime. Consider also one of its predecessors, cybernet-
ics. In the 1960s, futurists, policymakers, journalists, social scientists, and
humanists ‘started writing about the coming of a new era based on the
merging of computers and communications technology’ and the coming
of the ‘information age.’28 Confronted with a dominant concept, we
could choose to ignore its ‘flaws’ and use it for convenience; we could
entirely ‘reject’ it; or we could note its flaws but use it cautiously. All
approaches have been taken with mixed results. If indeed the figure of
cyberspace is not something we can merely ‘avoid’ or ‘critique’ as the
dominant concept through which we conceptualize our experiences of
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online life, how do we approach it? To explain why we’d rather analyti-
cally focus on ‘being digital citizens’, we will have to come to terms with
the figure of cyberspace and its allure and continue to use it with reserva-
tions.
We begin with a banal observation. The Internet and cyberspace are
not equivalent things. The Internet is a layered and complex phenome-
non. It is certainly an interconnected network of computers (and devices)
using standard and negotiated protocols to transmit information con-
verted into binary numeric form known as ‘digital objects’. These can be
sounds, images (moving or still), words, and numbers. The Internet in-
cludes governments, corporations, and organizations that own and oper-
ate terrestrial and extraterrestrial infrastructures that transmit digital
objects. It also includes Internet service providers (ISPs) who own and
operate additional infrastructure that connects users to the Internet. It
includes software such as operating systems, code, and cryptography to
encrypt and decrypt data, and hardware such as routers, switches, cables,
transmitters, receivers, servers, and server clusters. And it also contains
all the people who maintain, operate, and configure these infrastructural
elements.29 Let us now describe cyberspace as a space of transactions and
interactions between and among bodies acting through the Internet. But
this is hardly uncontroversial. If indeed cyberspace is first a relational
space, these relations are between and among bodies through the Inter-
net. These bodies can be collective (institutions, organizations, corpora-
tions, collectives, groups), cybernetic, or social.30 Finally, these acting
bodies are neither subservient nor sovereign subjects. To restate our con-
ception in short, cyberspace is a space of relations between and among bodies
acting through the Internet.31 Cyberspace is a space of social struggles and
no less or more ‘real’ than, say, social space or cultural space—concepts
that also describe relations between bodies and things. Yet this separation
between ‘real’ space and cyberspace is so pervasive and carries a baggage
that needs questioning.
The term ‘cyberspace’ is often attributed to William Gibson’s telling of
the story of a computer hacker whose adventures in cyberspace drive
Gibson’s award-winning novel Neuromancer (1984). This attribution is
both a fact and fiction. There Gibson imagines cyberspace as: ‘a consensu-
al hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in
every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts. . . . A
graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every com-
puter in the human system.’ Such is the life of words. Following Gibson,
cyberspace became a dominant concept to express a separate and inde-
pendent sphere of life possibly for ‘digital citizens’ if not cyborgs. As
Gibson himself recognized, it has travelled far from his usage and vision.
In the documentary film No Maps for These Territories he recounts, ‘[A]ll I
knew about the word “cyberspace” when I coined it, was that it seemed
like an effective buzzword. It seemed evocative and essentially meaning-
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less.’32 This is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s genealogical principle that just
because something comes into being for one purpose does not mean that
it will serve that purpose forever.33 Cyberspace has now become widely
used not only in popular culture but also in social sciences and human-
ities scholarship. In fact, there is a strong resonance between popular
culture and scholarship regarding cyberspace that many social sciences
and humanities concepts do not enjoy.
We cannot provide a genealogy of cyberspace here, but let it suffice to
note two of its pervasive contemporary connotations. First, a different
and distinct, if not unique, space exists elsewhere, and it is separate from
a space that is said to be physical. Second, this space is (or wants to be)
independent. These two connotations function in myriad ways, such as
virtual versus actual space, cloud versus real space, online world versus
offline world, and nonphysical versus physical world.34 In the early
1990s, when the concept began taking broader shape, cyberspace was
saturated by its libertarian qualities as an independent space. ‘A Declara-
tion of the Independence of Cyberspace’, written by the cofounder of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, John Parry Barlow, became its poignant
and oft-quoted representative. The declaration argued that ‘[c]yberspace
consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a
standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is
both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live.’35 The
declaration imagines that a new world is being created where everyone is
entitled to enter and where no distinctions or backgrounds exist. Being
adversely addressed to governments, the declaration states that ‘your
legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context
do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter
here.’ Leaving aside the paradox of using an American experience and
language for creating a universal ‘civilization of the mind’, the declara-
tion reveals that cyberspace is to be conceived not only as metaphysical
(no bodies and no matter) but also as an autonomous space (‘On behalf of
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.’).
These two functions—that cyberspace is separate and independent—
mobilize not only analytical but also political and, as we shall see, legal
arguments about the distinctiveness of cyberspace. Currently, these func-
tions operate so strongly that even the most careful scholars, such as
Lawrence Lessig, who routinely question the uses of cyberspace still
maintain this distinction.
It is helpful to follow Lessig on this distinction. In 1996 he considers
the Internet and cyberspace to be the same thing.36 For Lessig, cyberspace
is a metaphor to understand the Internet and the ways in which it is
different from what he called ‘real’ or nonvirtual space. Arguing that
cyberspace is (or used to be) a space of freedom, Lessig writes that ‘the
technologies of control are relatively crude. Not that there is no control.
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Cyberspace is not anarchy. But that control is exercised through the ordi-
nary tools of human regulation—through social norms, and social stig-
ma; through peer pressure, and reward.’37 The main difference between
cyberspace and ‘real’ space for Lessig used to be the way in which con-
duct on conduct was regulated—in other words, how power is exercised.
The anathema for Lessig is the loss of this freedom in cyberspace. In real
space, governing people requires inducing them to act in certain ways,
but in the last instance, people had the choice to act this way or that way.
By contrast, in cyberspace conduct is governed by code, which takes
away that choice. In cyberspace, ‘if the regulator wants to induce a cer-
tain behavior, she need not threaten, or cajole, to inspire the change. She
need only change the code—the software that defines the terms upon
which the individual gains access to the system or uses assets on the
system.’38 This is because ‘code is an efficient means of regulation. But its
perfection makes it something different. One obeys these laws as code
not because one should; one obeys these laws as code because one can do
nothing else. There is no choice about whether to yield to the demand for
a password; one complies if one wants to enter the system. In the well
implemented system, there is no civil disobedience.’39 What Lessig sug-
gests is that cyberspace is not only separate and independent but consti-
tutes a new mode of power. You constitute yourself as a subject of power
by submitting to code. Lessig thinks that cyberspace used to be an open
and uncontrolled space and its ‘regulation [used to be] achieved through
social forces much like the social forms that regulate real space.’40 At one
time it was not zoned, but now it has become so. For Lessig, then, ‘the
essence of cyberspace [used to be] the search engine—tools with which
one crosses an infinite space, to locate, and go to, the stuff one wants. The
space today is open, but only because it is made that way.’41 But Lessig
argues that engineers were acquiring too much power in creating zones
by code and that people were increasingly filtering themselves out from
various zones.42 Here Lessig attributes almost sovereign power to code
and accounts for the loss of freedom of cyberspace with the control of
code. This is almost equivalent to the (ancient-modern) divide we de-
scribed previously, between on the one side a subject of a sovereign and
on the other side the sovereign subject.
Lessig later develops a slightly more nuanced idea of the difference
between cyberspace and the Internet, yet he still insists on a basic differ-
ence between cyberspace and real space.43 Lessig thinks cyberspace, like
geographic space, has architecture, and this architecture is the code: algo-
rithms that govern hardware and software switches and regulate access
to its specific zones. Lessig writes, ‘[C]ode is a regulator in cyberspace
because it defines the terms upon which cyberspace is offered. And those
who set those terms increasingly recognize the code as a means to achiev-
ing the behaviors that benefit them best.’44 For Lessig, the difference
between what he calls ‘real’ space and cyberspace is that real space is
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structured around public spaces that have access to everyone. By
contrast, cyberspace includes many zones that are off limits to many and
is constituted by code, which means ‘You can resist this code—you can
resist how you find it, just as you can resist cold weather by putting on a
sweater. But you are not going to change how it is.’45 We disagree with
this view of code. Although we gather from Lessig and other scholars
such as Ron Deibert and Julie Cohen the importance of code, we cannot
agree that code can or does have such a determining influence.46 We will,
however, explain this later in chapter 3, where we discuss in more detail
the importance of language and the irreducible differences between
speech, writing, and code. For now, we want to emphasize that if we are
bound to use the concept ‘cyberspace’ and compare it to something called
‘real’ space, we’d better understand the complex registers in which cyber-
space exists rather than being opposed to an ostensible ‘real’ space.
Other scholars such as Julie Cohen and Richard Ford have made this
point. Yet while critical of the uses of the term ‘cyberspace’, we find them
also implicitly if not inadvertently accepting a distinction between cyber-
space and an ostensibly ‘real’ space. Cohen, for example, rightly notes
that ‘[c]yberspace is in and of the real-space world, and is so not (only)
because real-space sovereigns decree it, or (only) because real-space sove-
reigns can exert physical power over real-space users, but also and more
fundamentally because cyberspace users are situated in real space.’47
Most scholars of cyberspace, says Cohen, ‘ignore both the embodied,
situated experience of cyberspace users and the complex interplay be-
tween real and digital geographies.’48 She concludes that
theories of cyberspace as space fail not because they lack the proper
understanding of whether “cyberspace” is different from “real space,”
and indeed that debate simply muddies the issue. Rather, they fail
because they lack appreciation of the many and varied ways in which
cyberspace is connected to real space and alters the experience of peo-
ple and communities whose lives and concerns are inextricably rooted
in real space.49
Although we find her view agreeable, the question here is why continue
to use cyberspace and real space as though they still are different catego-
ries while at the same time arguing that people are embodied beings that
connect the two. It is almost as if having recognized the problem, Cohen
is searching for a way to avoid it but, in our view, without success. It
seems it is difficult to maintain that cyberspace ‘is most usefully under-
stood as connected to and subsumed within an emerging, networked
space that is inhabited by real, embodied users and that is apprehended
through experience’ while avoiding the assumption of some ‘real’ space
or users.50
We think Richard Ford experiences the same difficulty. He, too, right-
ly points out that ‘the decision to think of the Internet in spatial terms—
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and increasingly only in spatial terms—will not help us to understand
the Internet so much as it will affect the way we understand the Inter-
net.’51 He also points out that ‘cyberspace also encourages us to import
our biases, mythologies, misperceptions, and unreflective habitual prac-
tices concerning land and territory into a new domain.’52 Yet Ford contin-
ues to fight against the existence of a separate, if not independent, space
called cyberspace but unintentionally gives it an existence by being
against it as a project.53
We cannot claim that we will do better, but at least we will attempt to
avoid thinking of cyberspace as either a separate or independent space
from geographic or physical space. We have already characterized cyber-
space as a space of relations between and among bodies acting through
the Internet. We noted previously that 1984 was the birth of the concept
of cyberspace. Yet during the very same year, a much less known work,
or rather, a work known much more for its title, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s
The Postmodern Condition (1984), appeared. Being asked to report on
knowledge in the most highly developed societies and presented to the
now defunct Conseil des Universités of the government of Québec in
1984, Lyotard took as his main premise that the production, dissemina-
tion, and exchange of knowledge could not survive what he called ‘the
computerization of society’.54 Without assuming that computerization
ushered advanced societies into a machine age, as it was commonly
understood then and still is today, Lyotard instead argues that computer-
ization was ushering knowledge into a new mode of production. We
want to revisit both Lyotard’s substantive argument and his method be-
cause, writing before the concept of cyberspace, his starting point is not
an ostensibly existing space but changing social relations through com-
puterization. That, we think, ought to be the starting point.
Lyotard saw the production, dissemination, and legitimation of
knowledge taking on a new principle. He interpreted this principle as
commodification of knowledge, where it became a form of capital. Be-
cause the means of production, dissemination, and legitimation of
knowledge principally involves language, Lyotard saw language as the
main site of social struggle. It is not surprising, then, that Lyotard was
attracted to Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin to develop a method of
understanding language as a means of social struggle. Lyotard dubbed
this as ‘language games’ involving different classes of utterances.55
Again, we will wait until chapter 3 to elaborate these as speech acts. But
what is important here is to note Lyotard’s conception of language games
as being made up of competitive (agonistic) social struggles where per-
formative utterances—or what we will more generally call ‘digital acts’—
are strategic moves that bring into being rather than point to presumably
already existing referents. What we find in Lyotard—albeit in incipient
form—is that rather than conceiving a separate and independent space,
the point is to recognize that power relations in contemporary societies
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are being increasingly mediated and constituted through computer net-
works that eventually came to be known as the Internet.
Lyotard’s significant contribution was to recognize that computeriza-
tion was both mediating and constituting these language games and re-
sulting in new forms of capital, which Pierre Bourdieu would designate
as cultural capital.56 Lyotard anticipates it by imagining ‘that a firm such
as IBM is authorized to occupy a belt in the earth’s orbital field and
launch communications satellites or satellites housing data banks. Who
will have access to them? Who will determine which channels or data are
forbidden? The State? Or will the State simply be one user among others?
New legal issues will be raised, and with them the question: “who will
know?”’57 If the computerization of society raises such questions, the
analysis of the production, dissemination, and legitimation of knowl-
edge, on which it has a profound effect, cannot be restricted to under-
standing computerization as communication or computer-mediated com-
munication. Rather, the object of investigation ought to be language
games that became possible through what Lyotard saw as networked
computers.
The point here is not to claim that Lyotard provides a better descrip-
tion of ‘cyberspace’ or the Internet. Lyotard himself warned against using
his hypotheses as predictive claims. Nonetheless, when we examine the
shape that the Internet has taken since 1984 with its social-media plat-
forms, access struggles, storage battles, copyright fights, protocol compe-
titions, and so on, it is obvious that what is at stake is the production,
dissemination, and legitimation of knowledge and the control of its stor-
age, access, and transmission as objects of intense competitive struggles.
Who owns the growing volumes of data generated by saying and doing
things on the Internet, who accesses it, who has right to its use, and who
has right to profit from it are political problems of our age. So, when we
conceive cyberspace as a space of relations between and among bodies
acting through the Internet, we mean that it is through those relations
and struggles that it comes into being as a contested space. This is the
approach we develop to contribute to our understanding of the figure at
the centre of these competitive struggles: the digital citizens, their claims,
and the callings made on them. Understanding cyberspace as an agonis-
tic space of relations and struggles is our general starting point. Rather
than understanding cyberspace as a separate and independent space, we
interpret it as a space of relations. Put differently, Donna Haraway’s Cy-
borg Manifesto (1984), which is not about the then incipient Internet but
about the interconnectedness of humans and machines, is just as relevant
to our age of the Internet through which we both say and do things.58
We approach cyberspace, then, as a relational space in which digital
citizens come into being through digital acts. The Internet—whether it is
a network of networks or a network of filters and choke points—is a
sociotechnical arrangement that makes up only one part of the relations
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of cyberspace that are not separate from bodies.59 Deibert rightly argues
that
although cyberspace may seem like virtual reality, it’s not. Every de-
vice we use to connect to the Internet, every cable, machine, applica-
tion, and point along the fibre-optic and wireless spectrum through
which data passes is a possible filter or “chokepoint,” a grey area that
can be monitored and that can constrain what we can communicate,
that can surveil and choke off the free flow of communication and
information.60
Not only does this mean that the Internet has material effects such as data
centres, server clusters, and code, though this is certainly true and there
are studies about these material forms, but it also means that cyberspace
is a space of relations that comes into being through interactions and
transactions between and among bodies acting through the Internet. For
this reason, to declare cyberspace as either being actual or virtual, separ-
ate and independent from another space, ostensibly physical, is an inade-
quate starting point. If we make that point emphatically enough, then
where do we start?
We mentioned previously how Balibar defines Foucault’s contribution
as a genealogy of the birth of the citizen subject. It is worth exploring this
through Gilles Deleuze’s argument that Foucault’s theorization about the
birth of the subject was spatial.61 As Foucault provides a genealogy of
various forms of power, he assigns certain properties to each in terms of
strategies and technologies by which and through which it is exercised. A
form of power that works through exclusions, for example, is more ap-
propriate for sovereign power demanding of its subjects obedience. Being
subject to power, in other words, brings about forms of sociospatial exclu-
sion such as banishment, deportation, expulsion, and so on.62 The spaces
that sovereign power produces correspond to such strategies and technolo-
gies of exclusion: expulsion, prohibition, banishment, eviction, exile, and
deportation are such examples. By contrast, being a subject of power mobi-
lizes strategies and technologies of discipline, which require submission
but open possibilities of subversion. The spaces that disciplinary power
produces are appropriate to such strategies and technologies of disci-
pline: asylums, camps, and barracks but also hospitals, prisons, schools,
and museums as spaces of confinement. Each of these spaces is a space of
contestation, competitive, and social struggles in and through which cer-
tain forms of knowledge are produced in enunciations that perform sub-
jects. Neither spaces of exclusion nor spaces of discipline are static or
container spaces. They are dynamic and relational spaces. There are no
‘physical’ spaces separate from power relations and no power relations
that are not embedded in spatializing strategies and technologies of
power.
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The most notable contribution Foucault made to our understanding of
the modern subject of power is that this subject was also simultaneously a
subject of knowledge.63 So Foucault often preferred to reflect on relations
of power and knowledge and spaces appropriate to them. If we are think-
ing about spaces of confinement, it requires not only the power relations
necessary to constitute such spaces but also what relations of knowledge
are produced, disseminated, and exchanged about them. That a subject of
power is also a subject of knowledge is a significant aspect for both soci-
eties of exclusion and societies of discipline.These two forms of power—
sovereign and disciplinary—were conjoined by another—control—
defined by Deleuze, who, after Foucault’s death, thought about power in
relation to spaces that were becoming prevalent and in which cybernetic
control depended on the movements and conduct of subjects.64 Deleuze
recognized that ‘Foucault’s often taken as the theorist of disciplinary soci-
eties and of their principal technology, confinement (not just in hospitals
and prisons, but in schools, factories, and barracks). But he was actually
one of the first to say that we’re moving away from disciplinary societies,
we’ve already left them behind.’65 Deleuze was now convinced that
‘[w]e’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate by con-
fining people but through continuous control and instant communica-
tion.’66 The space of control societies was diffuse and dispersed and deci-
sively cybernetic in its modes of government.
For Deleuze, the logic of confinement is analogical: walls, perimeters,
streets, checkpoints, height, volume, and depth were prominent features
of spaces of confinement for exclusion or discipline. By contrast, the logic
of spaces of control is digital: movement, opening and closing of circuits,
transmission, and dispersion were its modulating operations. For De-
leuze, ‘factories formed individuals into a body of men for the joint con-
venience of a management that could monitor each component in this
mass, and trade unions that could mobilize mass resistance; but busi-
nesses are constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as
healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals against
one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within
himself.’67 Deleuze thinks that, by contrast, in control societies ‘the key
thing is no longer a signature or number but a code: codes are passwords,
whereas disciplinary societies are ruled . . . by precepts.’68 He observes
that ‘the digital language of control is made up of codes indicating
whether access to some information should be allowed or denied.’69 For
Deleuze, control societies function with a new generation of machines
and with information technology and computers. For control societies,
‘the passive danger is noise and the active [dangers are] piracy and viral
contamination. This technological development is more deeply rooted in
a mutation of capitalism.’70 Deleuze cites Guattari imagining a city
‘where anyone can leave their flat, their street, their neighbourhood, us-
ing their . . . electronic card that opens this or that barrier; but the card
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may also be rejected on a particular day, or between certain times of day;
it doesn’t depend on the barrier but on the computer that is making sure
everyone is in a permissible place, and effecting a universal modula-
tion’.71 Deleuze concludes, ‘It may be that older means of control, bor-
rowed from the old sovereign societies, will come back into play, adapted
as necessary. The key thing is that we’re at the beginning of something
new.’72 For Deleuze, ‘it’s true that, even before control societies are fully
in place, forms of delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also
appearing. Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes
and what the nineteenth century called “sabotage” (“clogging” the ma-
chinery).’73 What Deleuze envisions at the end of the 1980s is the appear-
ance of control societies merging analogue and digital forms of controls
to create a space—perhaps cyberspace—that is embodied rather than a
separate and independent space. As prescient as Deleuze’s thoughts on
control societies, he did not develop them further. He also made assump-
tions we cannot agree with, such as the succession of sovereign, discipli-
nary, and control societies. We see sovereign, disciplinary, and control
societies and their power/knowledge spaces as coexisting forms, al-
though they may have come into being in different historical and geo-
graphical circumstances.74
To start where Deleuze left off and work with cyberspace as a space of
acts, we briefly turn to scholars concerned with geographic space who
have long developed a critique of physical space as separate and inde-
pendent.75 Central to this critique has been to reject the existence of an
objective, natural, or physical space separate and independent from rep-
resented or lived spaces—a flat ontology, if you like.76 Following Henri
Lefebvre, at least three registers of spaces have been elaborated: con-
ceived space, perceived space, and lived space.77 The essential point is
that inhabiting spaces in three registers, we experience our being-in-the-
world through simultaneous but asynchronous registers. Subjects inhabit
conceived spaces such as objectifying practices that code, recode, present,
and represent space to render it as a legible and intelligible space of
habitation. Subjects inhabit perceived spaces such as symbolic representa-
tions of space that guide our imaginative relationship to it. Subjects also
inhabit lived spaces through things they do in or by living. Lived spaces
are the spaces through which subjects act. These three registers of space
are distinct yet overlapping but also interacting: by inhabiting them, we
make them.78 How people understand their own experiences and how
these experiences come together or stay apart in conceived, perceived,
and lived spaces requires doing research: How do bodies position them-
selves in relation to each other and other things? Having recognized that
space exists in various registers, scholars also study such spaces as cultu-
ral, social, legal, economic, or political spaces. Their assumption is not
that such spaces exist as separate and independent from spaces people
inhabit, but these are analytical means to concentrate on a subset of rela-
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tions that constitute such spaces for deeper understanding of how people
inhabit, say, a cultural space, which is simultaneously yet asynchronous-
ly a conceived, perceived, and lived space. We have provided here mere-
ly a glimpse of how critical scholars have complicated our views of
space.79 The point that we need to make before we proceed is that just as
critical geographers understand geographic space as not only physical,
so, too, do we understand cyberspace as not only virtual.
CYBERSPACE AS A SPACE OF DIGITAL ACTS
We want now to illustrate how we approach cyberspace as a relational
space of digital acts. But before we proceed, let us note that we will not
continue to use the language of conceived, perceived, and lived space.
Instead, we will use the same categories we have introduced to discuss
three forces of subjectivation that bring citizen subjects into being: legal-
ity, performativity, and imaginary. This is partly because we do not want
to introduce yet another vocabulary to complicate our discussion further
but also because the three forces parallel these three in broad terms. Thus,
when we consider the legality of spaces, we will discuss conceived spaces
comprising rules, regulations, and other codes that govern (or attempt to
govern) that space. When we discuss the performativity of spaces, we
will discuss the lived spaces that are brought into being by acts. And
when we discuss imaginary spaces, we will discuss the images, ideals,
and ideologies of perceived spaces.80 The parallel is not perfect, but it will
serve our purposes of maintaining a grip on the complexities of cyber-
space as distinct from other spaces while approaching it from the per-
spective of acts that constitute it.
Consider what happens when a group of people organize to be at the
same place and time through an Internet platform, say, messaging or
tweeting, and stage an act of protest. Since 2009 many acts of protest or
demonstration have taken place around the world, each receiving differ-
ent degrees of public attention. The most prominent began in Iran with
protests against the president in 2009. In 2011 these gathered pace with
acts of protest in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, uprisings in Bahrain
and Syria, and demonstrations in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco.
In 2010 and 2011 acts of protest and riots were staged in English cities. In
2011 acts of protests called ‘Occupy’ were also staged in New York, Lon-
don, Madrid, and other cities. In 2013 demonstrators in Istanbul staged
acts of protest against the government.81 In 2014, first Kiev and later in
the year Hong Kong were the sites of such protests. Although other major
acts have erupted since then, such as Hong Kong’s ‘umbrella revolution’
in 2014 and 2019, numerous others of various scales have been staged in
Venezuela, Brazil, India, China, United States, Chile, Lebanon, and South
Africa and often identified by social media hashtags. Although all of
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these acts were staged in the last ten years, there were significant differ-
ences, as one would expect, for the reasons, methods, reactions, and ef-
fects of these acts. Yet it is fair to say that they all shared two qualities: all
these acts were staged in squares and streets and were varyingly enacted
through the Internet.82 This has resulted in numerous interpretations of
the relation between the two: squares and social media. It is quite unfor-
tunate at the outset that the interpretive debates about the importance of
the Internet in the staging of these acts have been framed in terms of
‘social media’. To reduce the wide repertoires of communication and
collaboration that activists use to social media such as Facebook or Twit-
ter has had the effect of focusing attention on these (what we shall later
call) ‘closed’ platforms under the control of a few commercial organiza-
tions rather than on open platforms.83 At any rate, the question has been
framed as to the role of social media in these worldwide protests. Chris-
tian Fuchs has grouped these interpretations of the relationship between
social media and squares and streets into four: first are those who adopt
broadly a technological determinism perspective and argue that social
media has made these protests possible and that their staging in squares
would have been impossible without social media. A second takes an
opposite perspective, arguing that social media has had nothing to do
with the success or failure of the staging of these acts in squares. A third
group accepts that squares were crucial but recognizes that investing in
social media paid significant dividends in staging these acts.84 A fourth
group, in which Fuchs sees himself, argues that the objective conditions
that led people to protest found mechanisms for expressing subjective
positions, thereby helping organize these protests.85 By emphasizing a
difference between the Internet in general and social media, Fuchs iden-
tifies three dimensions of Internet usage, especially by the Occupy move-
ment: building a shared imaginary of the movement, communicating its
ideas to the world outside, and engaging in intense collaboration.86 Fuchs
also helpfully develops a much wider list of platforms used by the move-
ment rather than dumping them all into an all-encompassing category of
‘social media’. Paolo Gerbaudo also examines the squares versus social
media debate and attempts to move beyond optimists and pessimists
about the role of social media.87 His argument is that these acts always
involved groups of leaders who undertook the essential tasks of organiz-
ing and gathering people rather than flat hierarchies or distributed net-
works that are often attributed to such enactments through the Internet.
Both Fuchs and Gerbaudo remind us of the importance of under-
standing how these subjects of protest had already been formed into
social groups, recognizing each other and summoning each other for ac-
tion. Several other studies have reached similar conclusions such as Ba-
nerjee’s analysis of the role that social media played in the 2014 Indian
elections and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) victory.88 Briguglio also
argues that Maltese activists who mobilized social media to protest
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against the construction of a private university in 2015 were already part
of pre-existing social networks.89 Radsch’s study of the Arab uprisings of
2011 similarly shows how years of grassroots organizing, digital acti-
vism, and political awareness-raising laid the groundwork necessary for
social media and the Internet to be effective.90 And finally, Monshipouri
and Mokhtari, reflecting on a collection of studies, note that factors, in-
cluding traditional, political, and cultural variables, have had a much
more decisive impact on the results of power struggles in the playing out
of contentious politics than the utilization of modern technological
tools.91
Without that understanding, could a message or tweet even have the
capacity of being understood, let alone the power to summon subjects, as
simply recipients of messages? Both Fuchs and Gerbaudo are critical of
assuming that there exists another space—cyberspace—separately and
independently from squares, but neither then offers a way of conceptual-
izing cyberspace.92 Lessig’s question, ‘[S]o where are they when they are
in cyberspace?’ remains unanswered. Lessig’s own response that ‘we
have this desire to pick: We want to say that they are either in cyberspace
or in real space. We have this desire because we want to know which
space is responsible. Which space has jurisdiction over them? Which
space rules? The answer is both. Whenever anyone is in cyberspace, she
is also here, in real space.’93 Our answer is different from Lessig’s. We
think that the answer is not both because there are no two different
spaces in the first place. Instead, we have characterized cyberspace as a
space of relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet.
Cyberspace is a space like social space, cultural space, economic space, or
psychological space. Each of these kinds of spaces is a space through
which we enact ourselves in relation to other bodies in whichever ways
our acts derive their legal, performative, and imaginary force. Acting
through the Internet, making connections with others, is a new condition
of our lives that adds to but does not displace or supplant other ways of
acting in social or cultural spaces in which we are embedded.
Moreover, neither Fuchs, nor Gerbaudo—or for that matter, many
digital studies scholars—ask the question of whether the subjects of cy-
berspace are citizen subjects. The ubiquitous concept used is ‘activist’, but
it runs the risk of being a homogenous and unified concept that osten-
sibly works the same way in Cairo, Istanbul, New York, Madrid, Kiev,
Tehran, Athens, Hong Kong, or Tunisia. This is partly because the Inter-
net encourages this homogeneous and undifferentiated usage, but in each
of these political, economic, and social if not cultural spaces, citizen sub-
jects have different histories and embody different legal, performative,
and imaginary forces for their enactment. To begin with, in each of these
spaces, rights that constitute citizenship are quite fundamentally differ-
ent. It is trite to say but being a US citizen in New York is different from
being an Iranian citizen in Tehran and not equivalent regardless of hu-
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man rights conventions. Second, the boundaries of what is sayable and
doable and, thus, the performativity of being citizens are radically differ-
ent in, say, Tunis and Madrid. Finally, the imaginary force of acting as a
citizen in Athens has a radically different history than it has, say, in
Istanbul. These complexities and differentiations come to make a huge
difference in how citizen subjects uptake certain possibilities and act and
organize themselves through the Internet.
This is even more significant since one of the most important develop-
ments is the increasing shaping of cyberspace to coincide with the bor-
ders of states. Originally, cyberspace came into being as centred on the
United States, as governmental and nongovernmental organizations and
corporations that made up the Internet networks were located ‘there’. It
then expanded throughout the world as a network of networks travers-
ing many nation-state borders. More recently, however, through impera-
tives of capital accumulation led by corporations such as Google, Apple,
Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr and imperatives of
surveillance and security led by states such as the United States, United
Kingdom, Iran, China, and India, cyberspace is increasingly overlapping
the borders of states. In other words, cyberspace as a space of relations
between and among bodies acting through the Internet is anything but a
smooth space. Rather, it is striated in the sense that it is differentiated,
fractured, segmented, and crisscrossing and in the sense that it embodies
a multiplicity of authorizations, controls, filters, choke points, and boun-
daries.94 The figure of the citizen traversing the borders of states in cyber-
space is rapidly being effaced like a face in the sand at the edge of the sea
as waves of filters and choke points wash over it.
Cyberspace, then, is a complex space of becoming citizens. What
kinds of digital acts constitute cyberspace? How do these acts produce
digital citizens? We address these questions in chapter 3, but here we
propose how acting through the Internet has resignified four political
questions. These are neither qualities nor properties of the Internet but
objects of political contestation more generally. Taken singly, each high-
lights contentious or contested issues of conflict arising from bodies act-
ing through the Internet. Yet we want to argue that taken together, they
point to how acts that constitute cyberspace are distinctive to other politi-
cal struggles. We will briefly state them here without further elaboration,
but we will return to them in chapter 3. The first concerns anonymity.
Being anonymous in cyberspace has several complex meanings that are
different from being anonymous or even making rights claims to be
anonymous. It is not surprising that one of the most recognizable if trou-
bling acts on the Internet is by citizen subjects called Anonymous. If we
distinguish privacy from anonymity, we realize that anonymity on the
Internet has spawned a new political development. If privacy is the right
to determine what people decide to keep to themselves and what to share
publicly, anonymity concerns the right to act without being identified.
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The second concerns the velocity of acting through the Internet. For bet-
ter or for worse, it is almost possible to perform an act on the Internet
faster than one can think. The third concerns the extensity of acting
through the Internet. The number of addressees and destinations that are
possible for acting through the Internet is staggering. So, too, are the
boundaries, borders, and jurisdictions that an act can traverse. The fourth
concerns traceability. If it is performed on the Internet, an act can be
traced in ways that are practically impossible outside the Internet. Taken
together, anonymity, velocity, extensity, and traceability are questions
that are resignified by bodies acting through the Internet.
CITIZENS, DIGITAL CITIZENS, CYBERSPACE
If we are going to use the figure of the citizen to describe the subject of
power in cyberspace, it requires more than being online or being on the
Internet to become digital citizens. Being online and being connected are
insufficient metaphors for describing citizens in cyberspace. The kind of
historical subject the citizen designates and how this subject is sum-
moned and enacts cyberspace is the object of our analysis. Understanding
how digital citizens and cyberspace come into being through digital acts
requires exploring both the ways in which this subject—digital citizen—
is produced and the ways in which cyberspace emerges as their domain
of existence. We suggested that enacting ourselves through the Internet
has resignified political questions of anonymity, extensity, traceability,
and velocity of acts. If we constitute ourselves as digital citizens, we have
become subjects of power in cyberspace. This involves the inscription of
rights in law (legality), claiming rights through performance (performa-
tivity), and responding to callings (imaginary) that, taken together, resig-
nify the digital citizen or its enactment.
To recapitulate the basic premises of this book, let us recall that we
consider the subject called the citizen as a subject of power. Although sub-
ject to power is produced by sovereign societies, the subject of power is pro-
duced by disciplinary and control societies. It is important to make it clear
that the contemporary subject embodies all these three forms of power.
This is the sense in which we consider the citizen subject as a subject of
power and as a subject we inherit.
If being subject to power involves obedience, being subject of power in-
volves obedience, submission, and subversion. The subject called ‘citizen’
is a paradoxical subject because it already embodies conduct of obedi-
ence, submission, and subversion. Conduct always acts on conduct as
embodied conventions. If we understand conventions as involving soci-
otechnical arrangements, we recognize that they comprise norms, rules,
values, affects, laws, ideologies, and technologies.
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Yet what makes a subject a citizen is the capacity for making rights
claims. To put it differently, the citizen as subject of power comes into
being through acts of making rights claims. Conventions are about insti-
tuting rights to govern relations between subjects and between subjects
and conventions. By making rights claims, citizen subjects govern their
relations with themselves, with others, and with conventions. This is the
process of the subjectivation of citizen subjects, and it always involves the
forces of legality, performativity, and imaginary.
If we understand cyberspace as neither a separate nor an independent
space but one constituted by bodies acting through the Internet, then we
need to know how, as subjects of power, bodies are called on to conduct
themselves in that space. What actions become possible? What actions are
encouraged? What actions are cultivated? What actions are discouraged?
What actions are legalized or illegalized? What actions become perform-
able? What actions can be imagined? By asking these questions, we are
compelled to consider both cyberspace as a space of relations between
and among bodies acting through the Internet and how it is brought into
being through digital acts. This means to establish a continuous relation
between non-digital rights (i.e., civil, political, social, cultural, economic,
sexual, etc.) and digital rights (i.e., ownership, access, privacy, anonym-
ity, etc.).
We are not yet ready to define digital acts, but we have already sug-
gested that bodies acting through the Internet resignify political ques-
tions of anonymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity of the conduct of
citizen subjects. We have so far expressed our basic premises as a series of
propositions that we have put forward rather than argued. This is by way
of approaching both the figures of the citizen and cyberspace with ideas
that we think are important to bear in mind. In chapter 3 we will elab-
orate both speech acts and digital acts to develop the concept of making
rights claims. Then, in chapters 4, 5, and 6, we will specify digital acts—
callings (demands, pressures, provocations), closings (tensions, conflicts,
disputes), and openings (opportunities, possibilities, beginnings)—as
ways of conducting ourselves through the Internet and discuss how these
bring cyberspace into being. We return to the citizen subject making
rights claims and make a case for its resignification in chapter 7. We then
discuss the kinds of political subjects who have emerged through the
Internet by making rights claims over the last few years in chapter 8.
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1. This is a generally used meaning of ‘digital citizenship’ used most consistently
by K. Mossberger, et al., “Measuring Digital Citizenship: Mobile Access and Broad-
band,” International Journal of Communication 6 (2012); K. Mossberger, et al., Digital
Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008),
expresses it most clearly. It is an understanding also to be found in work that examines
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Chapter 240
innovative forms of political participation that have been enabled through information
and computer technologies (ICTs) and invented by citizens in the Global South. See:
M. Emmer and M. Kunst, “‘Digital Citizenship’ Revisited: The Impact of ICTs on
Citizens’ Political Communication Beyond the Western State,” International Journal of
Communication 12 (2018).
2. Mossberger, et al., Digital Citizenship.
3. Nathan Jurgenson, for example, writes of the ‘false separation’ between the
‘digital and physical’ and argues that they are enmeshed, there is no ‘elsewhere,’ and
that ‘what we do while connected is inseparable from what we do when discon-
nected.’ Thus, ‘disconnection from the smartphone and social media isn’t really dis-
connection at all: The logic of social media follows us long after we log out. There was
and is no offline; it is a lusted-after fetish object that some claim special ability to
attain, and it has always been a phantom.’ N. Jurgenson, “The IRL Fetish,” New In-
quiry, 28 June 2012 [accessed 8 August 2014], http://bit.ly/N57s34.
4. The field of citizenship studies is quite extensive. Although T. H. Marshall’s
work has been considered a key contribution, its Anglo American bias and historical
outlook has been criticized. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1949), ed. T. B.
Bottomore (London: Pluto Press, 1992). See S. White, The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); J. Clarke, et al., Disputing Citizen-
ship (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014); M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees, eds., Citizenship Today: The
Contemporary Relevance of T. H. Marshall (London: UCL Press, 1996). Also see B. S.
Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism (n.p.: Unwin, 1986); B. S.
Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship,” Sociology 24 (1990).
5. U. Erel, Migrant Women Transforming Citizenship (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); S.
Phelan, Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and Dilemmas of Citizenship (Philadelphia: Tem-
ple University Press, 2001); A. Latta, “Environmental Citizenship,” Alternatives Journal
33, no. 1 (2007); T. Miller, Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitanism, Consumerism, and Tele-
vision in a Neoliberal Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007).
6. A. McNevin, Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the
Political (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); K. Rygiel, Globalizing Citizen-
ship (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010); P. Nyers, “The Acciden-
tal Citizen: Acts of Sovereignty and (Un)Making Citizenship,” Economy and Society 35
(2006); P. Nyers, “Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-
deportation Movement,” Third World Quarterly 24 (2003); A. Ní Mhurchú, Ambiguous
Citizenship in an Age of Global Migration (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014);
V. Squire, The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
7. Clarke, et al., Disputing Citizenship, 9–11.
8. E. Balibar, “Citizen Subject,” in Who Comes after the Subject?, ed. E. Cadava, et al.
(London: Routledge, 1991).
9. The literature on the subject is quite extensive, but see S. Žižek, The Ticklish
Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (New York: Verso, 2000); J. Butler, Sub-
jects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999); R. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference
in Contemporary Feminist Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
10. We recognize here that both ‘modern political theory’ and ‘critical political theo-
ry’ are rather broad categories. We do not mean to neatly slot political theorists into
these categories but rather consider the categories as capturing particular dispositions:
Those theorists who see such a radical divide between subject to power and subject of
power and temporally assume that the latter displaces the former (and hence a belief
in modernity) convey that disposition. By contrast, critical political theorists are dis-
posed to question both the divide and displacement. These dispositions can be found
in many political theorists and, in fact, sometimes both in the same theorist.
11. Balibar, “Citizen Subject,” 38.
12. Ibid., 46. Balibar puts it the following way: ‘The idea of the rights of the citizen,
at the very moment of his emergence, thus institutes an historical figure that is no
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Citizens and Cyberspace 41
longer the subjectus, and not yet the subjectum.’ We designate his ‘subjectus’ as subject
to power and ‘subjectum’ as subject of power.
13. M. Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. P. Rabinow, vol. 3, Essential Works
of Foucault, 1954–1984 (New York: New Press, 1997), 81.
14. Ibid., 87.
15. Ibid., 114.
16. Balibar, “Citizen Subject,” 55.
17. This understanding comes first from Foucault’s conceptualization of the ar-
rangements (discourses, laws, regulations, physical spaces, etc.) that organize and
configure processes of subjectivation. This conceptualization has been advanced in
different and not necessarily consistent ways in Deleuze’s conception of assemblages.
G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); G.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). It is also
captured in understandings of actor-network. B. Latour, Reassembling the Social: An
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); J. Law,
After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Routledge, 2004). It is akin to
what other scholars in science and technology studies more generally refer to as soci-
otechnical arrangements. We understand the human body as not a given but a socially
produced yet material body adjusted to the sociotechnical arrangements in which it
lives. This we consider to be consistent with J. Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discur-
sive Limits of “Sex” (London: Routledge, 1993).
18. Balibar, “Citizen Subject,” 53.
19. Ibid., 45.
20. M. Poster, “Digital Networks and Citizenship,” Proceedings of Modern Language
Association of America (PMLA) 117, no. 1 (2002), 99.
21. Ibid., 99–100.
22. These symbolic dates refer to the following inscriptions: 1689, the passage of the
Bill of Rights in England; 1776, the Declaration of Independence in the United States;
1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Citizens and Men in France; 1835, the Act of
Parliament in Britain; and 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
23. K. Zivi, Making Rights Claims: A Practice of Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Ox-




27. J. Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics,” in Reading
Rancière, ed. P. Bowman and R. Stamp (New York: Continuum, 2011).
28. R. R. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment: Or Why We Call Our Age the Information Age,
New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2015), 5.
29. L. DeNardis, “Hidden Levers of Internet Control,” Information, Communication &
Society 15 (2012). DeNardis provides a useful description of its complexity and layers
as objects of control. For a description of cyberspace as a ‘medium’ that includes all of
these elements that we have described as constituting the Internet, see M. Dodge and
R. Kitchin, Mapping Cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2001).
30. Butler, Bodies That Matter; D. J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Rein-
vention of Nature (London: Free Association, 1991). We follow Butler and Haraway in
considering bodies as inherently social and not prior to their socialization. For us,
collective, technological, and biological bodies are all social bodies.
31. Adrian Mackenzie describes cyberspace as a condition of wirelessness. He says,
‘Wirelessness designates an experience trending toward entanglements with things,
objects, gadgets, infrastructures, and services, and imbued with indistinct sensations
and practices of network-associated change. Wirelessness affects how people arrive,
depart, and inhabit places, how they relate to others, and indeed, how they embody
change.’ A. Mackenzie, Wirelessness: Radical Empiricism in Network Cultures (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 5.
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Chapter 242
32. M. Neale, William Gibson: No Maps for These Territories (Canada: Docurama,
2000), documentary.
33. F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. K. Ansell-Pearson, trans. C. Diethe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ii, §12.
34. For an excellent account, see J. E. Cohen, “Cyberspace as/and Space,” Columbia
Law Review 107, no. 1 (2007).
35. J. P. Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic
Frontier Foundation, 8 February 1996 [accessed 11 July 2014], http://bit.ly/1r41WqG.







43. L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic, 2006).
44. Ibid., 84.
45. Ibid., 93.
46. J. E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday
Practice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012); R. Deibert, Black Code: Inside the
Battle for Cyberspace (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013).
47. Cohen, “Cyberspace as/and Space,” 217–18.
48. Ibid., 213. However, there are many examples of scholars who undertake empir-
ical studies of Internet users and argue that the online and offline, or the real and
virtual, are related rather than isolated; see, for example, D. Miller, Tales from Facebook
(Cambridge: Polity, 2011). See also Briguglio’s discussion of Maltese protests that in-
volved social networks, recruitment and mobilization strategies, and activism that
were at once digital and physical. M. Briguglio, “Digital Activism, Physical Activism,”
Contention 6, no. 1 (2018).
49. Cohen, “Cyberspace as/and Space,” 225.
50. Ibid., 255.
51. R. Ford, “Against Cyberspace,” in The Place of Law, ed. A. Sarat, et al. (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 154.
52. Ibid., 158.
53. Ibid., 177.
54. J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 7.
55. Lyotard was drawing from L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed.,
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1958), and J. L. Austin, How to Do
Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
56. The debate over Bourdieu’s contribution is vast, and his influence on our collec-
tive work is deep, but clearly his book Distinction has been most influential. P. Bour-
dieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1987).
57. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 6.
58. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women. The inspiration for Haraway was Nor-
bert Wiener’s understanding of cybernetics as the domain of human-machine fusion.
N. Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 2nd ed. (London:
Sphere, 1968); N. Wiener, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and
the Machine (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1948).
59. This is an understanding advanced by scholars in the social studies of science
who argue against distinctions between humans and technologies and nature and
society. For example, it echoes what some scholars refer to as postsocial relations
mediated by objects, technologies, and data, as defined by K. Knorr Cetina and U.
Bruegger, “Traders’ Engagement with Markets: A Postsocial Relationship,” Theory,
Culture & Society 19, nos. 5/6 (2002).
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Citizens and Cyberspace 43
60. Deibert, Black Code.
61. G. Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
62. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage,
1979).
63. M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, ed. C. Gordon (Birmingham: Harvester Wheat-
sheaf, 1980).
64. G. Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” in Negotiations (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1990).
65. G. Deleuze, “Control and Becoming,” in Negotiations (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 174.
66. Ibid.






73. Deleuze, “Control and Becoming,” 175.
74. Similarly, Galloway has also drawn from this short text of Deleuze to explore
protocols of the Internet as modes of control. He argues that ‘with the advent of digital
computing, the term [“protocol”] has taken on a slightly different meaning. Now,
protocols refer specifically to standards governing the implementation of specific tech-
nologies. Like their diplomatic predecessors, computer protocols establish the essen-
tial points necessary to enact an agreed-upon standard of action.’ A. R. Galloway,
Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 7.
75. Almost half a century ago Lefebvre was precisely concerned about the dualistic
separation of physical space from nonphysical space. His analysis of the three ways of
making space has been widely discussed, and we will not rehearse it here. H. Lefebv-
re, The Production of Space (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991).
76. E. W. Soja, Thirdspace (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1996); C. Collinge, “The Différ-
ance between Society and Space: Nested Scales and the Returns of Spatial Fetishism,”
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 23 (2005); C. Collinge, “Flat Ontology
and the Deconstruction of Scale: A Response to Marston, Jones and Woodward,”
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31 (2006). Also see J. Allen, “Three
Spaces of Power: Territory, Networks, Plus a Topological Twist in the Tale of Domina-
tion and Authority,” Journal of Power 2 (2009).
77. We are drawing from E. C. Relph, Place and Placelessness (n.p.: Pion, 1976); Y.-F.
Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2001); D. B. Massey, For Space (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005).
78. This reminds us also what F. Braudel, On History, trans. S. Matthews (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980) called three modes of experiencing time, of which
longue durée was one.
79. Among those who write about cyberspace are Cohen and Rodgers, who have
taken up this conception of space inspired by Lefebvre, The Production of Space. Cohen,
Configuring the Networked Self, chap. 2, and J. Rodgers, Spatializing International Politics:
Analysing Activism on the Internet (London: Routledge, 2003), chap. 1.
80. In his study of geek culture, Chris Kelty argues that their formation as a public
is guided by a moral imaginary of the Internet as well as the heterogeneous infrastruc-
ture of the Internet, which constitutes and constrains their ability to ‘become public’.
In this regard, he describes geek culture as ‘recursive’ to capture the interrelation
between imaginaries and technologies. C. M. Kelty, Two Bits: The Cultural Significance
of Free Software (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
81. We have limited our description of these acts to ‘demonstration’ and ‘protest’ to
indicate the contested terrain of naming that followed these acts, which ranged from
revolution to rebellion to uprisings and riots. Here we are not concerned with the
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Chapter 244
effects of these acts; we want to discuss their relation to the Internet and how to think
about cyberspace.
82. By using the term ‘choreographed’ we are following Paulo Gerbaudo, Tweets
and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism (London: Pluto, 2012).
83. Most scholars have also followed this unfortunate trend of not differentiating
open Internet platforms, such as independently run websites, and closed platforms.
An exception is C. Fuchs, Digital Labour and Karl Marx (London: Routledge, 2014).
84. See, for example, Dagi’s discussion of the massive opposition waged against the
government in Turkey against the Gezi protests. They argue that social media did not
trigger the Gezi Park protests but served as a channel to express the suppression of
rights by an authoritarian government. In this way, social media is argued to have had
a magnifying effect. I. Dagi, “The Politics of Protest and Repression in the Digital Age:
Turkey During and after the Gezi Park Protests,” in Information Politics, Protests, and




87. Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets.
88. S. Banerjee, “Social Media and the Transformation of Indian Politics in the 2014
Elections,” in Information Politics, Protests, and Human Rights in the Digital Age, ed. M.
Monshipouri (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
89. Briguglio, “Digital Activism, Physical Activism.”
90. C. C. Radsch, Cyberactivism and Citizen Journalism in Egypt: Digital Dissidence and
Political Change (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).
91. M. Monshipouri and S. Mokhtari, “Conclusion: The Quest for Human Rights in
the Digital Age: How It Has Changed and the Struggle Ahead,” in Information Politics,
Protests, and Human Rights in the Digital Age, ed. M. Monshipouri (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2016).
92. Ibid., 12.
93. Lessig, Code, 298.
94. We are using smooth and striated space in the same way as G. Deleuze and F.
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980),
372–82. See also M. Nunes, “Virtual Topographies: Smooth and Striated Cyberspace,”
in Cyberspace Textuality: Computer Technology and Literary Theory, ed. M.-L. Ryan
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
45
THREE
Speech Acts and Digital Acts
Making rights claims, we have proposed, involves enacting ourselves as
citizen subjects through legal, performative, and imaginary forces. To put
it differently, we have suggested that making rights claims involves
bringing citizens into being legally, performatively, and imaginatively.
We discuss in this chapter how rights claims made through the Internet
are digital acts that bring digital citizens into being as subjects to power
and subjects of power. If indeed we have defined cyberspace as a space of
relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet, how do
digital acts bring cyberspace into being? We are not convinced by the
dominant view that cyberspace exists separately and independently from
so-called real space or the acts of citizen subjects. Cyberspace introduces
at least two complexities. First, digital acts traverse borders, boundaries,
and jurisdictions much more speedily and imperceptibly through the
Internet.1 The resulting cyberspace is a mesh of national borders and
involves a multiplicity of legal orders. When a citizen of a state makes an
observation about, say, an athlete who is competing in a competition in
another state, whether this act is classified ‘racist’ or ‘misogynist’ will
involve multiple borders and legal orders that this speech act has tra-
versed. This traversing of acts produces considerable complexities in be-
coming digital citizens. Second, we need to specify to what extent certain
rights claimed by digital acts are classical rights (e.g., freedom of speech),
to what extent they are analogous to classical rights (e.g., anonymity),
and to what extent they are new (e.g., the right to be forgotten). If indeed
digital acts in control societies produce these complexities and bring into
being both the subject and cyberspace, then how do we understand digi-
tal acts? To address that question, we step back in this chapter to develop
a critical discussion of speech acts as a way of conceiving digital acts. This
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discussion then frames the core chapters of this book, which are orga-
nized around digital acts that make rights claims possible.
SPEECH ACTS
There is a crucial if not fundamental relationship between the speaking
subject and the citizen subject. Yet theorizing the speaking subject is any-
thing but straightforward, and this is further complicated by speech
through the Internet: Blogs, comments, messages, and tweets are new
conventions of speech acts that have not only become more numerous
but also brought about fundamental changes in how we do things with
words. The speaking subject has moved to the centre of debates over the
Internet and how acting through the Internet creates cyberspace is now a
question concerning technology, international law, and politics.2 The per-
missibility, legality, legitimacy, privacy, security, and anonymity of
things said and done and whether they are sayable or doable are among
the major debates of our times. Already, considerable scholarly work has
been produced, especially on freedom of speech through the Internet,
and it is beyond the task of this book to even try to attempt an outline.3
Moreover, our concern with the Internet is not the speaking subject as
such but how making rights claims brings citizen subjects into being.
How do digital acts bring citizen subjects into being? Does the Internet
introduce a radical difference for understanding citizen subjects? Does
the language of the Internet—code—work like natural language? To ad-
dress these questions and to characterize digital acts, speech acts theory,
developed in the twentieth century, provides our starting point. To antic-
ipate our argument, many of the complexities that arise about acting and
speaking through the Internet are in fact complexities of speech acts as
such. To address the complexities of enacting ourselves through the
Internet, we will need to develop an appreciation of the complexities of
enacting ourselves as citizen subjects, legally, performatively, and imagi-
natively. Then we will need to consider what, if any, difference the Inter-
net makes and the properties of the space that acting through the Internet
creates—cyberspace.
We mentioned previously that François Lyotard had already argued
that the emerging Internet was a space of language games.4 He had ob-
served that computer networks were altering the way knowledge was
produced, disseminated, and exchanged. He proposed understanding
these language games constituted by performative utterances as strategic
moves. Lyotard drew on Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in his later work
famously insisted that we must understand language as a human activity
rather than as code, which came to be known as ordinary language phi-
losophy.5 What that meant was to investigate what people are doing with
language, with an emphasis on doing, and that this ought to be the cen-
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tral focus of philosophy. To understand language as activity rather than
code meant to investigate how people do things with words in everyday
language and life. This was the object of J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things
with Words.6 We have already expressed some scepticism in chapter 2
about arguments treating code as speech.7 Clearly, on the debate between
ordinary language philosophy’s focus on language as an activity and
analytic philosophy’s focus on language as code, we favour the view of
language as a social activity. That choice rests on the idea that how peo-
ple do things with words (or code) is much more creative and inventive
than a conception of speaking subjects following rules. If we work with
the idea of speaking subjects following rules, we fail to recognize the
practical creativity and inventiveness of people in action with language.
Although a speech act for Austin often involves doing things with
words, he is critical of the dominant view that treats a speech act as a
description. Austin designates this descriptive element of speech acts as
constatives. When we use statements such as ‘I am typing,’ I am describ-
ing what I am doing. It is a constative speech act. It describes a state of
affairs; it makes a truth claim; and it can be verified or falsified. As a
constative speech act, it is a statement that signifies a meaning. By
contrast, when a statement either warns about something or urges some-
one to do something, it moves from being a statement to being an utter-
ance. It accomplishes an act by its force. Austin says that there are many
verbs in the English language that can be classified according to these
effects of meaning and force. Austin uses three connectives to classify
speech acts: ‘of’, ‘in’, and ‘by’. For ‘of’, Austin says: the act of saying
something is a locutionary act. This is a speech act whose meaning calls
forth a truth versus false distinction and provokes verification or falsifica-
tion. The effect or consequence of a locutionary act—a constative—is to
produce or fail to produce a meaningful description of a state of affairs.
For ‘in’, as in saying something we may be doing something, Austin says
it produces an illocutionary act. This is a speech act whose force creates a
potential effect in a state of affairs that it seeks to describe. What it invokes
is not verification or falsification but whether there is an uptake. To put it
another way, whether an utterance is successful (felicitous) or unsuccess-
ful (infelicitous) is determined by its force.8 For example, in saying, ‘I am
writing my will,’ I am indicating that I am bequeathing. Although my
speech act places me under an obligation, I have not done anything yet.
In saying something, I have brought forth—performative—conditions for
something to happen. Finally, doing something by saying something is a
perlocutionary act. This is a speech act that must have an effect to be
actualized. Like an illocutionary act, a perlocutionary act invokes an eval-
uation along felicitous or infelicitous lines rather than true or false. By
saying that ‘I am typing gibberish’ (when you are anticipating otherwise),
I may have annoyed you. (Perhaps I am under coercion to give a false
statement.) By saying something, I have accomplished something. Thus,
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‘of’ saying something has meaning (locutionary acts), whereas ‘in’ or ‘by’
saying something has force (illocutionary and perlocutionary acts).
The crucial insight here is that these distinctions between meaning
and force, between statement and utterance, and between constative and
performative are key to understanding how speech that acts is different
from speech that describes. Austin gives examples of illocutionary acts,
such as betting, bequeathing, warning, promising, and so on, and exam-
ples of the perlocutionary acts, such as persuading, annoying, thrilling,
bullying, frightening, wounding, and so on.9 By advancing the idea that
speech is not only a description (constative) but also an act (performa-
tive), Austin ushers in a radically different way of thinking about not
only speaking and writing but also doing things in or by speaking and
writing.
The brief sketch we have provided does not even skim the complex-
ities that Austin has given rise to, and it is not our aim to go further into
speech acts. We need to highlight a few points here to show how Austin
helps us articulate an adequate conception of digital acts. First, as far as
we are concerned, Austin is more interested in deeds than words, or,
more precisely, he is interested in deeds that words perform. He observes
that words will never be enough to accomplish an act, despite recogniz-
ing that without words at some stage it is difficult to see how any act can
be accomplished.10 So although his examples are from speech, his interest
is how words perform acts: ‘to say something is to do something; or in
which by saying or in saying something we are doing something’.11 It is
perhaps unfortunate that his work is considered to be about ‘speech acts’,
but quite emphatically we consider Austin to be theorizing speech that
acts. Second, Austin recognizes that nonverbal forms of speech such as
bodily gestures and movements as well as visual and aural forms are
almost always involved in the accomplishment of an act, especially in a
perlocutionary act. So Austin may not mention bodies much if at all, but
bodies and their movements are implicit in speech that acts. To put it
differently, speech or writing cannot act without bodies. Third, although
almost all of Austin’s examples are in the first person, he is not ena-
moured by the speaking sovereign subject who is the master of her
speech situation. On the contrary, as the illocutionary and perlocutionary
acts indicate, in acting there are always infelicitous situations. As Cavell
writes, Austin recognizes that acts will also occur ‘unintentionally, un-
willingly, involuntarily, insincerely, unthinkingly, inadvertently, heed-
lessly, carelessly, under duress, under the influence, out of contempt, out
of pity, by mistake, by accident [and so on].’12 To put it differently, Aus-
tin’s concern with infelicitous is not a regret on his part but a recognition
that speech does not only act, it also can fail to act or fail to act in ways
anticipated.
We read Austin as trying to understand what he calls ‘total speech
situations’, where bodies, words, images, sounds, and smells combine to
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accomplish an act.13 For Austin, investigating an act would require ‘pro-
longed fieldwork’, though he admits that’s not what he is doing.14 But
focusing on conventions of, in, and by which we act clears the ground for
such investigations. For Austin, both the meaning of statements and force
of utterances become possible by their appropriateness to the situation,
which means an understanding of conventions governing a speech act
situation. In chapter 2 we characterized conventions broadly as sociotech-
nical arrangements that embody norms, values, affects, laws, ideologies,
and technologies. To judge the situation, the speaking subject must
understand and perform in relation to the conventions governing what is
sayable and doable in that place and time. The acting subject who speaks
will have an understanding of not only the situation but also the appro-
priateness of what can and must be said and not said in that situation.15
For this reason Bourdieu, also discussing Austin, insists that words them-
selves do not have inherent meaning or force but acquire them in appropri-
ate situations. For Bourdieu, speech acts are social acts and draw their
force, illocutionary force if you like, not from linguistic forms that govern
them but from social conventions that make them possible. The things
which render a subject capable of accomplishing an act are precisely the
social conventions that guarantee its institution.16 This is not to deny the
power of words. But such power is nothing other than the delegated
power of the speaker as a social subject.17 This is, of course, another way
of saying that a speech act is always a social act and the speaking subject
a social subject. But do speaking subjects merely follow conventions (as
Bourdieu seems to think)? The key issue in speech acts becomes whether,
and if so to what extent, what is sayable and doable follows or exceeds
social conventions that govern a situation.
Austin is quite subtle on this point, but Judith Butler picks it up in a
creative way. For Austin, a general consideration is that although a
speaking subject will rely on conventions to ascertain the meaning and
force of his or her speech act, neither the meaning nor its force will ever
be controllable by him or her. So although a convention is a necessary
condition of an act, almost equally it is also a necessary condition of its
misfire—one of the ‘ills that all action is heir to’.18 That it requires con-
ventions to accomplish an act and that it also provokes their transgres-
sion turns out to be a significant discovery of Austin. Butler makes use of
this in her theorizing of gender by drawing our attention to citation,
repetition, and resignification of a convention and how these produce
subjects of both submission and subversion. If a convention is to be cited
to accomplish an act, a repetition of certain norms will be necessary. Yet
each repetition will bring new circumstances to bear on the act, so much
so that it is a resignification—a new deployment of a convention.19 But
Austin reserves the transgression, or subversion if you like, of a conven-
tion only for perlocutionary acts.20 Although illocutionary acts will cite
and iterate conventions to enact their performative force, perlocutionary
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acts will derive their force from the unconventional, undecidable, and
unpredictable effects (in Butler’s sense of resignification). Contra Bour-
dieu, this is exactly where Butler locates the agency of the subject not as a
sovereign subject but a speaking subject who becomes responsible for
what he or she cites, repeats, and resignifies.21 Thus, as opposed to locu-
tionary and illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts will rupture conven-
tions, and their performative force will derive from this rupture. Follow-
ing Derrida on this, Butler says: ‘The force of the performative is thus not
inherited from prior usage, but issues forth precisely from its break with
any and all prior usage. That break, that force of rupture, is the force of
the performative, beyond all question of truth or meaning.’22 For political
subjectivity, ‘performativity can work in precisely such counter-hege-
monic ways. That moment in which a speech act without prior authoriza-
tion nevertheless assumes authorization in the course of its performance
may anticipate and instate altered contexts for its future reception.’23 To
conceive rupture as a systemic or total upheaval would be futile. Rather,
rupture is a moment where the future breaks through into the present.24
It is that moment where it becomes possible to do something different in
or by saying something different.
We have described cyberspace as a space of relations between and
among bodies acting through the Internet. We have discussed that for
Austin, speech acts mean that ‘in’ and ‘by’ saying something, we are
doing something. By advancing the idea that speech is not only a descrip-
tion (constative) but also an act (performative), Austin ushered in a radi-
cally different way of thinking about not only speaking but also doing
things in or by speaking. As Felman writes, Austin ‘[demystified] . . . the
illusion upheld by the history of philosophy according to which the only
thing at stake in language is its “truth” or “falsity”’.25 For Felman
thought that Austin eradicated the difference between saying and do-
ing.26 For Austin, even constative speech acts that are statements describ-
ing a state of affairs cannot remain without effects. It is in this sense that
Austin makes us think about ourselves as those beings who always know
how to do things with words, even though our chances of accomplishing
things we set out to do remain precarious because our words will occa-
sionally (perhaps more so than we would like) misfire and accomplish
things we did not intend.
But what about saying something in or by doing something? Or, to
put it differently, what about saying something in or by doing things?
This question may appear redundant since Austin is said to have erased
the difference between saying and doing. But Austin never considers
speech situations where things perform words. It was Bruno Latour who
raised the question of how we may accomplish words in or by doing
things—hence reversing Austin’s phrasing.27 For Latour, without men-
tioning Austin, it was important to recognize that actions can accomplish
words.28
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This reversal enables us to address a question we have not yet articu-
lated. It is the question of acting bodies. Now Austin does not explain
what is an action that accomplishes an act. He implicitly recognizes that
action is a bodily movement that accomplishes something, but he does
not explicitly recognize that to perform an act involves bodily move-
ments. We may raise our hand, for example, in a way to indicate we are
taking an oath—an act of promising. Here, raising a hand is an action, but
the conventions governing the situation indicate that this action is per-
forming an act of promise. An action is a bodily movement that accom-
plishes something. Strangely, Austin says to perform illocutionary acts
does not require action. This is because the illocutionary force of an act
consists in its potential. When I say ‘I promise’, I indicate that in saying so
I commit myself to doing something. But this act of commitment is yet
unfulfilled, and its completion is not guaranteed because I have not ful-
filled it yet. What I have done is place myself under an obligation. By
contrast, the accomplishment of a perlocutionary act requires action. Do-
ing something means performing an action. This is strange because, as
Butler says, ‘when one declares that one is a homosexual, the declaration
is the performative act—not the homosexuality, unless we want to claim
that homosexuality is itself nothing but a kind of declaration, which
would be an odd move to make.’29 So the question of the body should
make us think about the difference between speech and bodies, acts and
action.
It is just unconvincing that illocutionary acts will not require actions
and that perlocutionary acts will. If we return to the example of an act of
promising, where we raised our hand by taking an oath, the situation
there may have not required words at all but simply raising hands. Simi-
larly, in certain situations we may perform an act of promising simply by
an action of nodding heads, which will indicate a promise. Austin, in
other words, despite his cautions, is unable to consider the possibility of
saying something in or by doing something or how to do words with
things.
A reason Austin is perhaps compelled to make this distinction be-
tween illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (former requiring no action
and latter requiring it) is a result of his examples, which (a) are exclusive-
ly linguistic and (b) involve the first person. Austin is aware of both
limitations.
We said that the idea of a performative utterance was that it was to be
(or to be included as a part of) the performance of an action. Actions
can only be performed by persons, and obviously in our cases the
utterer must be the performer: hence our justifiable feeling—which we
wrongly cast into purely grammatical mould—in favour of the ‘first
person’, who must come in, being mentioned or referred to; moreover,
if the utterer is acting, he must be doing something—hence our per-
haps ill-expressed favouring of the grammatical present and grammati-
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cal active of the verb. There is something which is at the moment of
uttering being done by the person uttering.30
Although Austin concedes that ‘there is something which is at the moment
of uttering being done by the person uttering’, he does not consider a moment
where something being done may constitute uttering something.31 Nor
does he consider what happens when we move from the first person to
the second and third—from individual to collective bodies. There is then
really no reason to assume that an act can be accomplished without bod-
ies in action, whether illocutionary or perlocutionary.
It was Shoshana Felman who brilliantly teased out the implications of
Austin’s understanding of action, body, and acts.32 Felman says the act
calls into question the difference between language and the body: ‘the
act, an enigmatic and problematic production of the speaking body, de-
stroys from its inception the metaphysical dichotomy between the do-
main of the “mental” and the domain of the “physical,” breaks down the
opposition between body and spirit, between matter and language’.33
Although we are inspired by this reading of Austin, it is actually a resig-
nification of Austin rather than a description.
The importance of recognizing that we know how to do not only
things with words but also words with things will become apparent
soon, when we further specify digital acts. When we develop the idea in
more detail, that it is the relations between and among bodies acting
through the Internet that brings cyberspace into being, it will become
apparent that we need to understand numerous digital actions. If for
Felman ‘the scandal [of the body] consists in the fact that the act cannot
know what it is doing’, we need to recognize here that when bodies act
through the Internet, they are not only doing by speaking but also speak-
ing by doing. This is the principal reason why we need to investigate not
only things done in or by speaking through the Internet but also things
said in or by doing things through the Internet.34
‘I, WE, THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO’
We have provided a sketch of basic issues concerning speech acts as
characterized by Austin and as repeated, cited, iterated, and resignified
by his recent interlocutors. Let us provide a description of what we gather
from Austin, Bourdieu, Butler, Derrida, Felman, and Latour for resignify-
ing acts for our purposes. Since we act of, in, and by saying something,
language calls us into being as speaking subjects of acts. To be addressed
by and addressing others in language is a social act (Bourdieu). It in-
volves our bodies not as always already given but as responsive agents
(Butler). It involves our subjectivity (the way in which we understand our
bodies and their embeddedness with others through language) not as
always already given but as responsible agents (Butler). Being responsive
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means being called on by others and to call on others. We accomplish acts
through conventions. Yet we cannot control or master our responsive-
ness: how we cite, iterate, and resignify conventions. We fail. This is the
scandal of the body (Felman). This is the scandal of submission. Yet we
make choices on what to cite, how to iterate, and where to repeat. We
perform our responsibility in resignifying the conventions by which to
act. This creates the space for agency. It is also the time of rupture by
which conventions are deconstructed by performative force (Derrida).
This creates the space for subversion (Butler). We succeed. There are
distinctions between speech acts and actions (Butler). We not only in or
by saying something do things but also in or by doing things say some-
thing (Latour).
So far, so good. But Austin and his interlocutors do not speak about
citizen subjects making rights claims. Butler comes closest because she is
interested in articulating a ‘politics of the performative’, but her primary
concern is not the citizen subject who claims ‘I, we, they have a right to’.
We noted in chapter 2 that we will return to the argument that making
rights claims involves in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, they have a right
to’. We can now add that citizen subjects who make such claims should
not be conflated with the rights-bearing subject who already exists and
whose claim is to already existing rights. On the contrary, citizen subjects
performatively come into being in or by the act of saying and doing
something—whether through words, images, or other things—and
through performing the contradictions inherent in becoming citizens.
To understand citizen subjects who make rights claims by saying and
doing ‘I, we, they have a right to’, we are moving from the first person to
the second and the third, from the individual to the collective. We need to
consider two additional forces that make acts possible. The two forces are
the force of the law and the force of the imaginary. Arguably, various
examples that Austin provides address the force of law. Austin calls two
classes of speech acts as judgements and decisions, and regarding judge-
ments, most of his examples are court verdicts. Yet we still think that the
performative force of a convention’s legality is different enough that the
force of law should be considered as a separate force. Breaking a conven-
tion will have significantly different effects, depending on whether that
convention is constituted as legal or illegal. This is not to say that Austin
does not provide room for legality, but it is to say that it requires analyti-
cal separation.
Similarly, the force of the imaginary is undeniably a significant force
in making an act possible, which Austin does not consider.35 We use the
term ‘imaginary’ as originally used by Cornelius Castoriadis, who asks a
seemingly simple and yet quite a challenging question: What holds to-
gether any given thing called a society? To put it differently, what gives a
society its apparent cohesion, unity, and organization?36 To address that
question, Castoriadis says that we ought to understand the institution of
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society. The institution does not mean organizations but conventions by
which individuals conduct themselves. The institution of society requires
norms, values, language, tools, procedures, and methods of dealing with
relations and differentiations—in short, conventions. This institution re-
quires coercion and sanctions as well as support, adherence, legitimacy,
belief, and consensus. It cultivates individuals who know how to nego-
tiate these sanctions and adherences. The institution of society through
which individuals conduct themselves through conventions would be
impossible without what Castoriadis calls ‘social imaginaries’. These in-
clude spirits, gods, God, polis, citizen, nation, state, party, commodity,
money, capital, interest, taboo, virtue, sin, and so forth. These are imagi-
naries not because they fail to correspond to concrete and specific experi-
ences or things but because they require acts of imagination. They are
social because they are instituted and maintained by impersonal and
anonymous collectives. Being both social and imaginary, these institute
society as coherent and unified yet always incoherent and fragmented.
How each society deals with this tension constitutes its politics. Castoria-
dis thinks that this tension is especially acute in democracy as it cultivates
an individual who remains at home with this tension. This individual is
autonomous not because it is separate or independent from society but
because its product retains the capability to question its own institution.
Castoriadis says that this new type of being is capable of calling into
question the very laws of its existence and has created the possibility of
both deliberation and political action. The imaginary institution of society
for Castoriadis is much more complex than we depict it here, but what
we want to recognize is that not only does the imaginary institution of
society require making and breaking conventions, but these conventions
can be sustained only through the force of the imaginary: myths, stories,
and values that inhabit people and their sense of the world.37 In fact,
what we describe as the ‘call’ to act would be impossible without the
force of the imaginary. Imaginaries sustain conventions which, as we
defined in chapter 2, go beyond language to include sociotechnical ar-
rangements that are part of the relations of cyberspace. This is a specifica-
tion advanced in STS, which accounts for the workings of science and
technology in the performance of imaginaries.38 It is through collective
imaginaries that the possibilities of science and technology and different
visions of society are performed.39 Although some achieve dominance
and become forceful visions, such as those advanced by powerful state
and non-state actors, different imaginaries can and do take shape and
acquire force at myriad scales.40 There is understandably an overlap
among legal, performative, and imaginary forces of acts, but separating
them analytically allows us to emphasize their distinct qualities.
Our understanding of how the citizen subject comes into being
through enacting herself legally, performatively, and imaginatively
should indicate that the citizen subject is both a result and an effect of
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making claims about rights that may or may not yet exist. By making
rights claims in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, they have a right to’,
people enact themselves as citizen subjects. To put it our way, it is by
making rights claims by the forces of legality, performativity, and imagi-
nary that we enact and bring ourselves into being as citizen subjects.
Yet we still must demonstrate specifically how the citizen subject as a
speaking subject is called into making rights claims. To do this, we need
to return to Austin briefly and then show how his classification of speech
acts requires expansion to understand citizen subjects making rights
claims in or by saying and doing something. Austin considers five classes
of acts with performative force: judgements, decisions, commitments, ac-
knowledgements, and clarifications. (1) There are judgements, such as
acquitting, convicting, measuring, characterizing, ranking, calculating,
and placing. These are typified by giving a verdict. As we mentioned
previously, we would separate legal judgements from practical judge-
ments and value judgements. (2) There are decisions, such as appointing,
excommunicating, sentencing, nominating, resigning, bequeathing,
pleading, and pardoning. These are typified by exercising power, influ-
ence, and authority. (3) There are commitments, such as guaranteeing,
pledging, consenting, espousing, embracing, and proposing. Promising
or undertaking to commit to doing something typifies these. These also
include declarations or announcements of intention. (4) There are ac-
knowledgements, such as apologizing, congratulating, commending,
cursing, and challenging. They are typified by action that involves social-
ly oriented and evaluated expression. (5) There are clarifications, such as
conceding, illustrating, assuming, postulating, or replying. They are typ-
ified by the declarations ‘I argue’, ‘I postulate’.
This classification of acts is clearly useful for developing our view on
acts of citizen subjects. But it should also be clear that Austin (and his
interlocutors) do not pay enough, if any, attention to the subject who thus
speaks ‘I, we, or they have a right to’. What kinds of acts are those that
make rights claims? They are not judgements, decisions, commitments,
acknowledgements, or clarifications. They are claims. When Karen Zivi
argues for a performative approach to understanding rights, she suggests
that ‘it means asking questions about what we are doing together when
we say we have rights, about the realities we create and the relationships
we engender through the making of rights claims, and about the effects
that our utterances may have, intended or otherwise, on both ourselves
and others.’41 This, in turn, for Zivi, requires ‘appreciating the extent to
which our claims both reference and reiterate social conventions and
norms, and yet have forces and effects that exceed them.’42 Thus, she
argues
that we treat claims such as ‘I have a right to privacy’ or ‘We have a
right to health care’ as performative utterances, asking not just whether
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the particular claim corresponds to law or morality as if it were simply
a constative utterance but also what it is a speaker does in or by making
a particular claim. We need to analyze rights claiming, in other words,
as an illocutionary and a perlocutionary activity.43
Yet, ironically, claiming as a class of speech acts is not on Austin’s list.
We have already suggested as a first move to expand the forces that
make speech acts possible to include not only performativity but also
legality and imaginary. Having proposed that, we now name the class of
acts that involves ‘making rights claims’ as ‘claims’. In other words, we
are proposing to add a new class of acts to Austin’s: claims. People mak-
ing rights claims in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, they have a right to’
enact themselves as citizen subjects. It is imperative to reflect further on
how in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, or they have a right to’ produces a
citizen subject.
The citizen subject, we have argued, is both a submissive and subver-
sive speaking and doing subject. How does ‘I, we, or they have a right to’
function as a claim? First, it places the citizen subject under conventions
that constitute callings on him or her. Making rights claims in or by
saying ‘I, we, or they have a right to’, the citizen subject recognizes—
explicitly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—that he or she acts
under certain conventions. Saying ‘I have a right to’ is possible only
within a convention from which it derives its legal, performative, or
imaginary force. This is essentially an act of submission.44
Yet, and second, the utterance ‘I, we, or they have a right to’ also
provokes closings or openings. What we mean by this is that as a claim,
the utterance ‘have a right to’ places demands on the other to act in a
particular way. This can activate the force of the law, for example, when
citizen subjects claim that a right is being violated. Or it can mobilize a
performative force in or by breaking a convention. Or it can invoke an
imaginary force by appealing to a convention that is out of place or time.
This is the sense in which the rights of a subject are obligations on others
and the rights of others function as obligations on us. By virtue of the
legal, performative, or imaginary forces, ‘I, we, or they have a right to’
can provoke openings and closings as possibilities. For this reason, we
think of the relation among callings, openings, and closings as not se-
quential or separate but simultaneous and intertwined aspects of making
rights claims. The conversion between submission and subversion can be
instantaneous. In or by saying and doing something and making a rights
claim as a speaking citizen subject may have aimed at subversion of a
convention, yet it may well have functioned, as a misfire would, as an act
of submission to that convention. Or an act of obedience, for that matter.
How an act functions in making rights claims through callings, closings,
and openings and how a citizen subject is produced through these are
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ultimately matters of empirical research and cannot be elaborated only
theoretically.
If callings summon citizen subjects, they also provoke openings and
closings for making rights claims. We consider openings as those pos-
sibilities that create new ways of saying and doing rights. Openings are
those possibilities that enable the performance of previously unimagined
or unarticulated experiences of ways of being citizen subjects, a resignifi-
cation of being speaking and acting beings. Openings are possibilities
through which citizen subjects come into being. Closings, by contrast,
contract and reduce possibilities of becoming citizen subjects. We dis-
cussed previously the imaginary institution of society by Castoriadis. We
highlighted a basic tension to which he draws our attention between
conventions and their resignification. He also sees this tension playing
out as openings and closings. The principle of closure always directs
itself to maintaining the institution of society, while the principle of open-
ing constantly threatens its institution. The principle of closure intensifies
coercion and sanctions, while the principle of opening calls into question
their institution with imaginary significations.45 Our sense of openings
and closings draws on Castoriadis’s articulation of this tension as constit-
utive for the imaginary institution of society and subjects that it spawns.
To sum, by adding claims as a class of acts to Austin’s judgements,
decisions, commitments, acknowledgements, and clarifications, we have
identified making rights claims with ‘I, we, they have a right to’ as acts of
citizen subjects. We now must discuss how digital acts are a special case
of speech acts that we resignify in this chapter.
DIGITAL ACTS
Making rights claims, whether this is through the Internet, will occasion
callings, openings, and closings and will involve conventions and negoti-
ations among and between obedience, submission, and subversion. The
same issues are practically present in all speech acts. All speech acts
performed through the Internet—which we will refer to as digital acts—
such as blogging, messaging, emailing, tweeting, posting, liking, and
commenting can have the same qualities of being locutionary, illocution-
ary, and perlocutionary acts. Similarly, the felicity or infelicity of such
acts, whether speaking subjects have understood adequately the appro-
priateness of the situation in which they have spoken, and whether there
were misfires (an appropriate description for emails or tweets gone awry)
or effects in their performativity are not peculiar to digital acts. More-
over, one prevalent issue is whether subjects can control the effects of
their acts and, if so, to what extent, and another is how their acts exceed
their intentions. Acting through the Internet illustrates particularly well
the inoperability of the sovereign subject yet also his or her emergent
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agency. Finally, the perlocutionary force of digital acts through the Inter-
net and to what extent they rupture conventions are legal and political
issues. Thus making rights claims to privacy, anonymity, accessibility, or
the right to be forgotten all have the qualities of making rights claims
through digital acts
Yet making rights claims is possible through a class of acts—claims—
that, although related, is irreducible to one of the classes of speech acts
that Austin enumerates. The premise of this book is that the citizen sub-
ject acting through the Internet is the digital citizen and that this is a new
subject of politics who also acts through new conventions that not only
involve doing things with words but also doing words with things.
A complicating aspect of digital acts is that they involve computer
programming languages—code—which is similar to but distinct from
human languages. We mentioned in chapter 2 that we find the idea of
code as architecture proposed by Lessig as misleading. It conflates what
code is with what code does. Or, now using Austin, we suggest that in or
by saying and doing something with speech and code people produce
illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. If Lessig persists in using ‘archi-
tecture’ to describe the effects of code, then clearly, code is not architec-
ture. Rather, in or by using code, the architecture or the conventions of
the Internet are created. Nevertheless, we think the metaphor of architec-
ture is also misplaced, a point that is captured in Alexander Galloway’s
description of code as the creator of protocol.46 He argues that
a computer protocol is a set of recommendations and rules that outline
specific technical standards. The protocols that govern much of the
Internet are contained in what are called RFC (Request for Comments)
documents. Called “the primary documentation of the Internet,” these
technical memoranda detail the vast majority of standards and proto-
cols in use on the Internet today.47
But Galloway recovers a broader conception of protocol to include ‘any
type of correct or proper behavior within a specific system of conven-
tions.’48 It is the use of code to create conventions that gives code its
potent force in the age of computer networks.49 For Galloway, ‘now,
protocols refer specifically to standards governing the implementation of
specific technologies. Like their diplomatic predecessors, computer
protocols establish the essential points necessary to enact an agreed-upon
standard of action.’50 What is code, then? Arguing that computer lan-
guages and natural languages are similar, Galloway writes that ‘like the
natural languages, computer languages have a sophisticated syntax and
grammar. Like the natural languages, computer languages have specific
communities and cultures in which the language is spoken.’51 For Gallo-
way, then, code is a language. But unlike natural languages, it is a special
kind of language. He contends that ‘code is the only language that is execut-
able.’52 ‘So [for Galloway] code is the first language that actually does
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what it says—it is a machine for converting meaning into action.’53 With
Austin (and Wittgenstein), this conclusion comes as a major surprise to
us. As we have argued in this chapter, for Austin (and Wittgenstein)
language is an activity, and in or by saying something in language we do
something with it—we act. To put it differently, language is executable.54
There is no uniqueness to code in that regard, although while code is like
language, it is different. We think that difference is to be sought in its
effects and the conventions it creates through the Internet rather than in
its ostensible unique nature.55
To develop the difference that code makes for speech, let us recall here
the four political questions that acting through the Internet resignifies,
which we briefly discussed in chapter 2: anonymity, extensity, traceabil-
ity, and velocity. We can now say that these are effects of in or by saying
and doing something through the Internet. To put it differently, digital
acts through the Internet and the space that these acts create—cyber-
space—are marked by these effects and distinguish them from other
speech acts. If we consider briefly the question of anonymity, we may
begin to realize its immensity. For speech acts to have illocutionary or
perlocutionary effects, speakers do not have to identify themselves. Nor
would they need to necessarily locate themselves. Consider a demonstra-
tion in a public square. To perform it as a political act, people assemble,
sing, shout, clap, thump, and disassemble. Despite all the contemporary
surveillance technologies such as cameras, to identify each person in this
act is quite difficult. To maintain anonymity in squares and streets is still
a possibility, and the convention called ‘demonstration’ requires it. By
contrast, acting through the Internet has disrupted this convention. Of-
ten, digital acts give rise to a multiplicity of performative utterances that
want to and, more importantly, as we shall see, claim the right to remain
anonymous. But to remain anonymous on the Internet is a battle.56 Thus,
the political struggle over anonymity when one acts is among the defin-
ing struggles of our time. Similarly, digital acts introduce enormous ve-
locity to the performative force of utterances. Digital acts will not elimi-
nate distance (we understand distance here as not merely quantitative
but also a qualitative metric), but the speed with which digital acts can
reverberate is phenomenal. When we consider this along with extensity,
or the reach of digital acts, it becomes even more significant. Finally, the
transmission, recording, and storage of utterances of digital acts also
make them durable in unpredictable ways and amenable to tracing. It is
well-nigh impossible to perform digital acts without a trace; on the
contrary, often the force of a digital speech act draws its strength from the
traces that it leaves. As we said in chapter 2, each of these questions
raised by digital acts can arguably be found in other technologies of
speech acts—the telegraph, megaphone, radio, and telephone come to
mind immediately. But it is when taken together that we think digital acts
resignify these questions and combine to make them distinct from speech
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acts, in terms of both the conventions by which they become possible and
the effects that they produce.
We touched on a distinction between speech acts and action previous-
ly. We argued that to accomplish performative acts requires bodies in
action. To accomplish the performative force of speech requires perform-
ing an action or series of actions. To put it differently, we argued that we
not only do things with words but also do words with things. Is it the
same for digital acts? Do digital acts require acting bodies as speech acts
do? The answer is yes, but differently. Consider a total speech act situa-
tion. There will be conventions creating spaces for possible performative
utterances. There will be bodies to perform, witness, and enjoin those
utterances. There will be constative speech acts about the situation. There
will be illocutionary utterances. There will be perlocutionary utterances.
Some conventions will be cited, iterated, and repeated. Some conventions
will be resignified. Some will be broken. Each of these acts will come into
being through legal, performative, and imaginary forces. They will also
bring into being subjects who will act this way or that way. There will be
various actions to bring about these things if indeed we are imagining a
space of movement and performance. We say this is ‘more or less’ a total
speech act situation because depicting a ‘total’ speech act situation is
impossible. Yet this gives a fairly good description of what transpires in a
scene of speech acts. The important thing is to separate acts (locutionary,
illocutionary, perlocutionary), forces (legal, performative, imaginary),
conventions, actions, bodies, and spaces that their relations produce.
If we consider digital acts with this scene in mind rather than imagin-
ing a separate and independent cyberspace from an ostensibly real space,
we will begin to give a description of what conventions have arisen that
enable digital acts, what sorts of digital acts have become possible, what
kinds of actions make those acts performative, and what kinds of open-
ings and closings arise. Consider the conventions that have emerged
through the Internet that made possible new actions such as emailing,
blogging, coding, messaging, tagging, posting, and pirating. These con-
ventions include platforms such as Bitcoin, BitTorrent, Facebook, Gi-
tHub, Pirate Bay, Tor, WikiLeaks, and YouTube. These platforms have
come into being for various purposes: communicating, evading, collabo-
rating, networking, whistle-blowing, programming, or downloading.
Each of these platforms makes possible various actions: aggregating,
blogging, coding, downloading, emailing, filtering, firewalling, follow-
ing, friending, liking, mashing, messaging, mining, pirating, posting,
trending, tweeting, and uploading. Note that each of these may involve
words but not necessarily so: they can also involve citations involving
images and sounds. But they can also involve repetitions such as retweet-
ing, forwarding, and downloading; and they can involve resignifications
such as classifying and linking. To accomplish an act would require one
or more of these actions. Because to perform these actions is possible only
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through the Internet, digital acts would require them. What are digital
acts, then? When people perform digital acts in or by saying and doing
things through the Internet, they become digital subjects. When people
perform digital acts in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, they have a right to’,
they enact themselves as citizen subjects; they are making digital rights
claims.
We want to recognize digital rights claims as those made through the
Internet and through which people claim ‘I, we, or they have a right to’.
We do not yet want to give content to this claim separate from how
making digital rights claims has evolved over the past decade or so. But
for now, we are proposing that becoming digital citizens in cyberspace involves
making digital rights claims. Through digital acts and making rights claims,
digital citizen subjects are brought into being. Two issues to remember
here are the traversing of digital rights across multiple national borders
that invoke multiple legal orders and the transferability of rights from
classical to digital domains. Both issues create considerable complexities
for numerous struggles that are already occurring and which involve a
continuous relation between non-digital rights (i.e., civil, political, social,
cultural, economic, sexual, etc.) and digital rights (i.e., ownership, access,
privacy, anonymity, etc.).
Combined, these two issues raise one big question: Who is the subject
of digital rights? We pose this question not in the sense of subjects that
already exist as the bearers or holders of rights but as their claimants. The
difference is important. If we ask this question about the bearers of rights,
then we would be embroiled in a debate over whether digital rights are
human rights or citizenship rights. If not, then the question we must ask
is: Who are digital citizens? If their acts traverse national borders, surely,
they cannot be called citizens because we do not have transnational legal
arrangements—save the EU, whose legal scope and competence on citi-
zenship is limited by its derivative character. Arguably, human rights are
distributed across various regional conventions which certainly lack not
only scope and competence but also the force of law in protecting those
rights. Accordingly, most legislation that governs digital rights is enacted
by nation-states, and their scope and competence are applicable only
within their borders. To put it simply, although digital acts traverse bor-
ders, digital rights do not. This is where we believe thinking about digital
acts in terms of their legality, performativity, and imaginary is crucial
because there are international and transnational spaces in which digital
rights are being claimed that if not yet legally in force are nevertheless
emerging performatively and imaginatively. Yet, arguably, some emerg-
ing transnational and international laws governing cyberspace in turn are
having an effect on national legislations. To put it differently, the classical
argument about the relationship between human rights and citizenship
rights, that the former are norms and only the latter carry the force of law,
is not a helpful starting point. We are going to return to the question
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‘Who is the subject of digital rights?’ in chapter 7. Before we reach that
point, we need to demonstrate, in chapters 4, 5, and 6, how callings,
closings, and openings of cyberspace bring that subject—the digital citi-
zen—into being by examining various digital acts.
THE SEARCH FOR A METHOD
We mentioned that the way we approach the citizen subject is inspired by
a method Michel Foucault practiced, Gilles Deleuze elaborated, and
Étienne Balibar articulated. We have expanded it through the speech acts
theory of J. L. Austin and his interlocutors Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bour-
dieu, Shoshana Felman, Judith Butler, and Bruno Latour. We have further
expanded speech acts to digital acts by recognizing not only their perfor-
mative force (illocutionary and perlocutionary) but also their legal and
imaginary forces. We have then developed a concept—making rights
claims—that connects the figure of the citizen subject to acts. We devel-
oped this by first identifying a sixth class of acts as claims. This class of
acts, just as Austin would argue about his classes of acts, is not mutually
exclusive but simultaneous and overlapping with those articulated by
Austin. Clearly, investigating making digital rights claims in cyberspace
would involve all six classes of acts. What distinguishes the citizen sub-
ject is making rights claims in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, they have a
right to’. We consider this book as a contribution to laying the ground-
work for undertaking empirical investigations of digital acts, their princi-
ples, concepts, and methods concerning specifically making rights claims
in cyberspace as a question of the subject of digital rights.
For us, the most important proposition we have developed here is that
through making rights claims in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, they have
a right to’, people enact themselves as citizen subjects. By including all
persons in the claim (singular, plural, and third), we want to indicate that
making a claim never brings a singular subject into being but that a
subject is always already plural. For this reason, the citizen subject who
speaks thus, ‘I, we, or they have a right to’, is neither the rights-bearing
subject who already enjoys rights nor the sovereign subject in mastery of
the effects of her acts. If indeed conventions and their resignification are
necessary conditions of acts, as we argued previously, then making rights
claims produces obedient, submissive, and subversive citizen subjects in
the sense that making rights claims enters the subject into a play of pow-
er. To understand digital acts we have to understand speech acts or
speech that acts. The speech that acts means not only that in or by saying
something we are doing something but also that in or by doing some-
thing we are saying something. It is in this sense that we have argued
digital acts are different from speech acts only insofar as the conventions
they repeat and iterate and conventions that they resignify are conven-
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tions that are made possible through the Internet. Ultimately, digital acts
resignify questions of anonymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity in
political ways.
For us, the most important recognition we have developed is that
digital acts traverse national borders and legal orders in unprecedented
ways. That the resulting cyberspace often (if not always) crosses a multi-
plicity of borders and involves a multiplicity of legal orders is something
that complicates the legality, performativity, and imaginary of becoming
digital citizens. To put it differently, making rights claims in cyberspace
complicates the subject of rights and of which rights those claims are
subject.
We described a scene enacted by the relations between or the coming
together of bodies, acts, actions, and conventions through the Internet.
There we identified some of those actions, acts, and conventions that
make possible digital acts. We mentioned actions such as emailing, mes-
saging, chatting, and blogging that have now been incorporated into plat-
forms such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp, WikiLeaks,
GitHub, Tor, Bitcoin, and BitTorrent. We said that people are now acting
in relation to these platforms and are performing conventions such as
communicating, collaborating, networking, whistle-blowing, and so on.
Each of these conventions involves citing, iterating, repeating, and resig-
nifying various actions: aggregating, blogging, coding, downloading,
emailing, filtering, firewalling, following, friending, liking, mashing,
messaging, mining, pirating, posting, trending, retweeting, and upload-
ing. We next will discuss some of those digital acts and actions and the
citizen subjects that they produce.
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If the citizen comes after the subject—as a subject of power—then what
are the various digital acts through which citizen subjects perform them-
selves? How are citizen subjects called on to conduct themselves in cyber-
space? As we have argued, digital citizens do not already exist as subjects
who now access, communicate, participate, work, and shop online.1 We
cannot simply assume that being a digital citizen already means some-
thing, such as the ability to participate, and then look for those whose
conduct conforms to this meaning. Rather, digital acts are refashioning,
inventing, and making up citizen subjects through the play of obedience,
submission, and subversion. As we noted in chapter 2, the citizen embod-
ies and is implicated in the formation of all of these forms of power, a
composite subject of possibilities of obedience or submission to authority
but also of potential subversion.
To repeat, if we are going to designate the emerging political subject
of cyberspace as the digital citizen, we ought not to use that concept in its
conventional meaning as the ability to participate in cyberspace. Being
digital citizens is not simply the ability to participate.2 We discussed in
chapter 1 how Jon Katz described an ethos of sharing, exchange, knowl-
edge, and openness in the 1990s. Today, these have become callings to
perform ourselves in cyberspace through actions such as petitioning,
posting, and blogging. These actions repeatedly call on citizen subjects of
cyberspace, and here we want to address their legal, performative, and
imaginary force.
Consider the force of openness, an imaginary that places numerous
demands on the digital conduct of citizens.3 The liberating promises of
digital technologies include the demands that what we do be shared or
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exchanged and be open to others. This was exemplified in Katz’s opti-
mism, which embraced cyberspace as part of an emerging political liber-
tarian ethos of connectivity, the free exchange of information and spread-
ing of ideas, the creation of new communities and forms of democratic
participation, and the reconnection of people to institutions that govern
their lives. All of these values are related to openness. Today, being open
has become a demand on organizations and individuals to share every-
thing from software and publications to data about themselves. From
open data, open government, open society, to open access, open source,
and open software, both individuals and collectives are compelled to
make available through the Internet what they produce, what they do,
their processes and traces.4 These demands come from not just governing
authorities or commercial interests but also from social, political, cultural,
and work relations with others when we are called on to share and col-
laborate digitally. But also the demands come from subjects who,
through habit, necessity, or desire, engage digitally for a variety of pur-
poses, from those of pleasure and politics to mere convenience, and call
on others to do so as well.5
However, openness also gives rise to uneasy tensions between calls
for ‘free culture’ and access to knowledge and calls for privacy and copy-
right, albeit for different reasons and with different effects.6 Julie Cohen,
for example, emphasizes that the imaginary of ‘protecting intellectual
rights’, enforced through copyright laws, commodifies and marketizes
knowledge. Moreover, privacy laws inhibit the free flow of knowledge
and stand in the way of efficient markets, meeting consumer needs, and
securing public safety. Cohen argues that copyright often trumps privacy
because the latter is interpreted as ‘second order’ to broader commercial
interests. Yet copyright and privacy are debated as though they are unre-
lated legal domains; however, they share underpinning political and
theoretical ideals, or we would say imaginaries, of information as freedom
versus control.
We agree with Cohen on the seemingly paradoxical relation between
imaginaries of openness (copyleft, commons) and closedness (copyright,
privacy) and their connection to information freedom and control. Cohen
is right to argue that this paradox cannot be resolved in legal theory for
two main reasons. First, freedom and control are not separate but require
each other, and how this plays out involves calibration within specific
situated practices.7 Second, and relatedly, legal theory depends on a con-
ception of abstract liberal autonomous selves rather than subjects that
emerge from the creative, embodied, and material practices of situated
and networked individuals.8 It is in relation to the latter that Cohen
understands subjectivity, self-formation, and the networked self and how
these are configured by the imperatives and tensions of openness.
Although fruitfully opening legal theory to social theory in challeng-
ing ways, Cohen reproduces the legal strategy of instituting an imaginary
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Callings 69
of the citizen based on broad abstract principles on which specific laws
and policies can then be enacted. In doing so, Cohen elides an under-
standing of the specific actions through which political subjects come to
act in cyberspace. It is by making and responding to callings (and the
various actions that these mobilize) that subject positions as ways of act-
ing come into being.9 Without specifically investigating these callings,
how they are made, how they are responded to, and the actions that they
engender, it would be difficult to understand the kind of citizen subject
they bring into being. It is often forgotten that the citizen subject is not
merely an intentional agent of conduct but also a product of callings that
mobilize that conduct.
If we focus on callings and the actions they mobilize and how they
make acts possible, we also shift our focus from a freedom versus control
dichotomy to the play of obedience, submission, and subversion. This is a
play configured by the forces of legality, performativity, and imaginary
which call on subjects to be open and responsible and through which
mostly governmental but also commercial and nongovernmental author-
ities try to maintain their grip on the conduct of those who are their
subjects.10 How do subjects of power act within such a play of obedience,
submission, and subversion? That is the question that this chapter ad-
dresses through an examination of callings that mobilize a series of ac-
tions that make possible digital acts in cyberspace. We focus on three acts
that symbolize particularly well the demands for openness—participat-
ing, connecting, and sharing. These acts are not all inclusive; there are
certainly other acts, but they cover what we suggest are key digital acts
and their enabling digital actions. And although we treat these acts ana-
lytically as separate, it is with the understanding that they are interrelat-
ed yet have distinctive aspects that need specifying.11
PARTICIPATING
Acts of participating in cyberspace are now seen as democratizing. Being
active ‘in’ cyberspace was a defining characteristic of digital citizens ad-
vanced in the 1990s. This understanding was confined to democratic poli-
tics and the ability to access, communicate, and participate online, which
was understood as a virtual space separate and independent from ‘real’
space. Many writers such as Clay Shirky, Yochai Benkler, and Chris An-
derson continue to celebrate the participatory and social-change prom-
ises of the Internet, especially in the age of Web 2.0, which Tim O’Reilly
has referred to as providing an ‘architecture of participation’.12 But such
universal claims have increasingly been challenged, especially in argu-
ments that the Internet is implicated in the production of digital inequal-
ity and a ‘digital divide’ along lines of class, gender, race, and ethnicity,
which reflects and reinforces already existing inequalities in contempo-
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rary societies.13 Digital inequalities are understood as products of online
activities and digital skills, which vary according to not only economic
factors but also social class, social status, and power.14 However, both the
existence of already formed subjects and virtual and real spaces are as-
sumed in these accounts. For this reason, it is imperative to begin think-
ing about participating in relation to how a digital divide is being con-
ceived.15
Inequality is expressed as leading to two divisions: between those
who do and do not have access and between those who do or do not
contribute to content or leave digital traces. In either case, certain groups
are left out, and the concern is either their participatory or methodologi-
cal exclusion, the former referring to the representativeness of who is
‘online’ and the latter pointing to who leaves digital traces that can be
analysed by different knowledge-making practices. Being left out is also
argued to lead to further exclusions: ‘A “digital divide” is never only
digital; its consequences play out wherever political and economic deci-
sions are made and wherever their results are felt.’16 For example, in
relation to participation and diversity in arts and culture, while digital
media can engage new audiences, such engagement both online and of-
fline remains unequal and online access has been found to reproduce and
enlarge existing inequalities.17 Halford and Savage note that this is a
common argument of many scholarly studies, which see lack of access to
the Internet as both arising from and reinforcing existing social inequal-
ities because citizens are denied information about employment or social
services or opportunities for involvement in politics, social networking,
and consumption. In this way, access to the Internet, they say, is inter-
preted as a neutral good that can be converted into other goods and so it
is through access that life chances can be changed. Solutions put forward
to reduce such digital divides and increase social inclusion often include
education, training, and the delivery of publicly accessible and subsi-
dized technology.18 Critical approaches have offered that there is no sin-
gular divide and identify several critical dimensions of inequality such as
social supports.19 Carlson and Isaacs, for instance, offer a conception of
‘technological capital’ to capture that the capacity to participate is a prod-
uct of the interplay among awareness, knowledge, access, and technical
capacity. Yet, in each of these accounts, whether described as dimensions
or capital, differences in participation are explained as a consequence of
given or pre-existing attributes that subjects possess.
For Halford and Savage, whether liberating or dividing, cyberspace
(or what they refer to as the ‘Web’) is always considered as an already
given space, and its subjects are separate, independent, and preformed
rather than performed. Rather than assuming that ‘pre-formed social
groups “use” (or don’t use) technologies’, they identify a ‘more complex
process of mutual interaction and stabilisation’ where digital technolo-
gies are not separated from social processes but instead involved in con-
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stituting subjects in diverse and pervasive ways.20 In other words, they
advance that the Web is not independent from the actions of subjects.
Though they refer to a vague conception of the ‘Web’, Halford and Sav-
age are right about the digital divide and social divide being interrelated.
What they identify as complex social processes between digital technolo-
gies and the formation of subjects, we specify as the digital acts through
which citizen subjects are called on by legality, performativity, and imag-
inary.
Becoming a digital citizen involves responding to callings where par-
ticipating is one of them. Participating demands specific actions of skill-
ing and tooling that citizens need to undertake to equip themselves.
Governments and international organizations, such as the United Na-
tions World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which promotes
the principles of connectivity, access, and capacity, security, governance,
equity, and diversity, often issue this calling.21 For governments, partici-
pating involves digital access to not only information but also transac-
tions and services such as registrations, service requests, licences, voting,
and so on. For example, in the United Kingdom, ‘starting with the citizen’
is a policy concerned with a transactional relationship and about digitally
doing ‘business’ with government.22 Participation is thus understood as a
means of transforming the relationship between citizens and states
through the use of digital technologies.23 The same demand extends to
transacting with corporations where online purchasing is promoted as a
form of consumer empowerment and where consumer citizens are called
on to access and analyse their transactional data. This is exemplified in
the UK government’s ‘midata’ programme, which gives ‘people greater
access to electronic records of their past buying and spending habits [to]
help them to make better buying choices.’ Here, rights to personal data
are about giving ‘power to consumers.’24 The empowering possibilities of
accessing and working with data also underpin ‘open government data’
programmes. Openness is extended to making government transparent
through a public right to data and freedom to information, a version that
is also advanced by civic organizations such as mySociety.25 These call
forth an imaginary of citizens as data analysts equipped with the skills
necessary to analyse their commercial transactions and thus make better
decisions or to analyse the transactions of governments and hold them
accountable.26 Yet, this imaginary belies the differential capacities and
participation of citizen subjects along ability, class, gender, race, and eth-
nicity in both the analysis or production of digital content.27
For governments, corporations, civic organizations, and many schol-
ars, digital citizens are thus subjects called on to equip themselves so that
they can participate on the Internet. Mossberger, et al., for example,
understand digital citizenship as the ability to fully participate in society
online, which requires regular access to the Internet, with adequate de-
vices and speeds, technological skills and competence, and information
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literacy.28 Equipping thus includes not only hardware, such as installing
computers in classrooms and libraries and expanding high-speed broad-
band services, but also developing skills and capabilities through training
courses in computing, coding, and programming.29 This is an under-
standing also advanced in studies of digital forms of citizen participation
originating in non-Western countries. In their description of digital citi-
zenship, Emmer and Kunst, for instance, approach information and com-
munications technologies (ICTs) as a means for changing the civic and
political participation of ordinary African citizens, and potentially em-
powering them to change their living conditions and societies ‘from be-
low.’30 Equipping digital citizens is thus understood as assembling and
investing in the material and literary skills necessary for people to partici-
pate in cyberspace as a social right. The UK government’s digital inclu-
sion strategy, for example, has been introduced not only to provide ac-
cess through investments in digital infrastructures but also to ‘equip the
whole country with the skills, motivation, and trust to go online, be digi-
tally capable and to make the most of the internet. . . . If we succeed, by
2020 everyone who can be digitally capable, will be.’31 Such digital inclu-
sion is linked to making better financial decisions, finding jobs, accessing
services, maintaining social contacts, and addressing equality, social,
health, and well-being issues such as isolation. In its response to the
strategy, the Labour Party’s digital review identified ‘digital inclusion’ as
a necessary condition of access to other social goods, noting, for example,
that ‘benefits claimants [are being] sanctioned because they can’t job
search on-line.’32 For governments, being online is a means of ‘digital
health literacy’ and a ‘matter of life and death’; as people who are ‘disen-
gaged from the digital world, [they] won’t be part of a culture of preven-
tive care’ and managing their own health, which are crucial when auster-
ity meets rising demand.33
The so-called digitally excluded in the United Kingdom are identified
in the government’s strategy as ‘the most vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups in society’ and include ‘those’ residing in social housing, living on
lower wages or unemployed, having disabilities, being older than fifty-
five or between fifteen and twenty-four years of age, or being offenders
or ex-offenders. To track national progress on reducing digital exclusion,
a nine-point scale measures the performance of digital capability in rela-
tion to particular digital services (such as claiming benefits). From people
‘who never have and never will’ to those who are ‘reluctant’ or are ‘confi-
dent’ or ‘expert’, the figure of the citizen is imagined as a progression of
digital competencies. Just as corporations are evaluated in relation to
their ‘digital IQ’, so, too, are citizens.34 The lack of access to hardware
used to separate ‘cyber-haves from the cyber-have nots’, but now access
is conceived as occurring along a ‘continuum ranging from, at one end,
those who have no Internet access or experience to those, at the other,
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who have broadband access at home, use the Internet frequently, and are
comfortable with a variety of online techniques.’35
The examples noted illustrate different political views and emphases
concerning the causes and consequences of a digital divide, a concept
that has been variously defined in both government and the academy
since its inception in the 1990s. Despite their differences, they do general-
ly share an imaginary of citizen subjects as already formed as subjects of
submission, where their participation is a matter of access, skills, and
usage. It is an imaginary of a citizen as a subject who is often submissive
(if not obedient) and is active only in ways recognized by government
policies and programmes. All efforts are aimed at disciplining subjects
along digital inclusion scales through actions that involve access, skills,
motivation, and trust. It is through repetition that these actions become
embodied and through which citizen subjects become governable. Digital
inclusion thus places demands on the citizen subject to uptake these ac-
tions, to be skilled and tooled, and to learn and become knowledgeable
and competent in looking after themselves and governing their social
needs, from accessing services and jobs to reducing their household bills.
But to do so also demands vigilance in maintaining and re-equipping
oneself in terms of both skills and infrastructures in the face of constant
change: ‘System outages, constant software updates, platform redesigns,
network upgrades, hardware modifications, and connectivity changes
make netizenship in the bitstream a rather challenging way of life.’36
Digital inclusion—at least as it is expressed in the United Kingdom—
is not imagined as participating in politics digitally through actions such
as petitioning, organizing, recruiting, contributing, campaigning, blog-
ging, and so on. But participating can also be understood as including
these actions along the lines first celebrated in the 1990s, where the Inter-
net was promoted as a way to improve socioeconomic advantage via the
opportunity to get political information and engage in political discus-
sion and exchange.37 Nevertheless, many studies have found little evi-
dence that socially and economically disadvantaged group participation
increases when politics is conducted through the Internet, whether in
ways that mimic offline forms, such as petitions, or new ones, such as
social media.38 Although some studies have demonstrated the difficulties
that disadvantaged young activists have overcome to gain access to blog-
ging and filmmaking, systemic and structural inequalities remain.39
What can be said of the political participation of the socially advan-
taged, then? One common finding of studies is that youth have the high-
est level of online political participation. This is, however, usually iden-
tified to be less than other ‘offline’ forms.40 Let us consider a couple of
examples. One 2007 study of youth in five cities—Hong Kong, Seoul,
Singapore, Taipei, and Tokyo—found youth online participation is lower
for forms of digital civic political engagement in much the same way as it
is offline (e.g., reading newspapers, voting, signing petitions). Other
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forms of participating such as fandom, connecting with friends or strang-
ers, peer-to-peer file sharing for music, and so on are more predominant
modes. But interestingly, although commercial and entertaining uses
dominate, the study found that participating online could increase civic
political engagement for youth who are already politically interested.
Furthermore, ‘social networking can potentially be transformed to mobi-
lizing forces when the time comes’.41 In another study, US teens were
found to sometimes use their online engagement to help them to be polit-
ical whereby the ‘act of hanging out online [was found to have] enor-
mous potential for creating the civic networks that support real-world
political engagement’.42 One more study of youth is worth mentioning
here as it points to a problematic differentiation between online and
offline worlds that persists in these analyses of participation. A website
supported by a local authority but managed and run by youth in Sweden
was found to lead to greater civic participation and engagement, but this
to a large degree was linked to wider participatory activities such as town
hall meetings.43 It is interesting to note that in all of the examples, the
mere fact of participating is key, whether it involves simply accessing
information or services or participating via interactive or dynamic social
media and platforms. This has also been a conclusion drawn in studies of
advocacy and service organizations and the participation of youth in
politics.44 Simply put, the production and consumption of political con-
tent—political positions, opinions, demands, claims, and so on—are not
matters of concern in these studies. When they are discussed, participants
are found to do so ‘thinly’ and without being substantially engaged.45
Although these are important issues, we have summarized them prin-
cipally to distinguish our argument, which is that once a superficial dis-
tinction is made between online and offline activities, how people con-
duct themselves through the Internet by meshing their lives is neglected.
First, the imaginaries of participating elide how the forces of legality and
performativity organize and configure it and are neither neutral nor vis-
ible. Participating is treated as a functional demand rather than a political
one, where making rights claims is an open object of contestation and
struggle. For example, what resources of cyberspace do digitally
equipped subjects have the authorization to access as a result of the
workings of search algorithms and filters or the protocols that govern
and normalize the retention, storage, sharing, and discoverability of in-
formation?46 If legality and imaginary configure the citizen as a subject of
power and place demands on them to participate digitally (submission),
what we find interesting here and in relation to how we have understood
being digital citizens is the performativity of participating that provides a
glimpse of the citizen as also a potential subject of subversion. How, for
example, does participating give rise to subversive actions, such as those
of critical citizen science?47 Or, as Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey
put it, how do injunctions such as Google’s ‘Don’t be evil’ maxim belie
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the propensities that are activated by relatively unstable sociotechnical
arrangements that are generative of ‘unintended or secondary effects’?48
Moreover, the discourse on participation presumes subjects as being al-
ready formed. Instead, we ask: How can the calling to participate that we
have identified produce digital citizens whose acts exceed their inten-
tions? To put it differently, a tension exists between the ways in which
the figure of the digital citizen is conceived in hegemonic imaginaries and
legal discourses and how they are performatively coming into being
through actions that equip them to be a citizen in ways that are not
acknowledged or always intended.
CONNECTING
If we take the examples of teens noted previously, what comes to matter
in terms of political participation is in the first instance their ‘network-
ing’. Beyond participating as an information or resource-seeking practice
is the demand to connect with others and in doing so to be part of digital
networks and associations. In relation to teens, danah boyd argues that
social media enables them not only to participate but to help create ‘net-
worked publics’, which are ‘constructs’ through which teens connect and
imagine themselves as part of a community that is not independent from
but very much connected to their relations in ‘real’ space.49
Yet understandings of networking or being networked imply that
subjects are already constituted and how they network occurs through
‘open’ systems.50 Instead, networking is really an effect of a calling that
summons subjects to be and remain almost always connected in already
given sociotechnical arrangements. The difference is captured in José van
Dijck’s account of the change that social media has introduced from com-
munity-oriented ‘connectedness’ to platform- and owner-configured
‘connectivity’.51 With the introduction of Web 2.0, van Dijck argues that
connectivity captures how sociality has become technologically mediated
through commercial platforms that organize and manage interaction. So
while much is made of the ‘networked information society’, it is through
the calling to connect that subjects engage in actions that come to make
up both their subject positions and social networks.52 But connecting also
captures how digital actions are taken not only in relation to others but
also with specific sociotechnical conventions of which platforms are just
one part.53 In other words, conventions are what subjects submit to when
they connect.54 It is through actions such as joining social media, email-
ing, following, gaming, chatting, friending, or messaging that subjects
connect and act.
That 2011 was deemed ‘the year of the networked revolution’ speaks
to this, especially in relation to the number of political uprisings that
were, to various degrees, mediated by different conventions such as
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tweeting, blogging, and messaging. Mass political protests and occupa-
tions seeking to overthrow dictatorships, austerity programs, world
banks, media empires, or the rich were compared to one another not only
in terms of a revolutionary ethos but also in terms of their mobilization of
(especially) social-networking platforms as means of expression, dissemi-
nation, and organizing.55 Although the conventions of social media have
sometimes been attributed as causes of such uprisings, captured in termi-
nology such as ‘Twitter revolutions’, as we noted in chapters 2 and 3,
more nuanced arguments have noted that these were mediated by digital
platforms.56 Or, as we would put it, acting through the Internet and
making connections with others does not replace, displace, or supplant
other ways of acting in social or cultural spaces in which we are embed-
ded.
In its most mundane and everyday connotation, connecting responds
to the demand that subjects become active in relation to various conven-
tions and be available and continuously open to others. That is, despite
concerns about surveillance, control, privacy, and commercial exploita-
tion (which we discuss in chapter 5), connecting is a social, cultural,
economic, and political demand expressing an obligation.57 These de-
mands of always being connected have fostered numerous critiques. It is
in relation to this demand that Sherry Turkle weaves a narrative of every-
day practices that moves between connecting as liberating and tethering.
Turkle concludes that rather than connecting people, cyberspace is isolat-
ing them from more meaningful and ‘real’ face-to-face human interac-
tions such that ‘digitally native’ people—especially young people—are
now ‘alone together.’58 Numerous other popular critiques such as Nicho-
las Carr’s The Shallows and Evgeny Morozov’s Net Delusion also provide
critical analyses of connected lives. Yet others have argued against these
critics, especially the arguments that technologies are making people data
subjects and rewiring their brains or those that sound a moral panic
about teens’ obsessive engagement with devices.59 A key argument of
these critiques is that such panics do not attend to what Lovink calls the
specific ‘user cultures’ that are emerging and becoming embedded in
social life in relation to actions such as linking, clicking, or liking that
extend beyond specific platforms. To put it bluntly, from our perspective,
popular critics have become too concerned about cyberspace creating
obedient subjects to power rather than understanding that cyberspace is
creating submissive subjects of power who are potentially capable of sub-
version.
It is through specific actions that subjects connect, and the compulsion
is evident when subjects continue to use digital platforms even knowing
that their digital traces are tracked and their conception of privacy is
being breached. There are different explanations posited for this, such as
the ‘learned helplessness’ of subjects in the face of the unchangeable
agreements they enter into with providers to the weighing of the benefits
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of ‘free’ apps against costs that are either unknown or not yet evident.60
Van Dijck concludes that despite these and other constraints on agency
and participating, opting out of social media is difficult, especially if
being digitally literate and maintaining a critical stance in relation to
contemporary culture are of value.61 Franklin echoes this in their stance
that such propositions see ‘unplugging’ as ‘simply a technical matter
when evidence shows that there is a little understood psycho-emotional
component to being and staying in touch via the Internet.’62 Hintz, Den-
cik, and Wahl-Jorgensen conclude that people overwhelmingly resign to
ubiquitous data collection in more and more aspects of social life.63 Con-
sidering the tenets of what Draper and Turow have posited as a ‘sociolo-
gy of digital resignation’, they frame this as ‘surveillance realism’ to cap-
ture surveillance as a ‘realism’ in the sense of being an inevitable social
condition.64 This is reflected in the ‘temptation to dismiss lack of outrage
about surveillance revelations [such as Snowden leaks], or limited
changes in online behavior, as apathy or even as consent to data process-
es’.65 Such conclusions ‘would neglect how these data-driven systems
have become integrated and mediated in society, creating new figura-
tions of power relations and agency’.66 In other words, surveillance has
become a ‘way of life’ that is not only ubiquitous but difficult to opt-out
of or challenge.
Acts of connecting respond to a calling that persists even in light of
the traceability of digital actions and concerns about privacy. Those who
are making rights claims to privacy and data ownership are by far out-
numbered by those who continue to share data without concern. That a
data trace is a material that can be mined, shared, analysed, and acted on
by numerous people makes the imaginary of openness vulnerable to of-
ten unknown or unforeseeable acts. But digital traces also introduce an-
other tension. Another calling, that of sharing digital content and traces,
is a demand that evokes the imaginary of openness fundamental to the
architecture of shared resources and gift economy that formed the once-
dominant logic of cyberspace.67
SHARING
Acts of sharing place unique demands on citizen subjects of cyberspace.
Most creatively, sharing involves actions of collaborating and co-produc-
ing with wikis (e.g., Wikipedia), file sharing (e.g., Dropbox, CiteULike),
websites (e.g., mySociety), software (e.g., open source), code (e.g.,
GitHub), crowdsourcing (e.g., DesignCrowd), recommendations (e.g.,
TripAdvisor), and social media (e.g., blogs, Instagram, Pinterest). Al-
though all of these conventions are concerned with sharing, what is
shared, of course, varies, but also the meaning of sharing is organized in
platform-specific ways. One-to-many sharing applications, for example,
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work on different principles: Grindr enables sharing locations with oth-
ers who are nearby at the same time, whereas LinkedIn organizes sharing
via a ‘People You May Know’ recommender algorithm.68 To various de-
grees, the action of sharing can permit and lead to further actions, such as
repurposing, adapting, revising, and mashing content. Sharing expertise
is also the ethos of hacking events, which are not only forums organized
by and for activists but now commonly by governments and corpora-
tions. The same can be said of actions that involve collective problem
solving as modes of sharing one’s labour, skills, and data through initia-
tives such as the citizen science projects of Zooniverse or, in contrast,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.69 However, like other one-to-many sharing
platforms, these are also organized on different principles. Galaxy Zoo
and similar forms of citizen science involve donations of voluntary la-
bour for usually broader public goods and objectives. Numerous aca-
demic-led citizen science projects conducted on the Internet also engage
participants in sharing their computers and thinking to analyse large data
sets, for example, in a project on the process of protein folding.70 Be that
as it may, they also have their forms of hierarchical organization, such as
that of the ‘Wikiworkers’ of Wikipedia, which is ‘predicated on a strict
hierarchy, in which higher levels exist to frustrate and undo the activities
of participants at lower levels.’71 In comparison, Mechanical Turk is a
commercial marketplace that connects businesses and researchers with
workers to complete specific digital microtasks such as transcribing text
or responding to surveys. Unregulated and mostly paid at very low rates,
‘turkers’ constitute a cheap and irregular form of digital labour.72
Sharing works in manifold ways. Governments are compelled to be
open and transparent to citizens through sharing not only information
and reports on websites but also data and metadata as open-government
data programs around the world illustrate. But here the sharing of
government data is also directed at commercial bodies towards stimulat-
ing a market of applications, platforms, and analytics as well as to inno-
vate services, contribute to a worldwide government data market, and
stimulate greater private-sector provision of public services.73 This
understanding of sharing extends to academic research through policies
of open-access publishing, where creative commons copyright is increas-
ingly being adopted; the sharing of research outcomes and processes on
websites, in university repositories, and in social media; and the sharing
of educational resources and courses online via closed virtual learning
environments or massively open online courses (MOOCs).
The sharing of data extends to the digital traces generated by the acts
of participating and connecting. The ubiquity of various uses of digital
traces has made data sharing a norm.74 Digitally transacting with corpo-
rations and governments generates digital traces that citizen subjects are
compelled or required to share. For example, the proposal of the UK
government’s care.data programme for sharing patient medical records
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from general practitioners and healthcare providers with researchers and
other specified groups was justified on the grounds that such sharing of
digital traces is in the patient’s interest. Although data confidentiality
and protection concerns were key matters of concern and set back its
implementation, the underlying assumption was that the well-being of
the patient depends on sharing the data of all patients.75 Technological
solutions for protecting and securing health data are thus provided as the
solutions, but the ethos of sharing remains intact.76
As Luke notes, while government practices of sharing data have been
controversial, subjects use many connected digital devices on an every-
day basis to ‘control their daily schedules, travel routes, personal com-
munications, work lives, and individual identities far more than any in-
trusive state bureaucracy.’77 Through the use of these digital devices and
apps, subjects continuously generate data about various aspects of their
lives, from communicating, sleeping, and exercising patterns to their
moods. Popularly known as the ‘quantified self’, data traces produce a
compulsion to not only self-track but share this data so that subjects can
monitor themselves in relation to others but also contribute to research
on, for example, health conditions.78 Ironically, although government
programmes for sharing health data have been scuppered, the sharing of
health information through private organizations such as 23andMe
(DNA profiling of more than 700,000 members) and PatientsLikeMe
(health conditions of more than 250,000 members) are proliferating and
promoting data sharing for the public good of advancing medicine.79
Governments and corporations alike call on citizen subjects to share data
about themselves as an act of common good. Through disciplinary meth-
ods they compel citizen subjects to constitute themselves as data subjects
rather than making rights claims about the ownership of data that they
produce.
These calls for sharing data extend to the growing development of
digital methods by government, corporate, civic, and academic research-
ers. Many examples can be cited, but one alone can exemplify the valua-
tion and justification of data sharing, especially for research. A controver-
sial 2014 study of Facebook users involved the collection of data and
manipulation of emotions through targeted posts without informed con-
sent. Although raising numerous ethical issues, the study was defended
on the grounds that like other scientific pursuits, such uses of data con-
tribute to improvements in social scientific methods and knowledge.80
Indeed, sharing data—even if it leads to questionable ethical practices—
trumps these issues because, it is argued, collective public utility vastly
outweighs the risks.81 While initially thought to be an isolated case, it
nevertheless exemplifies the logic of the sharing of data generated by
various digital actions.82 That the potential abuses of data sharing are
more pervasive was revealed in 2018 when it was disclosed that the
personal information of up to 87 million Facebook users was harvested
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without their permission by an app designed by a Cambridge academ-
ic.83 The Cambridge academic at the centre of the controversy then
shared the data with a now defunct political consulting company, Cam-
bridge Analytica, and claimed that it was both legal and ethically accept-
able to sell data to a third party and use it for the purposes of research.
While academic researchers have lauded the values of sharing social me-
dia data for research, the controversy revealed how research purposes
can be implicated in commercial and political agendas.
The example also illustrates how sharing data as a public good ex-
tends beyond that in commercial and government databases. Myriad
conventions are also generative of ‘new forms of social data—data gener-
ated as a by-product of new forms of popular cultural engagement’.84
Much attention is paid to how social media and other conventions are
active in processes of ‘prosumption,’ a term that is used to capture how
subjects are simultaneously involved in the production and consumption
of content through actions such as posting profiles, uploading files, blog-
ging, and tweeting.85 However, these actions also generate data that cir-
culate, have a ‘social life’ and liveliness, and through feedback loops
come to co-construct and reshape popular culture.86 Consider how ac-
tions such as tagging and posting profiles create social and cultural data.
They shape the type of music, books, and friends people will have but
without recognizing the workings of the predictive algorithms that
underlie such actions.87 But it also occurs in other automated ways, such
as Facebook’s ‘frictionless sharing’, where tastes and preferences—such
as online purchases of books—are automatically registered and made
available to one’s friends.88 More generally, eliminating ‘friction’—any-
thing that makes a platform more difficult or time-consuming to use—
‘has become an obsession of the tech industry, accepted as gospel by
many of the world’s largest companies’.89
Sharing digital traces is also key to the operation of location-based
platforms, such as Foursquare, which tracks geographic locations of indi-
viduals and rankings (restaurants, stores, neighbourhoods, cities) and
then makes personalized recommendations based on these and those of
‘trusted’ friends and experts.90 These locative recommender applications
exemplify how the movement of bodies through physical spaces is con-
stituted by conventions and that a separation between ‘real’ space and
cyberspace is untenable. The ‘where’ of bodies and their interactions are
produced and reproduced by the actions of citizen subjects acting
through these conventions, and like the recursive and performative ef-
fects of other recommender platforms, their actions feedback to shape
locational knowledge and preferences. In these ways, relations between
and among bodies acting through the Internet are not separate from but
bound up with relations to places. Bodies acting through the Internet
thus involve making connections not only with others but with things
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(products) and places (pubs) and do not displace but are entangled with
other ways of acting.
Data configure and shape not only the content and substance of popu-
lar culture but also the very functioning and shaping of its conventions
made possible through the Internet. Sharing is by default demanded by
numerous conventions that require the data generated by the repetitive
actions of subjects to function. Indeed, end-user licence agreements and
contracts often require this sharing of data to ostensibly improve the user
experience and without which a platform could be rendered less usable.
Users are also repetitively requested via surveys that pop up on plat-
forms or appear as emails to provide feedback about their online experi-
ence, to review, or to comment on or like content or products.91 As noted,
sharing purchasing data or profiles is a built-in requirement of recom-
mender systems that generate suggested products through either collabo-
rative or content-based filtering.92 But more generally, sharing is the logic
on which search engines especially depend, where user queries and clicks
on links in search results are signals and data that feed algorithms to
autocomplete entries, track trends, build profiles, and index and rank
access to content. Echoing the arguments on prosumption, William Gib-
son stated in relation to this point that ‘Google is made of us, a sort of
coral reef of human minds and their products’.93 That is, how platforms
are configured and navigated is not based on the actions of users but on
algorithmic calculations of what all users do and the massive traces they
leave.94 In other words, the sharing of user-generated content is the
working and shaping logic of many conventions.
Exploring this logic, Beer and Burrows exemplify what we consider as
two kinds of ‘speech that acts’: sharing through actions such as posting
‘user-generated content’ as text, images, and sounds in files, blogs, and
tweets; and sharing through actions such as clicking, querying, rating,
liking, recommending, following, listening, viewing, and retweeting.
They exemplify our point that there are two ways of acting through the
Internet: in or by saying something but also in or by doing something. In
both instances, citizen subjects are acting where the effect is to influence
the content and ranking of knowledge.
The imaginary of openness places demands on subjects for sharing
through numerous digital actions of which we have covered only a few
of a massive number mobilized by this calling. As we have suggested,
many digital actions are predisposed to sharing, whether this is visible or
known. Sharing is a logic fundamental to the operation of many of the
conventions that configure and are configured by actions. Openness in
relation to sharing thus has multiple meanings and is a matter of political
contestation that belies the positive formulations of it as a founding imag-
inary of cyberspace. On the one hand, it means making governments
transparent, democratizing knowledge, collaborating and co-producing,
and improving well-being but on the other, exposing, making visible,
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and opening up subjects to various known and unknown practices and
interventions.95 Along with participating and connecting, sharing gener-
ates these tensions, especially in relation to what is often reduced to as
questions of privacy. This tension that openness generates increasingly
creates additional demands that citizens secure themselves from and be
responsible for the potential and even unknowable consequences of their
digital conduct.
DEMANDS
If participating, connecting, and sharing place subjects under demands,
the tensions that these generate are managed by the formation of new
demands and obligations. It is these infinitely demanding calls that con-
cern us. They either cultivate citizen subjects who make rights claims in
or by saying and doing ‘I, we, and they have a right to’, or they cultivate
citizen subjects who routinely reproduce conventions governed by com-
mercial or governmental logics. Governments, corporations, civic organ-
izations, and the media persistently issue these demands that favour the
latter over the former. Governments call on citizens to be digital; they
also demand that digital citizens know their data rights and apply appro-
priate security and data-sharing protections. This is exemplified in the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force
in May 2018. It is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, but in brief one
of its consequences is that it ended practices where the default is a gener-
al consent to the collection of personal data. At the same time, it makes
subjects responsible for knowing their rights, when they have possibly
been breached and then enforcing the regulation by filing complaints.
While participating starts with the demand that the subject take up the
responsibility of making informed and resourceful decisions, this is ac-
companied with the demand that they exercise their data rights and con-
duct themselves responsibly and safely as prescribed by government au-
thorities and others such as journalists, authors, and civic organizations.
The inherent tensions in calls for citizen subjects to enact themselves
in specified ways are most visible in the discourse on what is euphemisti-
cally called ‘netiquette’: conventions governing how subjects should
digitally conduct themselves. As Lessig argued in the early days of cyber-
space, control is exercised through the ordinary tools of human regula-
tion—through social norms and social stigma, through peer pressure and
reward.96 Indeed, some norms that are popularly appealed to are about
‘good manners’ (such as not texting during meals with others) and some-
times wax nostalgic about predigital forms of communicating and con-
necting that may never have existed (such as interacting with people in
cafés or on public transit).97 For Sherry Turkle, such netiquette involves
establishing social norms about the use of devices in everyday life to
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reduce social costs such as cybersolitude and being tethered to the de-
mands of devices. For others, such as Douglas Rushkoff, cyberspace is
controlling and shaping conduct and the solution lies in freeing citizens
from the edicts and control of programming (and programmers). Quite
tellingly, his manifesto for freeing citizens consists of ‘ten command-
ments’ for promoting ‘one set of behaviours over another’ for how we
conduct ourselves in cyberspace, such as not constantly checking email.98
The rise of subjects taking photos and selfies at iconic sites and sharing
them on various social-media platforms has led to calls for more respon-
sible digital behaviours.99 From museums banning selfie sticks because of
the risks to artworks and the death of selfie-takers, to locations gaining
popularity on Instagram leading to a surge in visitation and in turn harm
to environments, conduct in cyberspace transcends the distinction be-
tween online and offline in myriad ways.100
These are popular edicts that both originate from positions about the
negative consequences of being digital and at the same time assert that
being digital is an inevitable yet controllable part of life. Even critical
accounts of privacy recognize that making subjects responsible for their
digital lives is required; for Julie Cohen, this is captured in the general
call for a ‘culture of exposure’ where subjects have the ‘ability to manage
boundedness’, that is, between what they expose or do not expose about
themselves.101 Such leveraging is achieved through legal protections
about invasions of privacy and the flow of information.102 For boyd, it
involves ‘helping young people navigate public life safely’, and teens
‘must develop strategies for handling ongoing surveillance and attempts
to undermine their agency when they seek to control social situations’.103
That subjects can indeed take ‘control’ is shared in the formation of de-
mands such as cybersecurity and cybersafety, which have become com-
mon and regularized aspects of being digital citizens. Participating, con-
necting, and sharing expose subjects to a number of actions, such as
bullying, flaming, abuse, sexism, racism, sexual predation, trolling,
shaming, and so on. Although not unique to cyberspace, the properties of
anonymity and extensity inflect these actions with new performative
force. That is, rather than a simple translation of ‘offline’ conducts, digital
actions extend these conducts in pervasive and more insidious ways: in
other words, ‘viral’, as that word is now understood. From vigilance
about fraud and reporting spam, phishing, and forms of abuse to ways of
securing online privacy and identity, subjects are called on to protect
themselves from the dark web of criminality, terrorism, extremism, and
pornography and child abuse.104 Cyberspace is thus like other spaces that
demand securing oneself through materials and technologies but also
through habits, norms, and protocols.
Such demands to be a responsible citizen of cyberspace are now per-
vasive. A US federal mandate has required that all school districts certify
that their staff and students have learned about cybersafety and digital
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citizenship. One US school program expresses this as ‘the importance of
cybersafety to ensure that our students exhibit the characteristics of re-
sponsible digital citizens’ and provides tips on how to conduct oneself
online: be responsible (be careful about what personal information is
shared), aware (be vigilant against viruses), cautious (do not respond to
emails from unknown sources), and appropriate (use netiquette).105
These principles echo those promulgated by the technology industry,
such as Microsoft’s safety and security centre, which defines digital citi-
zenship as digital literacy, ethics, etiquette, online safety, and norms and
offers a series of resources especially for youth, educators, and parents.106
These calls have in part come out of revelations about what is being
done with digital traces beyond the examples we discussed previously.
Disclosures about the big data monitoring practices of the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ), the harvesting of data of 87 million Facebook users or even
Acxiom’s high-tech recycling bins in London, which in one week cap-
tured the unique identifier codes of some four million mobile phones of
passersby, have made citizens aware of the extensity of data harvesting
and surveillance technologies.107 In response, citizens are called on to
know their digital data and metadata rights as expressed in end-user
licensing agreements or data protection legislation and take responsibil-
ity for managing their digital traces. Although opting out or changing
privacy settings is one set of suggestions, more comprehensively, a range
of actions is demanded to remain secure against, especially, security
agency snooping: implementing services such as Tor to anonymize one-
self; encrypting communications; buying a computer that is never con-
nected to the Internet to store confidential documents; and not using
commercial encryption software as it will likely have a ‘back door’.108 All
of these make further demands on subjects to acquire considerable forms
of capital, from technical expertise to financial resources and time. Even
though citizen subjects are interpellated to respond to these calls, the
solutions are increasingly individualized, personalized, and privatized.
Short of these actions and beyond protecting against the tracing of
digital actions, subjects are compelled to manage their privacy and iden-
tity against other potential dangers. For social media such as Facebook,
Twitter, Google+, and LinkedIn, twenty-nine steps are recommended for
‘taking control’ of how the platforms operate and the openness and vis-
ibility of identity, reputation, and presence by customizing privacy
settings or by being stealthy.109 Identity assurance is another recommen-
dation, such as a program introduced by the UK Government Digital
Service to protect privacy and online identities. It requires that citizens go
through a process of registering a profile with contracted and certified
private-sector organizations (identity providers), which can be used as
part of the process of validating and verifying their identity when trans-
acting with governments or businesses.110
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These demands, though, raise another and often implicit concern: the
problematization of the subject. Like William Gibson, Ronald Deibert
argues that it is users ‘after all, who share and network through social
media, and it is we who have entrusted our information to “clouds” and
social networking services operated by thousands of companies of all
shapes, sizes, and geographic locations.’111 Similarly, Jonathan Franzen
accuses Amazon of turning literary culture into shallow forms of social
engagement consisting of ‘yakkers and tweeters and braggers’ and Twit-
ter as the ‘ultimate irresponsible medium’.112 These misfires produce at
least two infelicities. First, inadvertently they end up ascribing more
power to such corporations as Amazon or Google than they actually
have. Although much attention is given to the automated and computa-
tional aspects of Google, the workings of the search engine are unstable
and rely on the distributed, heterogeneous, and dynamic actions of not
only algorithms but also engineers, operators, webmasters, and users.113
Second, they ascribe less power to people than they actually have. While
the rules of Google’s algorithm and functions such as autocomplete are a
tightly held secret, Google’s operation is shaped and mediated by the
search-and-find behaviours of citizen subjects.114 What disappears is the
performative force of being digital and the possibilities of citizens being
subjects of power who regularly subvert demands in or by saying and
doing things on the Internet. We argue that to place further demands on
subjects against being ignorant or indifferent completely misses the per-
formativity of being digital: Subjects of power in cyberspace are coming
into being through the accumulation of repetitive actions, through their
taking up and embedding of conventions in their everyday lives in
homes, workplaces, and public spaces. It is through the acts of participat-
ing, connecting, and sharing that these have become demands and
learned repertoires that are not separate from but indelibly shaped by
and shaping of subjects and cyberspace.
That these demands have emerged in the span of only a few years
attests to what we call the ‘closings’ of cyberspace. These demands and
their closings are effects of the way in which acting through the Internet
has resignified questions of velocity, extensity, anonymity, and traceabil-
ity. Velocity calls for regular and ongoing vigilance about rapidly chang-
ing technologies, protocols, practices, platforms, and rules about being
digital; extensity calls for awareness of where and to whom digital ac-
tions reach; anonymity calls for limiting and protecting exposure and
being cautious about the presumed identities of others; and traceability
calls for managing how actions are tracked, analysed, manipulated, and
sorted by unknown others and for unknowable purposes. All of these
demands spring not from participating, connecting, and sharing alone
but the relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet,
which is made up of conventions configured by the actions of dispersed
and distributed authorities. It is to these configuring actions, which we
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call the closings of cyberspace, that we turn to in the next chapter, with a
focus on filtering, tracking, and normalizing.
But we first want to clarify that callings are interrelated with closings
and openings, which narratively organize the next two chapters. Al-
though we address these in turn, this is not to suggest that they happen
sequentially or are discrete but rather that they are dynamically interre-
lated. Callings summon subjects who are not ‘always-already interpellat-
ed’ by the imaginary, legal, or performative forces that mobilize them.
Because they are subjects of power, citizen subjects have the potential to
subvert such forces through their uptake of actions. However, it is this
very possibility of subversion that gives rise to closings, which are at-
tempts by selves and others to control and manage how callings and
closings are enacted. So if openness is an imaginary that calls on citizen
subjects to participate, then closings seek to further configure the actions
through which participation is done. But this is never settled. The two
remain in tension. In turn, as we have argued, new callings arise, new
demands, and again new configurations of closings, what Deleuze theor-
ized as modulating controls. These modulations, though, give rise to a
third configuration of possibility, what we narratively call ‘openings’;
because citizen subjects occupy positions in response to callings and clos-
ings, they also come to forge new ways of being, or openings that we
name digital rights claims. That is, the callings we have outlined in this
chapter—of participating, connecting, and sharing—are the very condi-
tions that make possible both closings and openings. It is the analysis of
these dynamics that enables us to understand to what extent citizen sub-
jects are able to make digital rights claims in the form of ‘I, we, or they
have a right to’ by resignifying conventions in which they are implicated
rather than only obeying or submitting to them.
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For some, openness is the very essence of the Internet.1 Yet whether the
practical workings of the Internet conform to this imaginary has been
called into question. Evgeny Morozov, for example, argues that openness
is configured by political choices and in relation to specific ‘digital tech-
nologies’ and that those choices should be both resisted and politically
debated. But like the misfires of critics we noted at the end of chapter 4,
control is given over to how digital technologies are configured without
accounting for how people act through the Internet, the conventions they
repeat, iterate, cite, or resignify, and the performative force of their acts.
In this chapter, we consider closings as configured not simply by plat-
form owners in the design of algorithms and databases but also by both
authorities and subjects in their decisions about how they act and what
they share. These decisions result in struggles over laws or politics of
information use, as scholars such as Julie Cohen argue.2 We consider how
closings are dynamically configured by the play between all of these
actions, including those of citizen subjects that arise in response to the
callings to participate, connect, and share. It is through the interrelated
actions of citizen subjects, governments, corporations, and others and
their repetitions, iterations, and citations that cyberspace comes into be-
ing and knowledge about it is produced and disseminated. Three acts
express most strongly the play of obedience, submission, and subversion
that citizen subjects engage in the constitution of closings: filtering, where
citizen subjects submit to regulate and protect themselves or agree to be
protected by authorities; tracking, where citizen subjects enter into games
of evasion; and normalizing, where the ways of being citizen subjects in
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cyberspace are iteratively modulated towards desired ends by private
and public authorities.
FILTERING
Acts of filtering involve numerous actions and conventions (sociotechni-
cal arrangements that embody norms, values, laws, ideologies, technolo-
gies, and desires). Although blocking and censoring (‘the denial of access
to information’) have received much attention, we want to attend to sub-
tle yet effective actions through which citizen subjects participate in gov-
erning themselves.3 Acts of filtering, for example, are accomplished
through sorting (ranking, ordering, trending, indexing, categorizing) and
redacting (deleting, refusing, reporting, burying). It is not that we neglect
blocking and censoring. These actions are often performed to ostensibly
protect citizens from exposure to pornographic, offensive, or political
speech. They are often performed by blocking access to search results,
webpages, chat rooms, newsgroups, and so on, not only in authoritarian
but also in democratic states.4 A series of global studies by the OpenNet
Initiative (ONI) has documented how states—both in the Global North
and South—are creating borders in cyberspace by building firewalls at
key ‘Internet choke points’, an action that is so widespread that ‘[s]tates
no longer fear pariah status by openly declaring their intent to regulate
and control cyberspace. The convenient rubric of terrorism, child pornog-
raphy, and cyber security has contributed to a growing expectation that
states should enforce order in cyberspace, including policing unwanted
content.’5 The ONI has documented how these programmes have over
the past several years shifted from denying access to normalizing control
through a variety of means. Rather than simply ‘Chinese-style national
filtering schemes, recent techniques are more subtle and flexible, and
deploy legal regulations, covert practices, and outsource controls to
“third parties” to manage what can be posted, hosted, accessed, or com-
municated online’.6 These actions include targeted viruses and distrib-
uted denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, surveillance at key choke points,
legal takedown notices, and oppressive terms-of-usage policies. The ac-
tions have become so well integrated and widespread that they now have
become routine and taken-for-granted forms of the ‘everyday surveil-
lance’ of cyberspace.7 Importantly, the ONI argues that although much
attention is given over to state actions, the distributed and increasingly
private ownership of the infrastructures that make up the conventions of
cyberspace often span multiple legal orders such that the decisions on
retaining, filtering, monitoring, and sharing information are dispersed
and have political effects for citizens across jurisdictions. Rather than
being hierarchically organized, discrete systems, technologies and prac-
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tices are decentred and dispersed across numerous centres of calcula-
tion.8
Blocking is also notoriously undertaken by governments especially
during periods of intensified political protest. In early 2019, nine coun-
tries were reported as having blocked access to various social-media plat-
forms such as Twitter and Facebook.9 Although blocking and censoring
are important, filtering includes other actions that lead to the submission
of citizen subjects occurring almost imperceptibly. Even when blocking
and censoring are visible and protested, the citizen subject is often incor-
porated into their very workings. While writing the first edition of this
book in the British Library, our search query ‘Banksy’ for a potential
cover image returned the message: ‘Access to this site has been blocked
by our web filtering software as it is categorized as being inappropriate
for use in a public area. If you feel that the site is miscategorized, please
email.’10 The query was categorized as ‘criminal activity.’ When we pro-
tested, the site was unblocked with an apology for any inconvenience
caused. The example is telling for illustrating not only how filters operate
but also how they invite citizen subject actions such as ours. Through
those actions, although we were ‘disobedient’, we nonetheless submitted
to the authority of the filtering programme by engaging with it. Ques-
tions remain. Why was there a filter in the first place? Who was being
protected? By having unblocked the result of our query, should we have
felt relief that our activity was not criminal? How would we have reacted
had the British Library continued to block access to Banksy’s website?
Citizen subjects also participate in such filtering through everyday
actions. Parents are invited to block and censor sites using parental con-
trol bars so that their children cannot access content they deem inappro-
priate, such as adult sites. But so, too, do employers block sites for gam-
bling, social networking, and game playing through software such as the
Web Blocker, which also enables monitoring Internet usage histories.11
And citizen subjects block the content of flagged ‘friends’ on social-net-
working platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
Cohen refers to blocking as ‘architectures of control’ and ‘regimes of
authorization’ that are authoritarian in the generic sense that they favour
compliant obedience to authority.12 Rather than experiencing rules—
which need not be explained or disclosed—Cohen argues that users ex-
perience their effects, which consist of possibilities for action that net-
works create. So although concerns about the surveillance and collection
of digital traces are most controversial (discussed later), the transparency
of network processes and how access to knowledge is being filtered are
less visible and controllable. Filtering also occurs through the authoriza-
tions attached to content and devices. For example, in many cases, only
authorized tablets can access encrypted content, and citizen subjects must
submit to elaborate authentication procedures. So while sharing is a call-
ing, it is increasingly only within certain regimes of authorization that
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sharing operates, and in this regard, it can be understood as a form of
submission.
Sorting is a filtering action that comes in a variety of forms. It is an
action citizen subjects take when they create rules (if-then) in their email
software to automatically classify spam and move it to a junk folder. And
like the feedback and learning mechanisms of algorithms, through regu-
lar checking and updating, email filters can become ever more efficient in
sorting ‘good’ from ‘bad’ emails.13 Bookmarking pages and following
blogs and tweets or friending on Facebook are also actions through
which citizen subjects sort and prioritize content. But more pervasively,
sorting includes the ranking and ordering of content by search engines.
While blocking is often given more attention, of greater concern is how
sorting organizes access to knowledge in more pernicious ways. ‘Goo-
gling’ has become a regularized action for finding knowledge in ways
that are often taken for granted or not problematized, but it so pervasive
and dominant that the search engine has given rise to the term ‘googliza-
tion’. The term is coined to suggest that Google affects everything, in-
cluding ‘us’ through its use of personal data, the ‘world’ through its
practices of surveillance and infrastructural imperialism, and ‘knowl-
edge’ through its organization of access to information.14
Rather than simply providing results in response to a query, search-
engine algorithms are based on complex criteria that serve the interests of
users to find not only knowledge but also the aims and understandings
of relevance of providers and the demands of their business models.15
Some scholars have challenged the sorting effects of the Google search
engine to highlight that its operation (1) is based on decisions inscribed
into algorithms that favour and discriminate content; (2) is subject to
personalization, localization, and selection; and (3) threatens privacy.16
It is important to recall that initially, search engines sorted results to
queries in standardized ways. In 2004, however, the Google algorithm
started to filter them into personalized results based on users’ digital
traces, such as their history of queries and clicks on links. Pariser calls
these ‘filter bubbles’, personalized profiles generated by platforms such
as Google and Facebook that operate like ‘prediction engines’ by ‘con-
stantly creating and refining a theory of who you are and what you’ll do
and want next’ based on what you have done and wanted before.17 In
addition to harvesting and exploiting an enormous amount of data about
users to do this (discussed in Tracking), filter bubbles sort and narrow the
knowledge citizen subjects access and separate them into individualized
universes where the rules of their formation are invisible. However,
while promoting the benefits of personalization for users, search engines
such as Google subtly push users to ‘see the world according to criteria
predefined by Google’ and seem more oriented to serving the interests of
advertisers.18
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Trending is another form of filtering, such as that performed by the
Twitter trends filter, which ostensibly processes millions of tweets daily
and then indexes the ‘most-discussed’ terms. However, tweeting during
events such as Occupy Wall Street have demonstrated that even when
terms spike, they do not necessarily get classified as trending.19 In this
instance, critics protested that Twitter was involved in censoring political
content, but others have shown that the complex algorithms of the plat-
form organize and filter content in ways often beyond the intentions of
their designers. Rather than a simple measure of popularity, the algo-
rithm is based on a combination of factors, and those that Twitter has
revealed include identifying topics that are enjoying a surge in a particu-
lar way, such as whether the use of a term is spiking (accelerating rapidly
rather than gradually), whether users of a term form a tight single cluster
or cut across multiple clusters, whether tweets are unique or mostly re-
tweets of the same post, and whether the term has previously trended.20
However, although not knowing the specifics of Twitter’s trending
algorithm, the acts of citizen subjects can also interfere and influence its
workings. Proferes and Summers argue that this is what Wikileaks did in
the month before the 2016 US presidential election when it ‘released 37
serialized batches of e-mails authored by former Clinton campaign man-
ager John Podesta’.21 They argue that ‘releasing the information serially
and using new hashtags for each release, Wikileaks took advantage of
Twitter's features in a way that led to greater persistence, visibility,
spreadability, and searchability for their content than would have likely
been realized through a non-serialized release using a single hashtag.’ In
this way, Wikileaks was able to influence agenda-setting through interac-
tions with the technical workings of the platform.
Tarleton Gillespie argues that tensions between users and the design-
ers of the Twitter algorithm are part of larger stakes in the ‘politics of
representation.’ It is a tension underscored by a conflict between people’s
will to know and be visible to others and Twitter’s imperative to draw
new users into new conversations. But significantly, Gillespie notes that
such algorithms not only are based on assumptions about the image of a
public they seek to represent but also help construct publics in that im-
age. The same could be said of other platforms such as Foursquare, which
ranks popular places that users are visiting or talking about, or reddit, a
social-networking and news platform that enables registered users (‘red-
ditors’) to post content as well as ‘upvote’ or ‘downvote’ content along
scales of what is new and popular.22 Although not based on undisclosed
algorithms such as those that govern Twitter trends or Google searches,
the platform still operates as a filter of thousands of items, making some
more visible and accessible than others.
As opposed to sorting, redacting is a form of filtering that involves the
deletion of content. For example, to address legal problems that arise
from the publication of court records, the redacting of some content is
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performed to limit identification.23 But more generally, this can apply to
the use of formats such as the digitized images of text, which filter out
content because they are not searchable or discoverable. These are forms
of deletion that can also extend to automatic expiry dates when content is
removed (though still accessible), through the operation of search engine
optimizers, or as highlighted in ‘right to be forgotten’ and pornography
website cases, the burying of content so that it virtually disappears from
search-engine results. However, notwithstanding the objectives of regu-
lations such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
promulgated in 2018 and introduced in chapter 4, subjects have ever
diminishing control over the life and death of the vast amount of data
generated about them and the various ways it might be circulated and
put to different uses. While technological precautions may impose limits,
‘it is not possible to control the life (or death) of data that circulates about
a particular object or person’.24 Platform moderators can also refuse con-
tent or unacceptable actions, and citizen subjects can similarly report
content back to them. Moderating and reporting content include high-
profile cases such as the outrage and exposure of ‘Internet trolls’ who
swarm women with hostile tweets, threatening them with abuse and
rape.25
For high-profile women on Twitter, such as US Congresswoman Alex-
andria Ocasio-Cortez, trolling and abuse can be excessive with women of
color more likely to be targeted than white women.26 Other high-profile
examples include calls that Internet platforms filter and deny certain
speech acts. Apple, Facebook and Spotify, and YouTube’s decision to ban
from their platforms right-wing shock jock Alex Jones and his media site,
Infowars, in August 2018 reignited debates about the obligations of plat-
forms to provide access to ideologically diverse users in the name of free
speech.27 Jones, known for tirades against Muslims, immigrants, and
transgender people, was banned after years of public outrage over false
claims such as that the Sandy Hook killing of twenty-six elementary
schoolchildren and staff members was a hoax. However, some critics
worry that Internet giants regulating content will jeopardize free speech,
including various other protests such as that related to Boycott, Divest-
ment and Sanctions (BDS) or Black Lives Matter allegations about police
officers. These tensions and debates extend to the actions of individual
subjects such as public figures. A US court ruling on a lawsuit against
Ocasio-Cortez, who blocked a former New York State assemblyman on
Twitter, stated that the First Amendment ‘does not permit a public offi-
cial who utilizes a social media account for all manner of official pur-
poses to exclude persons from an otherwise-open online dialogue
because they expressed views with which the official disagrees’.28 A
precedent for this was a 2017 US district court ruling that President Don-
ald J. Trump could not block people on Twitter because it violates their
first amendment rights to participate in a ‘public forum’.29 In another
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2019 case, a Ugandan masters student living in the United States
launched a suit against President Yoweri Museveni for blocking him on
Twitter after he had referred to him as ‘a dictator’.30 The student, Hillary
Innocent Taylor Seguya, contended being blocked barred him from on-
line conversations and made it impossible for him to see or respond to
tweets on the president’s official handle. These acts show how the force
of legality configures what subjects can say and do through the Internet
and how these acts traverse multiple borders and legal orders. As Sahana
Udupa and Matti Pohjonen note, ‘calls to monitor, legislate, and remove
hateful and violent content have also reinvigorated older legal, political,
and philosophical debates on accepted civility and legitimate forms of
political communication’.31
For us, these issues epitomize how cyberspace is made up of relations
among citizen subjects, laws, and conventions that are not independent
but part of social struggles in spaces such as those taken by Occupy Wall
Street, #BlackLivesMatter, or #MeToo protesters, or political confronta-
tions over abuse and misogynist conduct.32 We are not persuaded by
arguments that citizen subjects are not in control and that platform own-
ers and moderators are in control and subjects ‘readily agree, though
mostly unconsciously, to this domination.’33 On the contrary, the work-
ings of platforms depend on citizen subjects and the performative force
of their actions because they belong to and are only one part of the con-
ventions of cyberspace. By not only citing, repeating, and iterating but
also resignifying, citizen subjects can, and as we noted in relation to
Wikileaks and shall see in chapter 6, indeed do, break conventions and
take responsibility. Critics such as those cited previously often slip into
determinist and structuralist accounts of the workings of platforms. They
do so by inferring that users are deceived and unwittingly submit to the
results of search queries, newsfeeds, filters, or trends and that these are
forces ‘shaping’ them and societies.34 Yet others grant agentic power to
‘the more-than-human performative acts of digital architectures’ and ig-
nore the human actors who design, organize, monitor, and shape those
very architectures.35 This is also evident in their solutions. In chapter 4
we noted that the demand of openness generates tensions about visibility
and privacy, giving rise to additional demands that citizens secure them-
selves from and be responsible for the potential and even unknowable
consequences of their digital conduct. Along the same lines, Pariser’s
suggestions for breaking out of filter bubbles are a set of actions that
amount to users changing their behaviours, such as erasing the cookies
on browsers to developing ‘a basic level of algorithmic literacy’.36 Yet
these are just other forms of submission to the logics and workings of
filtering.
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TRACKING
As we discussed in chapter 4, sharing raises concerns about privacy and
surveillance that are related to one of the political questions about acting
through the Internet: traceability. If ‘Google knows what you are looking
for’ and ‘Facebook knows what you like’ and is manipulating your emo-
tions, then the imaginary of openness includes citizen subjects exposing
themselves in ways of which they are often unaware but also which can
be tracked.37 Although filtering is a closing because of actions of block-
ing, sorting, and redacting knowledge, tracking is a closing because of the
actions of tracing, mining, linking, and profiling citizen subjects. But fil-
tering and tracking are also related. Consider sorting. It depends on
tracking digital actions and feeding this back into the very workings of
sorting algorithms. So while social-media platforms are spaces of social-
ity, their data traces have become a key objective and fundamental to
their very logic of closure rather than simply an effect of their opera-
tion.38
But importantly, the distinction between filtering and tracking is nec-
essary to capture that digital traces also get circulated and repurposed
and in this regard have social lives beyond the feedback loops of their
platforms.39 Thus, not only is tracking incipient to the functioning of
specific conventions, but the data generated has extensity such that it can
travel beyond and between conventions. Both the convention-specific
and extensive uses of data traces are sources of tension and what we call
‘closings’, which begin with the very process of rendering digital actions
into data, euphemistically dubbed ‘datafying’, which we use reluctantly
for its recognizability. Our reluctance concerns the assumption that data
are simply reflections or observations of already existing subjects rather
than brought into being by specific sociotechnical arrangements and rela-
tions. As we noted in chapter 2, modern subjects of power are also simul-
taneously subjects of knowledge, and in cyberspace this is constituted
through the datafication of actions and the making of data subjects.
Only when tracking involves datafying (the process of rendering an
action, attribute, or a thing into a quantified and digital form) can it be
digitally analysed.40 Attached to these data traces are various metadata
that can include location, time, date, IP address, and user-supplied infor-
mation such as name and gender. Importantly, it is through datafying
digital actions that citizens are made into subjects of power and knowl-
edge in cyberspace. For some, this is an irony of cyberspace: ‘the celebrat-
ed freedom of political expression via self-publishing and the ease of
connection facilitated in the social networking environments of Web 2.0
also offer a multitude of possibilities for automated gathering, sorting,
and targeting.’41 But such data subjectivation has specific effects or clos-
ings. One closing concerns the responsibilizing of citizen subjects we
noted in chapter 4, where the imaginary of openness calls on citizen
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subjects to anonymize and encrypt their communications and take re-
sponsibility for the privacy and anonymity of their digital traces. Respon-
sibilizing thus concerns separating digital actions from identifiable citi-
zen subjects by removing names or other particulars, and this is what
privacy laws generally seek to secure.
There is considerable disagreement about whether actions of anonym-
ization can secure privacy. Numerous forms of anonymization also exist,
such as those that involve ex post facto removal of metadata, which
governments or businesses do when sharing data with third parties. This
is distinct from anonymity, which involves actions that avoid identifica-
tion by using pseudonyms or encryption such as Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP). These actions perform the right to act without being identified.
With the growing volume of digital traces and the possibility of linking
data across multiple anonymized data sets, some critics have argued that
it is theoretically possible to ‘reverse engineer’ data sets to identify indi-
viduals.42 For example, a 2019 study demonstrated that even anonym-
ized data sets can be traced back to individuals using machine learning.
By reverse engineering data that is publicly available, machine learning
was able to re-identify individuals, despite anonymization techniques.43
The study concluded that heavily sampled anonymized data sets are
unlikely to satisfy the standards for anonymization and de-identification
set out in legal practices such as the EU GDPR.
Others such as Jane Yakowitz argue that the risks of such identifica-
tion are minimal and rarely materialize and that these concerns constitute
a ‘moral panic, and are out of proportion to the actual threat posed by
data dissemination’.44 Instead, Yakowitz argues that the public benefits
and values of open research data far outweigh the risks, and it is research
data that needs protection from the increasing incentives to remove and
defensively guard personal data, a trend that constitutes a ‘modern ex-
ample of a tragedy of the commons’.45 Just as in the classic version,
subjects who protect their data continue to reap the collective benefits
(such as in medicine) of data left in the commons, yet those benefits are
threatened and will degenerate as data subjects opt out. Others strike a
different warning, arguing that the anonymization of identity leads to
crowd behaviour and subjects taking less responsibility for what they say
and do and increases the likelihood of their misbehaving.46
Both the arguments for and against anonymization as a solution pre-
sume that what is at issue is protecting the ‘data doubles’ of citizen sub-
jects.47 However, the predominant objects of datafying that are of interest
to governments, corporations, or platform designers are discrete digital
actions such as searching, messaging, clicking, blogging, purchasing,
linking, tweeting, and posting. These data are often not connected to
individuals or even populations. That some can be associated with specif-
ic subjects who have committed an action is relevant, but it is not a given
or necessary logic of the tracking of digital actions.48 Instead, traces of
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digital actions are often ‘decoupled’ from identifiable subjects, which is
the working logic of data mining where inferences and predictions are
made based on associations between actions across multiple aggregated
data sets.49 Through combining actions such as tweeting, purchasing,
and messaging, patterns and associations can be identified, and profiles
of particular subject positions (as being made up of sets of digital actions)
can be generated. Louise Amoore thus argues,
The one-to-one match with an identified individual gives way to what
Gilles Deleuze calls the ‘dividual’—a ‘torn chain of variables’ dividing
the subject within herself, recombining with the divided elements of
others. The signature of the dividual that is sought by the security
software does not ‘belong’ to a subject as such—it does not sign off on
past events, it signals possibilities.50
That is, past associations and patterns between the digital actions of nu-
merous and often anonymous bodies are the basis on which profiles of
subjects can be composed and predicted and their digital and other ac-
tions acted upon. Consequently, once separated, the anonymized digital
traces of multiple citizen subjects can be linked, analysed, and made ac-
tionable and have effects on the lives of citizens. Through this action,
citizens become subjects not of disciplinary power but a mode of cyber-
netic or soft control51; rather than embodied subjects, modulations, pat-
terns, and associations between multiple digital actions are the sites of
often predictive analyses and interventions. These interventions can have
real effects on lives and opportunities, from the mundane predictive al-
gorithms of search engines that prefill queries and regulate access to
knowledge to the more serious pre-emptive security decisions of border
agencies that regulate movement or the decisions of credit and insurance
brokers that evaluate the worthiness of applicants.
Datafying is thus performative in two ways. First, within the work-
ings of particular platforms, through feedback loops and recursive itera-
tions, datafying shapes actions and conduct. An algorithm such as
‘People You May Know’ may prompt connecting with a friend on the
Internet, for example.52 In relation to sorting, the performative force of
filters involves directing the knowledge of citizen subjects and closes off
and encloses their worlds (filter bubble). Second, as Amoore suggests,
with the move from embodied subjects to their multiple digital traces,
anonymization cannot adequately address the circulation, aggregation,
and various repurposing to which individual digital traces may be put.
This leads to a different kind of closure, perhaps the one that Yakowitz
warns about, that of citizen subjects making new demands to further
close their ‘open’ digital traces through laws on consent and data rights
(an issue we address in chapter 7). But this demand is also fed by another
action, that of the commodification of data.
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In addition to owning and mediating the platforms that make up the
dominant conventions of cyberspace, corporations monetize the data
generated by the digital acts of citizen subjects. These digital traces are
often referred to as big data and are popularly discussed as a resource, a
raw material with qualities to be mined and capitalized, the new oil to be
tapped to spur economies. Through a variety of practices of valuation,
corporations not only exploit the digital traces of their customers to max-
imize their operations but also sell those traces to others. For that reason,
citizen subjects who use platforms such as Google are sometimes referred
to not as its customers but as its product.53 More generally, the continu-
ous tracking and turning of daily life ‘into a data stream’ has been inter-
preted as a ‘new form of data colonialism’: ‘Just as historic colonialism
appropriated territory and resources and ruled subjects for profit, data
colonialism exploits humans through data and ‘paves the way for a new
stage of capitalism’.54
Digital traces are widely bought and sold. Twitter Inc., for example,
makes only small amounts of its data available through its application
program interfaces (APIs), and access to larger volumes comes at a high
cost that only large corporations, governments, or major funded research
projects can afford.55 The valuation of digital traces has also given rise to
numerous data brokers, from small-scale resellers and repackagers of
tweets to the large-scale operations of Acxiom, which tracks millions of
consumers.56 Acxiom is the second-largest broker of personal data in the
world; it joins data from public records such as data on home valuation
and vehicle ownership, customer surveys, and ‘offline’ buying behaviour
with data on digital behaviour compiled via cookies and across multiple
devices to generate ‘master profiles.’57 In 2018, Privacy International filed
complaints against seven data brokers (Acxiom, Oracle), ad-tech compa-
nies (Criteo, Quantcast, Tapad), and credit referencing agencies (Equifax,
Experian) with data protection authorities in France, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom.58 As a major test of the recently promulgated EU
GDPR, which provides for stronger regulatory provisions against mass
data collection and exploitation, Privacy International argued that the
real test will be in actions by individuals, civil society, and journalists that
seek to enforce those powers.
For some critics, value generation is not the only consequence of these
actions, which are organized by platform owners; they also ‘subsume the
potential diversity of social life to narrower commercial interests’.59 In
exchange for the ‘free’ use of platforms and the values of connecting (via
email or social media, for example), subjects submit to forms of online
monitoring, advertising, and data monetization.60 Whether or not sub-
jects accept this exchange, the right to use and sell digital traces is mostly
reserved for platform owners, and few terms of service include the rights
of subjects to even access their data.61 Be that as it may, such submission
needs to be understood in relation to the callings of openness and its
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associated digital acts of participating, connecting, and sharing. That is,
rather than a simple question of choice or exchange economy, citizen
subjects are caught between the demands to participate and connect—
and all the reasons and values they attach to this—and the interests,
imperatives, and trade-offs configured by platform owners. But it would
be wrong to reduce this to merely the interest of platform owners, which
are only one element in the makeup of conventions such as browsing.
The conventions of social networking inevitably embody the social and
cultural norms, rules, and customs of which citizen subjects are a part
and take part.62
Because of the different ways that data is being generated and the
various ways that it circulates and gets analysed, the term ‘dataveillance’
has been coined to distinguish the actions of reusing bits of data generat-
ed by and for purposes such as social networking from other specific,
targeted surveillance practices. This is the distinction that David Lyon
makes in arguing that digital traces are being taken up by various ‘big
data practices’ and are extending and accentuating the character of sur-
veillance. Lyon summarizes this extension as involving the ever-growing
reliance on algorithms, software, and automated analytics, such that dis-
cretion is being further circumscribed; a focus on the anticipatory and the
future such that more emphasis is given to predicting, intervening, and
managing consequences rather than understanding causes; and the easier
and successful adoption and adaption of data to different fields with little
risk.63 Another field of governing that involves repurposing digital traces
is that of international development. Information communication tech-
nologies for [international] development (ICT4D) combines digital data
and technologies in the service of international development, human
rights, and public health.64 There are numerous examples of projects that
collect, monitor, manage, and analyse large amounts of sensitive data on
health care, demographics, biometrics, and communications (i.e., mobile
phone metadata). The lack or quality of development data for countries
in the Global South and its need for humanitarian purposes has long been
problematized by international organizations such as the United Na-
tions.65 Digital data is thus considered a possible answer to address what
has been referred to as a ‘statistical tragedy’.66 However, most ICT4D
projects are organized in countries of the Global North and ‘are often able
to collect and manage data in ways that would be unacceptable with the
more rigorous privacy laws’ and data protection policies.67 Thatcher et al.
describe this as a form of ‘data colonialism’ to highlight ‘the power asym-
metries of contemporary forms of data commodification’.68 For Hilbert,
such asymmetries are leading to a ‘new kind of digital divide in ‘data-
based knowledge’ due to the unevenness of technological diffusion as a
result of ‘lack of infrastructure, human capital, economic resource avail-
ability and institutional frameworks’.69
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The actions of datafying, commodifying, and dataveilling also remain
relatively invisible. This includes covert forms of dataveilling such as
spyware that reports digital actions back to an installer. However, even
when consensually installed, users rarely understand how spyware
works and often forget about its presence.70 Cookies are the most perva-
sive form. They are bits of data stored on devices and sent to browsers by
websites that are visited or through techniques like ‘device fingerprint-
ing’, which enables watching subjects who delete or do not store cook-
ies.71 They are used not only for monitoring digital actions but also for
tracking preferred language, login, and other personal settings such as
search preferences and for targeting advertising and tracking numbers of
visits to sites.72 Digital traces picked up by cookies have also been repur-
posed by security agencies, such as the National Security Agency’s
(NSA’s) utilization of Google’s advertising cookies to track targets.73
Concerns about online tracking and the use of spyware along with limit-
ed citizen awareness of cookies, how they are used, and options for
managing them have been some of the reasons that many states have
introduced regulations. For citizen subjects in the EU, the European
Commission E-Privacy directive was enacted in 2009.74 It requires that
consent must be obtained for the use of cookies and similar technologies,
which governments in the EU had to implement by May 2011.75 Impor-
tantly, the rules were designed not to restrict the use of these actions but
to prevent their use without the knowledge and agreement of users. As a
consequence, websites now include pop-up windows that advise visitors
through messages such as: ‘We use cookies to provide you with a better
service. Carry on browsing if you’re happy with this or find out how to
manage cookies.’76 These come in various forms, such as one on the
‘allaboutcookies’ website, which demands the action of granting permis-
sion to the site’s use of cookies. With the promulgation of the EU GDPR,
such consent and permissions have been extended. It is based on a broad
understanding of personal data and privacy and ended practices of gen-
eral consent by default for the collection of personal data. For subjects, it
includes the right to be informed, to access their data, to rectification, to
erasure, to restrict processing, to data portability, to object, and to restrict
automated decisions and profiling.77 EU citizen subjects thus have ever
more fine-grained ways of regulating what, when, and how data can be
produced about them. This includes email notifications from organiza-
tions about changes to privacy policies and how subjects can take action
to remain on, or be removed from, mailing lists.
Although important, data rights are confined to being notified about
changes to terms of service and privacy policies and consenting to the
collection of data and the sending of emails. However, with the explosion
of data-sharing practices and the transfer of data to third parties, the
potential infringements of privacy rights has increased as well as the
diligence demanded on the part of subjects to exercise their rights.78 Hull
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suggests that such self-management of privacy contributes to the forma-
tion of the ethical subject by inculcating responsibility, forcing privacy
into the market and treating it as an individual and commodified good to
be managed and traded.79 Similarly, Bellanova argues that data protec-
tion legislation ‘risks contributing to the foreclosure of the political space,
because it would protect actors that are able to process massive amounts
of digital data from any further political contestation of their doings’ such
as their logics of surveillance and profiling.80 These actions are now be-
coming a regularized part of the conventions of cyberspace for EU citizen
subjects and in various forms for others, where consent can be under-
stood as a form of submission. Consent—while often considered as a
right—also places obligations on citizen subjects to decipher the various
models of opting in (such as the ones referenced previously) and to re-
member their choices. But more significantly, as we noted in the discus-
sion of datafying, consent does not mean citizen subjects control their
individual digital traces or can ever fully be aware of what their consent
unleashes. Unknown are the dispersed sites where their traces may travel
or be aggregated and the purposes for which they may be analysed. The
circulation of digital traces is extensive, and rather than regulating, con-
sent involves the regularizing, authorizing, and normalizing of the track-
ing and circulation of the digital traces of citizen subjects.
NORMALIZING
Acts of normalizing perform the logic of closure by filtering and tracking.
We will illustrate this by referring again to some of the points raised
previously. Consent, for instance, is an action that is part of widespread
protocols that call on citizen subjects to permit other actions such as
automatic software updates. In general, normalizing actions produce
tractable subjects ‘who comply with the requirements of authorization
protocols and refrain from behaviours that are unauthorized or simply
anomalous’.81 Cohen argues that these form ‘regimes of authorization’
that operate on difference and unpredictability with the effect of produc-
ing ‘more homogeneous, more carefully modulated behavior’.82 But to
operate or be effective, they require the repetitive and normalized actions
of subjects, such as the granting of consent discussed previously.
Data collection and surveillance more generally can be considered
normalized such that citizen subjects submit albeit reluctantly to them
when they act through the Internet. As noted in chapter 4, lack of control
over online personal data has led not to consent but to widespread resig-
nation to ‘surveillance realism’. Through repeated encounters with digi-
tal technologies that are part of everyday practices, data production is
‘naturalised’ and the ways they are exploited ‘blindsided’.83 Despite feel-
ings of unease, surveillance through data has been normalized and in
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turn has come to limit possibilities of citizenship and imagining alterna-
tives.84 However, such normalization is variegated and platform-specific.
In their study of newspaper and blog coverage of the Snowden revela-
tions, Wahl-Jorgensen et al. note that although newspaper coverage nor-
malized surveillance by highlighting national security and the surveil-
lance of elites, blogs were more critical about mass surveillance and
advocated civil rights and privacy.85 They conclude that while political
subjects were silenced on the former, blogs then are perhaps spaces
where this silence may be broken. In relation to normalization, Lyon thus
argues that understanding surveillance today requires that we see it as a
culture. Such an understanding goes beyond the important concerns of
the surveillance state and surveillance society to examine how today’s
subjects make sense of, respond to, and—in some cases—initiate surveil-
lance activities.86
Although it may sound contradictory, even personalization is a nor-
malizing action. The personalized profiles or ‘filter bubbles’ generated by
platforms such as Google and Facebook operate on standardized algo-
rithms; while the predictions about ‘who you are and what you’ll do and
want next’ may be unique for different subjects, they are unique only in
line with the rules of the algorithm. Just as Twitter trends normalize what
constitutes a trend, so, too, does Google normalize ‘who you are’. And
continuing with the analysis of filtering, this also applies to the rules and
protocols that sort and narrow what is known by search engines that act
as amplifiers and filters of information.87 Perhaps more insidious is the
normalizing tendencies of digital self-tracking devices that form the
Quantified Self movement (discussed in chapter 4), which, on the one
hand, serve individuals’ self-knowledge and self-care and yet, on the
other hand, facilitate biometric surveillance.88 As Sanders argues, from
public health to fashion and beauty industries, they can operate as biopo-
litical technologies of surveillance and discipline that normalize concep-
tions of femininity, beauty, fitness, and so on.
Normalizing actions can also be taken up in relation to participating,
connecting, and sharing discussed in chapter 4. For instance, Campanelli
argues that Facebook’s ‘frictionless sharing’ presents sharing as normal
and even desirable and that it simply involves using trivial data such as
purchases to develop profiles that can then be linked to likely political
orientations, genders, or religions.89 Although this is certainly a privacy
concern, Campanelli argues that a greater danger is the narrowing of
horizons whereby subjects encounter cultural products that reflect only
the presumed preferences of their profile as interpreted by marketing
interests: ‘The more predictable result would be a gradual desertification
of the cultural life of individuals no longer able to encounter what is
unusual, unexpected, and surprising.’90 Rather than individualized bub-
bles, sharing segregates social network users into cultural bubbles of
preferences, products, and knowledge.
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If we explore another bubble that normalizes, an enclosed ‘virtual
world’ much like that of Second Life, this becomes clearer. It picks up on
the discussion of teens in chapter 4 and recalls the imaginary of cyber-
space as open and liberating. Buckingham and Rodriguez criticize the
educational uses of ‘virtual worlds’ that ostensibly provide children with
a space of freedom that is more open to innovation rather than more
controlled ‘offline’ pedagogical contexts.91 They also challenge celebrato-
ry assertions about the emergence of participatory culture, amateur crea-
tivity, user-generated content, and ‘prosumption’ (the combination of
production and consumption). They do so through a case study of Habbo
Hotel, an internationally popular ‘virtual world’ mainly aimed at teenag-
ers where ‘[u]sers create digital avatars and furnish virtual “rooms” in
which they live, and are able to engage in a range of interactions (includ-
ing chat, competitions and names) with other users.’92 Rather than a self-
regulating community as promoted by the owners, the researchers con-
clude that the site advances an imaginary of the ‘model citizen’ built on
expectations that subjects internalize rules by engaging in self-surveil-
lance and self-policing, and when these self-regulatory mechanisms fail,
subjects are disciplined by moderators (e.g., sanctioned, expelled, or
banned).93 Their argument is that what teens learn are particular eco-
nomic lessons such as how to be diligent consumers and how to construct
their identities through the virtual products that they purchase.
This convention illustrates a number of issues we have raised. First,
Habbo Hotel normalizes participating, regulating, moderating, posting,
blocking, purchasing, and reporting that make up this and other conven-
tions. So although we might take issue with the conclusions Buckingham
and Rodriguez draw, it is the normalizing effects of conventions that we
think their study highlights. Second, as the other examples we have cited
also illustrate, platforms are but one part of conventions—the rituals,
customs, practices, traditions, laws, institutions, technologies, and proto-
cols—that configure cyberspace. That is, notwithstanding what we have
stated in regard to normalization, it is wrong to confine the consequences
of platforms to the actions of their designers and technologies; instead,
their performative force springs from the actions of citizen subjects. For
instance, through the conventions of Habbo Hotel, teens regularly test
the boundaries of the rules of being a citizen and are invited to report
inappropriate conduct on the part of others and participate in forums
where they complain, challenge, and criticize the rules of the convention,
including decisions of moderators. That is, they learn that being a citizen
involves not simply obedience but also submission to a number of actions
(e.g., reporting) in which they participate but which they also attempt to
subvert by breaking conventions and resignifying actions.
The performative force of actions also opens the possibilities for sub-
versive and transgressing actions on ‘others’. Although citizen subjects
must be between thirteen and eighteen years of age, in 2012 a news inves-
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tigation revealed that would-be predators were engaging in routine sexu-
alized or violent online chatting and making sexual approaches to young
participants.94 This exposé lead to new measures being introduced as
part of the conventions of Habbo Hotel towards creating a ‘protected
democracy’: ‘a regulated environment that protects the free speech, as
well as the safety and interests, of the legitimate user community’.95 After
the exposé, Habbo Hotel turned off the chat function for several weeks
and called on its citizen subjects to make submissions during a six-hour
period to a forum called ‘the great unmute’, where they could express the
values and benefits of the convention and propose ideas about how safe-
ty could be revised. This led to the introduction of a slew of new meas-
ures with the understanding that a protected democracy ‘can only be
realised through a mix of technology, moderation, education and engage-
ment’.96 Through an assemblage of algorithms, humans, rules, norms,
and sanctions, the conventions of Habbo Hotel were changed not just
once but through an ongoing process of refinement in relation to the
digital actions of citizen subjects.
But more significantly for our argument and to recall what we have
said in chapters 2 and 3, both the logic and embodiment of conventions
involve agreement, but performing them also produces disagreement. It
is through their repetitive actions that teens in Habbo Hotel come to
experiment, push the limits, question rules, and subvert authority, not as
claims separate from but very much part of their embodied lives, where
bullying, disruption, sexualization, harassment, and hate speech are also
part of their experience. Rather than operating through disciplinary pow-
er and categories of normality or abnormality or spaces of enclosure such
as the school and prison, control is modulated in Habbo Hotel. New
actions are constantly being incorporated, an inventive power that is
working by inclusion, as Foucault illustrated, and ‘whose effect will be
greater than the sum of its component parts’, as Deleuze argued.97
The normalizing actions of Habbo Hotel illustrate what is often over-
looked: citizen subjects usually engage with multiple and disconnected
conventions composed of similar actions. Habbo Hotel, Google, Face-
book, reddit, Twitter, and YouTube are some of the multiple conventions
through which subjects inhabit and negotiate relations and knowledge
through cyberspace. Those who claim that [Google] is ‘altering the very
ways we see our world and ourselves’ overstate the case and assume it is
the only and dominant platform.98 Citizen subjects navigate cyberspace
through many conventions—blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and media and
institutional sites they bookmark and connect to. And while each of these
conventions embodies similar actions, from reporting functions to con-
senting to cookies, the kinds of citizen subjects they cultivate are not
homogeneous and universal but fragmented, multiple, and agonistic.
Consider election campaigns that involve the mining of data. These do
not rely on one source but on data from multiple platforms to interpret
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the voting intentions of citizens. Campaigns in the United States, for
example, have involved continuous recalibration—a ‘permanent beta in
politics’—in response to instant online polls, fund-raising drives, com-
ments lists on YouTube video pages, and blog and forum posts.99 These
possibilities were the subject of much controversy in relation to the 2016
US presidential election and 2016 UK Brexit referendum. Regarding the
former, a ‘sophisticated, Kremlin-led operation [sought] to sow division
in the U.S. and upend the election by using cyberattacks and social media
as weapons’.100 Additionally, as noted in chapter 4, a scandal erupted
around a now defunct marketing firm, Cambridge Analytica (CA), that
‘illegitimately acquired data on millions of Facebook (FB) users and used
them to contribute to Trump’s campaign’.101 The scandal led to debates
on privacy rights and social media and resulted in Facebook reducing
data that can be accessed through its API. As Venturini and Rogers note,
it is debatable to what extent this data (which are questionable in quality)
influenced the outcome of the election despite CA’s boasting about its
efficacy.102 That said, they note Facebook has full access to its social-
media data and greater analytic capacities; additionally it sells, on a
much larger scale, forms of ‘computational marketing’ promoted by CA.
In other words, privacy rights have not been protected by Facebook’s
tightening of third-party access to data. Beyond these scandals and uses
of data, social-media companies have become active agents in political
communication and electoral campaigns in other ways such as acting as
digital consultants, shaping digital strategies, content, and delivery.103 In
these ways, conventions of the Internet are being incorporated into the
conventions of politics and creating powerful groups who claim mastery
over these conventions or react to those claims by accepting them at face
value.
But the terminology of a ‘permanent beta in politics’ can be taken up
in other ways that usefully draw attention to how conventions modulate
through the digital actions of citizen subjects. British prime minister Tony
Blair’s e-petitions initiative, launched in November 2006, saw petitions
go exclusively to the prime minister’s office. Using open-source code, it
was launched by the charity mySociety and remained in a beta version
but was suspended by the coalition government with its election in
2010.104 The suspension was tied to the high volumes of prank petitions
and negative publicity that resulted from allowing any petition to be
posted and directed to the prime minister’s office, which resulted in em-
barrassing demands and a high number of rejections.105 Through the
actions of citizen subjects, e-petitions were contested and then recalibrat-
ed. Rather than simply participating on a platform, through the actions of
citizen subjects, the conventions of e-petitioning were followed but also
subverted. In turn, this led to the launch of a new site in 2011, owned and
operated by the UK government; petitions could now only be submitted
to specific ministries and departments of government and had to go
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through a checking and approval process before being posted. However,
this was again changed in 2015 such that citizens could start a petition
and, if supported initially by five others and then signed by 10,000 peo-
ple, a response would be required from the government. If signed by
100,000 people, then a Petitions Committee must consider it for debate in
parliament.106 As this case illustrates, like the ‘edit wars’ of Wikipedia,
conventions are not fixed, and in fact, the digital actions they permit are
the very means through which the conventions also are exceeded. As van
Dijck has noted in relation to social media, citizen subjects develop forms
of protest about user interfaces and negotiate their relations to conven-
tions through appropriation and protest.107 Although there certainly are
big differences in the relations of power between citizen subjects and
platform owners, actions can and do exceed the affordances of their con-
ventions. It is in relation to the normalizing tendencies of cyberspace—
from those that format the actions that make up participating, connect-
ing, and sharing to those of filtering and tracking—that tensions arise,
and citizen subjects engage in the play of obedience, submission, and
subversion.
Coming at this same issue in relation to everyday practices, Cohen
argues that more opportunity is needed in cyberspace to counter the
‘innate tendency to naturalize’ or ‘take the current technological land-
scape as given’.108 Instead, what is called for are mechanisms that pre-
serve ‘room for the acts of tactical evasion and situated creativity’ that
allow citizen subjects to ‘tinker, repurpose, and adapt’ and push ‘against
those structures, sometimes conforming to them and sometimes finding
ways to work around them’.109 Citing Jonathan Zittrain, Cohen notes his
principle of the ‘generativity’ of technologies, which refers to the capacity
of a technology to allow its users to tinker, revise, and make new things
that were never anticipated by their designers.110
RUPTURES
Tinkering is what citizen subjects are inevitably and always doing, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, through many of their digital actions.111 Con-
ventions such as search engines and trends are recursively calibrated in
relation to the modulating actions of citizen subjects. Others such as so-
cial networking are responsive to the demands and challenges of their
members or face mutinies, such as the outcries against Twitter, Facebook,
or Habbo Hotel. Citizen subjects have challenged conventions, such as
the storm around the introduction of an application called ‘Girls Around
Me’ in 2012 that scraped public Foursquare and Facebook check-ins onto
a map displaying people—but in particular, women—in one’s vicinity.112
Although technically within privacy laws, the case highlighted how data
generated by and publicly available on platforms can be freely accessed
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by applications and used for other purposes than originally intended. But
it was in response to the objections of citizen subjects who called it a
‘stalker app’ that Foursquare and Facebook closed the app’s access to
their APIs. Of course, there are many counterexamples, such as tracking
and filtering or the workings of regimes of authorization. But there are
also those acts of citizen subjects that go beyond tinkering, which, as
described by Cohen, are more a form of submission than of subversion.
Like our submission to the blocking actions of the British Library, tinker-
ers inevitably work within the logic and configuration of the conventions
of which they are a part.
Yet citizen subjects come into being through the subversion of conven-
tions that call them into obedience or submission in the first place.
Through creating openings for thinking, speaking, and acting differently,
citizen subjects resignify conventions rather than just tinker with them.
As we argued in chapter 3, the force of the performative issues from
breaking given conventions. While still calling for their obedience and
submission—for inevitably citizen subjects always act in relation to con-
ventions—at the same time, they create possibilities of subversion. In-
deed, it is this possibility (and the citizen subjects that have exercised it)
that many of the closings we have noted target. In relation to anxieties
about ‘superusers’ and morality plays of the hacker, the pirate, and the
terrorist, securitization has been invoked and then extended to other citi-
zen subjects who cannot be trusted because they will resort to illegality
when and if given the opportunity.113 This just highlights another aspect
of the play of actions between and among bodies acting through the
Internet where closings are intricately tied to callings but also give rise to
openings.
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If making rights claims in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, or they have a
right to’ enacts people as citizen subjects, it also creates openings. For
citizen subjects to come into being, certain conventions are invoked, pro-
voked, and ruptured. To recall, these conventions are typically sociotech-
nical arrangements that embody norms, values, affects, laws, ideologies,
and technologies. If rights claims gain ground, become articulable
through digital acts, and find addressees, their effects create openings
that can be understood as experiments that exceed existing conventions.
These openings are not groundless, normless, and lawless experiments,
though these properties may sometimes feature in them. Above all, open-
ings are moments and spaces when and where thinking, speaking, and
acting differently become possible by resisting and resignifying conven-
tions. Such resignification might feel like freedom for subjects, as if they
involve neither obedience nor submission. Yet resignification creates its
demands and calls for obedience and submission, while at the same time
creating possibilities of subversion. Effects depend on how resignification
plays out.
We can speak about many openings that the Internet has made pos-
sible, but witnessing, hacking, and commoning are perhaps the most
promising and recognized digital acts.1 Each of these acts has made pos-
sible recognizable citizen subjects: citizen journalist, citizen activist, and
citizen producer. To be sure, each of these citizen subjects existed before
cyberspace and has been performed and developed in myriad ways. The
traditions of community newspapers entirely run by citizen journalists,
protests and demonstrations organized by citizen activists, and the coop-
erative movements of citizen producers are prominent examples. How-
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ever, each of these has been resignified through cyberspace. The rise and
impact of WikiLeaks and whistle-blowing as forms of citizen journalism
have dramatically altered the politics of knowledge and the right to
know. The emergence of hacker cultures and movements such as Anony-
mous has dramatically transformed the meaning and function of protest.
The emergence of Wikipedia has spectacularly upstaged the subjects and
agents of knowledge production and dissemination. We have given only
a few examples to illustrate each of these openings, but the objective of
this chapter is to examine the various conventions of cyberspace that
have made digital acts of witnessing, hacking, and commoning possible.
As such, it illustrates how other citizen subjects and digital acts that are
coming into being can similarly be understood. To do so, we are going to
work through the theoretical framing we have developed to understand
the Internet and the space of relations that acting through the Internet has
produced—cyberspace. We are going to discuss a class of acts—making
rights claims—and demonstrate how in or by saying and doing some-
thing through the Internet people have resignified conventions and en-
acted ways of being citizen subjects. In doing so, we shall also pay close
attention to legal, performative, and imaginary forces through which dig-
ital acts have become possible. The primary aim of this chapter is to
illustrate the usefulness of approaching openings in relation to the con-
ventions they resignify rather than approaching them with already estab-
lished categories of thought and practice. As we shall see, approaching
myriad actions on the Internet that produce acts of witnessing from the
perspective of professional journalism and labelling them as citizen jour-
nalism limits our understanding of the new subject positions and ways of
being that these actions are opening.
WITNESSING
One of the most oft-cited definitions of citizen journalism states that it is
‘the act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the
process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and
information. The intent of this participation is to provide independent,
reliable, accurate, wide-ranging and relevant information that a democra-
cy requires.’2 This characterization was made relatively early in the de-
velopment of citizen journalism, when many platforms and digital tech-
nologies were in their initial stages of development. Still, in identifying a
shift from professionally produced news to hybrid amateur-professional
production and even almost entirely amateur production, this moment
signalled that the Internet was loosening the grip of professional journal-
ism on the production and dissemination of news and truth telling. Since
then, much has been written on whether this is indeed the case or wheth-
er professional journalism has now consolidated its grip. But there is no
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doubt that however it is defined—alternative journalism, citizen’s media,
citizen journalism, democratic media, and radical media—something
new is afoot in journalistic truth telling and knowledge production
through cyberspace.3
Let us return to the definition of citizen journalism that captured our
imagination. There are two aspects of the definition. First, the focus is on
acts performed by subjects called citizens. But what is exactly the act? The
answer that was originally offered was that of ‘participatory journalism’.
The idea is that the participation of audiences becomes part of journal-
ism. Those audiences are no longer passive recipients of information and
news but actively participate in its production. So the act of participation
breaks the established convention of journalism to produce news and
‘create’ events for an audience that is used to merely receiving it. It is
then that those audiences who participate in the production of news be-
come citizens. Many media scholars have questioned for years whether
journalism actually worked within such an established convention and
whether audiences were as passive as imagined, but the recognition here
is that the Internet now makes it possible at least to participate directly in
the production of news. Still, what is exactly the act? Is it participation?
Can its subjects be called citizens? We think that this is rather a weak
characterization of what is arguably a radical shift. This is because partic-
ipation often calls for, as we discussed previously, involvement in al-
ready established conventions. From our perspective, participation is a
submissive (though not obedient) act in or by which a citizen subject
performs a claim. There ought to be something broader than connecting it
to journalism alone to characterize acts by which citizens produce knowl-
edge about events. Moreover, the association of the term ‘citizen’ with
this rather submissive participation overlooks the radical potential of the
figure of the citizen subject as an agent of submission and subversion and
thus subject of power.
We will shortly return to this, but now let us take a look at the second
aspect of the definition. It proposes that the intent of participation is
about providing accurate, reliable, independent information for democ-
racy. This is the conventional imaginary of professional journalism—its
objectivity. Many media scholars question journalistic objectivity not be-
cause they disagree with it but because they do not think professional
journalism achieves it. Bolette Blaagaard, for example, argues that the
contribution of citizen journalism has been to challenge the ostensible
objectivity of professional journalism.4 She argues that in creating a jour-
nalistic objectivity, professional journalism portrayed a knowing subject
that is detached, unemotional, neutral, unbiased, and independent. By
contrast, citizen journalism’s contribution has been to demonstrate that
passionate, attached, affective, and biased yet fair reporting can result
from journalistic subjectivity.5 She illustrates this using a famous case of
citizen journalism where a bystander citizen recorded with his mobile
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phone the London police assault on Ian Tomlinson that resulted in his
death. Blaagaard argues that this was not accidental journalism, but its
intent was to demonstrate the consequences of the police action of ket-
tling.6 Blaagaard also illustrates with the website CrisisJam that journalis-
tic subjectivity can call for political solidarity and bring political interests
into the public in ways that journalistic objectivity often fails to accom-
plish.7 Similarly, Chris Atton notes that citizen journalism has inevitably
created multiple versions of events, which highlights how news is social-
ly constructed by selecting, filtering, and presenting.8 We now recognize
the regime of objectivity is only one of the ways in which we know about
the world of events. Atton asks, ‘[O]nce we acknowledge the social con-
struction of news, why should we then reject alternative journalism sim-
ply because it is not subject to the same normative and epistemological
limits of mainstream journalism?’9
So by imposing the conventional idea of professional journalism and
characterizing digital journalism as participation, the performative and
imaginary forces of a digital act are practically neutralized. How do we
then characterize citizen journalism? To answer this is to engage in a
social struggle and not merely an intellectual exercise. As Michael Mead-
ows says, ‘The shibboleth “citizen journalism” now seems to refer to
virtually anyone writing anything that bears some resemblance to “the
facts” or “the truth”, however they are defined.’10 Similarly, Linda Stein-
er and Jessica Roberts say that ‘as with public journalism, citizen journal-
ism’s philosophy is somewhat unclear; its definition is still emerging’.11
Yet ‘citizen journalism understands people as having political roles, inter-
ests and relationships, and as actively interested in sharing news they
deem relevant. It understands, or perhaps intuits, that a knee-jerk defini-
tion of all forms of journalism as acquiring and distributing information
misses the point.’12 There is a recognition that it is difficult to define
citizen journalism without making some investment in one or another
aspect of it. Rather than attempting to define it, let us see what the main
arguments are for and against ‘it’ so far and how we can tease out the act
that constitutes it.
The literature on citizen journalism is already vast, but it will be help-
ful to outline the various actions that have become possible and how they
have created conventions that have come to be named citizen journalism.
Let us start with some events. Beginning with the Southeast Asia earth-
quake and tsunami in 2004 and accelerating with major events such as
the Iranian uprising in 2009, uprisings in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, the
civil war in Syria since 2011, Hong Kong’s 2014 ‘umbrella revolution’ and
2019 anti-extradition bill protests, events staged by Extinction Rebellion,
and the 2014 Ferguson protests, a new kind of reporting has increasingly
incorporated images, video footage, and reportage by ordinary or ama-
teur observers or participants in these events. Many have commented on
the difference, for example, between the Afghan and Iraq wars previous-
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ly in the same decade and these later events. Simultaneously, citizen
journalism became prominent in other instances depicting racism, xeno-
phobia, misogyny, homophobia, or police conduct against protestors,
demonstrators, and activists around the world.13 Although these were
often called ‘accidental journalism’, citizen journalism also began creat-
ing new conventions—made up of actions, norms, values, protocols, and
practices—that came to be embedded in Internet platforms.14 Most of
these platforms, or at least the ones that have gained prominence, are
closed (proprietary) platforms, which means their protocols, algorithms,
and procedures are under the control of their owners. As the difference
between open and closed platforms or conventions is not straightfor-
ward, we will discuss both and indicate their main tendencies.15
Among the most famous platforms is the South Korean OhMyNews,
which arguably became a social movement and is considered a pioneer.16
OhMyNews advanced a direct challenge to professional journalism in
South Korea by registering thousands of citizen journalists, enabling
them to write their own stories, and developing an editorial process by
which they were curated and audited. By contrast, what some call ‘mobi
journalism’ in Slovenia accomplished an opposite effect by a major televi-
sion channel (Kanal A) that uses citizen journalism as a shield to produce
a tabloid news programme.17
Since then, many platforms have been established that follow similar
conventions, such as YouTube, IndyMedia, Digg.com, Global Voices,
Newsvine, and Guerrilla News Network (GNN).18 But there are also
interesting differences among these platforms, especially in terms of algo-
rithms and codes that determine ‘newsworthy’ reporting and footage by
ranking, ordering, and grouping. Luke Goode, for example, discusses
how different platforms produce different sociotechnical arrangements—
rules, norms, procedures, protocols, code, and algorithms—to create an
effective presentation for their users. These arrangements, or what we
call ‘conventions’, accomplish not only a sense of fairness but also strong
hierarchies through which news is produced.19 There is no reason to
believe that these platforms feature flat hierarchies or smooth spaces of
dialogue; rather, they are hierarchical and striated. The issues of status
and gatekeeping are as prominent in these platforms as they are else-
where.20 Thus, there is also no reason to think that citizen journalism—at
least as it is practiced in these platforms—is intrinsically counterhege-
monic. Rather, we would investigate the rationalities of these conven-
tions, the way they are taken up by subjects in obedient, submissive, and
subversive ways, and the effects they produce. Yet these are difficult
investigations not only because these platforms proliferate and change so
rapidly but also because the gatekeepers and proprietors of these plat-
forms display varying degrees of transparency and openness about them
(as we discussed in chapter 5).
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Concern also arises as to whether the openings for citizen journalism
are being already incorporated or co-opted by professional journalism.
One of the prominent examples of such co-optation is CNN’s iReport
platform.21 While overhauled in 2015, the original version launched in
2006 ostensibly provided a platform for amateur journalists and ordinary
citizens to engage in news production. But analyses of the platform urge
caution about whether and to what extent CNN provides a democratic,
unfiltered, and uncensored form of reportage and expression. Faroq
Kperogi, for example, argues that CNN deploys a sophisticated journalis-
tic hegemony—much akin to the imaginary of the definition with which
we began this discussion on participation and intent—that while legiti-
mizing a conventional imaginary of journalism, it benefits from the
unpaid labour of a vast army of people who provide its material.22 Simi-
larly, by investigating CNN’s reporting of the uprising in Iran in 2009,
Lindsay Palmer reports that ‘CNN simultaneously denigrates and de-
pends on the unpaid labour of its iReporters, especially when covering a
political uprising.’23 Yet she also concludes with a thought that rather
forcefully expresses our view of the modern citizen as subject of power.
She writes, ‘[M]y case study reveals that citizen coverage of global con-
flict is a story of both exploitation and subversion, since hegemonic jour-
nalistic representations of world events ultimately unfold within the in-
creasingly disruptive informational milieu that is the product of network
culture.’24 From our perspective, this is both the promise and the danger
of being subjects of power: what separates submission from subversion is
a fleeting moment. But by submitting to the authority of platforms such
as Digg, GNN, or iReport, citizen subjects also engage in the possibilities
of subversion, inventing ways of breaking conventions to which they
have submitted but from within the possibilities and affordances of those
very conventions.
We can also observe this in several other hybrid forms of journalism.
Research on various hybrid forms of journalism in Australia, Germany,
the Netherlands, and the United States conclude that ‘for all its success,
citizen journalism remains dependent to a significant extent on main-
stream news organizations, whose output it debates, critiques, recom-
bines, and debunks by harnessing large and distributed communities of
users’.25 Similarly, news organizations are increasingly relying on citizen
journalism, and this includes not only national outlets such as BBC’s
‘Have Your Say’ but also local outlets such as Citizens’ Eye of Leicester
News.26 Citizens’ Eye, an independent citizen journalist platform, is now
incorporated into the Leicester Mercury, which is a major local newspaper
but one facing losses.27 Nevertheless, rather than assimilating Citizens’
Eye, the Leicester Mercury finds it more effective to present it as its citizen
journalist component.
Although these examples of citizen journalism predominantly focus
on platforms that either serve as independent or hybrid journalism, the
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Internet raises an outstanding issue that Goode calls ‘metajournalism’.
We have seen some platforms that include algorithms and code that rank,
order, and group items submitted as news stories and where the logics of
these algorithms inevitably involved striating the cyberspace they have
created. The presence and persistence of such algorithms also creates new
actions such as tagging or aggregating. These actions involve neither the
production nor consumption of news but its dissemination, classification,
and curating or, as we have put it, involve acting not only in or by saying
things but also in or by doing things. As Goode illustrates when he calls
this activity metajournalism, many actions on the Internet involve sub-
jects tagging, aggregating, redirecting, liking, ranking, rating, and repost-
ing news items produced by citizen journalists.28 These actions by which
people submit to conventions are how the subject, the citizen journalist, is
enacted. Of note, these actions are not limited to bespoke news platforms
but normalized actions of other platforms such as Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube, Flickr, and Instagram that may not have had citizen journalism
in mind when they were created. Yet people often subvert the original
aims of these platforms and use them for other purposes. Again, that
such subversion takes place is no guarantee that the platforms are either
progressive or counterhegemonic, but it is to mark that citizen metajour-
nalism is perhaps just as significant as citizen journalism. The retelling or
resignification of news stories raises the question of whether such sub-
jects who engage in these actions should be called citizen journalists. Or,
as Goode writes, it raises the question ‘whether we should restrict its
definition to practices in which citizens act as content creators, producing
original news material’.29 More importantly, it also exposes an aspect of
professional journalism—its supposed objectivity—that has been kept
hidden from open view: that professional journalism, too, is an agent of
aggregating, filtering, and ranking rather than merely disclosing or re-
vealing events.30 If that is the case, we question whether there should be a
different label for curators and aggregators for two reasons. As we have
argued, digital acts involve doing something through various actions not
confined to language but including images and sounds as well as the
coding, linking, and classifying of content. Second, these actions resignify
questions of anonymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity. They enable
the dissemination of news with anonymity at almost instantaneous speed
through numerous networks, and they leave traces along the way. As we
shall now argue, this is indeed a distinctly cyberspace enactment of citi-
zen witnessing.
The question that we posed, though, still persists: What exactly is the
act that citizen journalists perform to constitute themselves as digital
citizens? What rights claims do citizen journalists perform? This is where
we find the literature on citizen journalism too narrowly focused on the
journalism aspect rather than the citizen aspect.31 The impact of citizen
journalism on professional journalism’s monopoly on telling truths about
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events and producing and disseminating knowledge is certainly momen-
tous and significant. But when we think about the citizen subject that it
gives rise to, matters appear rather differently.
We can approach citizen journalism from our perspective, that is,
from the perspective of not the subject but the act itself. Leaving aside the
question whether WikiLeaks is an instance of citizen journalism, an early
reflection by Julian Assange, a cofounder of WikiLeaks, is appropriate.
He writes, ‘Every time we witness an act that we feel to be unjust and do
not act we become a party to injustice.’32 Now, two things are said at once
here. There is an act that involves an injustice. There is also an act that
involves witnessing it. There are two dimensions here that we can term
‘political’ and ‘ethical’. The political involves the judgement on justice
and injustice. The ethical involves the call to act as bearing witness. The
ethical dimension becomes even clearer when Assange says, ‘Those who
are repeatedly passive in the face of injustice soon find their character
corroded into servility.’33 To put it in our words, citizen subjects, precise-
ly because of their capacity to judge, are not merely obedient (or servile)
but also subversive. This is because submission to conventions requires
using judgement on the terms of submission. Although the citizen subject
submits to conventions, because of this capacity, the call of subversion to
rupture a convention always retains its force. Assange clearly appeals
here to an aspect of journalistic ethics—bearing witness—but he resig-
nifies it politically by identifying it as a call to act. The debate over wheth-
er WikiLeaks is a platform for journalism or whistle-blowing overlooks
that it primarily enables witnessing—that the world may know (differ-
ently).34 It is often argued that such whistle-blowing exposes classified
secrets and endangers the intelligence work of the state. But what whis-
tle-blowing exposes is that there are those who find it intolerable to wit-
ness abuses and misuses of authority and not share them. If bankers
deceive, soldiers massacre, agencies snoop, and diplomats lie, citizens
have the right to know that. Citizens have a right to know what state and
corporate authorities are doing in, and often with, their name. WikiLeaks
and whistle-blowing in general are essentially claiming this right to
know.
We also think that witnessing is the act that calls for both content
creation and transmission. It is unnecessary to differentiate citizen jour-
nalists and citizen metajournalists because both depend on similar ac-
tions, invoke, provoke, and break similar conventions and enable citizen
subjects to bear witness. Acts of witnessing are making rights claims in
the sense that they enact a right to witness an injustice and share it (so
that the world may know) as both a political and an ethical act. Their
primary orientation is not towards the ethics of a profession but the right
to witness and share acts of injustice. This way, it also invokes a complex
assemblage of legal, performative, and imaginary forces. Making a rights
claim to witness a police injustice against a protest may invoke legal
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citizenship rights, but it may also perform citizenship rights that as yet do
not exist (performative) or even call for rights to come (imaginary).
For these reasons, we think Stuart Allan’s suggestion to think of citi-
zen journalism as ‘citizen witnessing’ is both powerful and yet inade-
quate.35 Allan describes citizen journalism ‘as a type of first-person re-
portage in which ordinary individuals temporarily adopt the role of a
journalist in order to participate in news making, often spontaneously
during a time of crisis, accident, tragedy or disaster’.36 This is powerful
because it recognizes the significance of the act that brings citizen subjects
into being as witnessing. It is vitally important to recognize that citizen
witnessing responds to a call whose imaginary force, what James Dawes
names as ‘that the world may know’, ought to remain and has been the
ethical core of being citizen subjects.37 This is one of the reasons why
singular acts of citizen witnessing enacted through blogs have received as
wide attention as collaborative or crowdsourced platforms. The celebrat-
ed Baghdad blogger Salam Pax, wrote his blog on everyday life in the city
immediately before and after the US invasion, is an example of this.38 So
is Huang Qi, ‘China’s first cyber-dissident’, who ran a website, called 64
Tianwang that reported on human rights abuses, and who was jailed for
twelve years.39
Yet Allan’s characterization of citizen witnessing has three weak-
nesses. First, Allan imagines citizen witnessing as a ‘first-person’ report-
age. We have already argued that making rights claims, as a class of acts
that Austin overlooked, in or by saying and doing ‘I, we, or they have a
right to’, enacts people as citizen subjects. Making rights claims does not
need to be performed in the first person. Second, Allan neglects citizen
metajournalists whose performative force we have already discussed. We
consider curation and aggregation as digital actions that enact citizen
subjects as witnesses in an especially forceful manner through the Inter-
net. Third, it is not clear why citizen witnessing must be restricted to
either temporary or crisis moments. In those moments, the meaning and
force of citizen witnessing may gain an additional and important strength
as the Internet and the space of relations acts have created—cyberspace—
has shown. Sasha Costanza-Chock’s objection to using citizen journalism
because most acts of witnessing involve subjects who are actually non-
citizens ought not to deter us from using the term. She warns that ‘those
tied to the “citizen journalist” label might want to publicly rethink their
reasons for conceptually linking the right to speak in new communication
spaces to legal membership in the nation-state.’40 As we affirm in chapter
2, we think that the citizen subject is not the exclusive property of the
nation-state. On the contrary, the nation-state may have become a liabil-
ity for upholding the subject of power we have inherited. As Allan writes,
many of the issues that citizen journalism raises are ‘set against the back-
drop of incidents around the globe where the nation-state’s ideological
appropriation of citizenship—from outright attacks on its legitimacy to
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the steady erosion of its protections, typically (and ironically) in the name
of national security—has made journalism a struggle over ‘the right to
bear witness.’41 Citizen witnessing is an ongoing and crucial aspect of
democratic citizenship.
Although we have focused on witnessing as an act performed in rela-
tion to citizen journalism, it is also an act performed in and through other
relations to digital technologies. In relation to India’s surveillant cultures,
Nayar shows how forms of ‘dissident surveillance’ have emerged that
involve video activism and the circulation of ‘witness videos’.42 They
argue that such ‘witnessing is “active” and produces or at least demands
an ethical response, especially when these are images of atrocity’.43 Em-
mer and Kunst document the development of the mobile-based crowd-
sourcing platform Ushahidi (a Swahili word for witness).44 Launched in
2008 in the wake of riots that broke out in Kenya after accusations of
fraud in the national elections of December 2007, the platform invited
citizens to send in their observations of violent election-related events by
text messaging. Another act is Fauzanafi’s account of anti-corruption
campaigns staged on Facebook and other online platforms by Indonesian
citizens in opposition to a corrupt dynasty.45 Understood as an act of
witnessing, they argue that citizens were not passive recipients of infor-
mation but active participants who did not simply post comments but
engaged in ‘acts of flaming’ that intensified affective publics through
insults, swearing, offensive language, or humorous play.
In these ways, the Internet, by creating openings for digital citizens,
has made citizen witnessing an indispensable part of a political imagi-
nary. This is not without its dangers and perils (co-optation, assimilation,
infiltration, taming, blocking, filtering, and so on), but that is what also
makes it a site of political struggles.
HACKING
To understand the emergence of citizen subjects acting through the Inter-
net as subjects of power requires investigating the conventions that call
them forth as digital citizens and the digital acts they perform to say and
do things. No doubt, the birth of a subject position called ‘hacker’ and the
digital acts with which it came into being present a challenge. The stories
that have been told about hackers make it difficult to resignify this sub-
ject of power afresh. Since the 1980s, the image of hackers has dominated
fictional and semi-fictional worlds of writing and filmmaking. Our focus
here, though, is to get a grip on the openings that ‘acts of hacking’ have
created.
Much has been written about hackers and hacking.46 Since the 1950s
with the emergence of large-scale computers (mainframes), we have seen
not only programmers but also those who were intrigued by the possibil-
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ities of accessing, controlling, and generally hacking into these comput-
ers. But first, with the networking of these large-scale infrastructures and
then, second, the progressive miniaturization of them (personal comput-
ers, laptops, handheld, and eventually wearable devices), the challenges
and possibilities of programming and hacking software and hardware
became exponentially huge. For us, probably the most pertinent distinc-
tion is between programmers and hackers. In or by saying something in
code performs both illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The difference
between programmers and hackers is, however, the effects of their acts,
which have dramatically changed over time. Programmers are those—
either employed by software companies or working independently—
who make a living by writing code, which includes anything between
snippets (short code) and apps. Hackers may also program code in this
fashion, but the culture that gives them the name emanates from a dis-
tinct set of ethical and aesthetic values that combine to create a different
kind of politics than programming does. This difference is hard to ex-
press, but it is also the difference that is of interest to us. It is hard to
express perhaps because so much has been said and written about hack-
ers—mostly negative. As a consequence, a unified, typically clandestine,
selfish, young, male, and outlaw image has become dominant, which
more recent studies have shown is grotesquely simplified. We want to
argue that hackers are those whose acts break conventions of program-
ming.
Even a pioneering and dominant, if not sympathetic and celebratory,
account provides an image of such a unified culture that it has recently
been questioned by scholars who have wondered about its popularity.
Interestingly, it was in that intriguing year of 1984 (The Postmodern Condi-
tion, Neuromancer, Cyborg Manifesto) that Steven Levy published his Hack-
ers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution.47 Levy drew a more nuanced and
panoramic view of hackers yet still practically reproduced the clandes-
tine image. Critiquing this image, Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor argue that
various classes of hackers emerged over time and need to be distin-
guished.48 They note that although hackers gradually formed a dissident
culture in the 1980s, they were also incorporated into a massive work-
force as ‘microserfs’ programming for global corporations and security
states in the emerging software and application industries.49 By the
1990s, hackers were already functioning in at least four ways: original
hackers (dissident and libertarian), microserfs (subservient and submis-
sive), a growing group of open-source software developers (critical and
resilient), and politically motivated hacktivists (political and subver-
sive).50 These two last groups—open-source developers and hackti-
vists—constitute the most significant groups for understanding the emer-
gence of citizen subjects in cyberspace.
Although many of the examples that have gained notoriety in the
media about hackers—attacks, encryption, decryption, and disclosure—
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are typically clandestine and negative, hacker culture also has shown
itself to be passionately committed to the collaborative development and
free dissemination of software for many purposes. These are known as
free software and open-source software (not to be conflated) and cover
considerable ground in providing reusable programming. Often strong
values are developed and codified through such development. Gabriella
Coleman gives the example of Linux (an operating system), especially a
version known as Debian. She says, ‘[T]hese values are reflected in a pair
of charters—the Debian Constitution and the Debian Social Contract—
that articulate an organizational vision and formulate a set of promises to
the wider free software community.’51 Coleman argues that by mostly
circumventing copyright laws with their commitment to the free circula-
tion of intellectual property, hackers contradict the existing liberal con-
ception of intellectual property as the right to exclude and control. Yet by
advancing values of civil liberties and promoting individual autonomy
and, above all, a commitment to free speech, hackers are the most ardent
promoters of liberal values. Thus, for Coleman, hackers occupy both a
central and marginal—we might say a paradoxical—place within the lib-
eral tradition.
We are not convinced that interpreting both the ethics and aesthetics
of hacker cultures as advancing liberal values captures their originality.
These ‘values’ are inherited by the figure of the citizen within a much
longer historical and wider geographic experience than liberal values
extending from universal law to equal opportunity. Coleman says that
hackers ‘tend to value a set of liberal principles: freedom, privacy, and
access’. It is difficult for us to see freedom, privacy, and access as either
values or principles, though they express certain values. From our point
of view, things such as freedom, privacy, and access are rights, and, like
all rights, they are born of social and political struggles, and these strug-
gles both predate and are wider than what liberalism implies. Thus, we
wonder whether it is possible to understand hacking cultures in ethical
and aesthetic terms without also considering their broader politics. The
joy (deep hack mode) that hackers experience in creating a collaborative
culture by sharing their skills and talents is wonderful, but understand-
ing the ways in which this joy can be assimilated into obedient, submis-
sive, or subversive ways of being hackers requires a broader perspective.
One aspect of hacker culture that Coleman highlights is the slogan
‘code is speech’.52 Code is indeed the language of the Internet. But is it
speech? Following Austin, we argue that through speech acts we do
something in or by saying something. Similarly, we would argue that
programmers are doing something in or by coding something. Yet, to
articulate this more precisely, code is not speech: it is a language in or by
which speech acts are performed. Just as in human languages, the deci-
sive things here are not only the linguistic conventions that animate
speech acts but also the social conventions that they bring about. For
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Coleman, ‘the key point is that the multifaceted pleasures of hacking
signal that utility is not the only driving force in hackers’ creative acts.’
Thus, ‘for many free software hackers, the act of writing software and
learning from others far exceeds the simple enactment of an engineering
ethic, or a technocratic calculus for the sake of becoming a more profi-
cient as well as efficient programmer or system administrator.’53 That’s
true, but what differentiates hackers from programmers is that in or by
saying something through code, hackers challenge, if not subvert, con-
ventions in which they find themselves. Coleman recognizes that ‘many
hackers are citizens of liberal democracies, and have drawn on the types
of accessible liberal tropes—notably free speech—as a means to concep-
tualize their technical practice and secure novel political claims.’ But giv-
en the extensity of the Internet, although this statement may have been
true in the past, it would be hard to substantiate today that hackers are
only citizens of liberal democracies, meaning they are legal holders of
citizenship status in liberal democratic states. If we think about being
citizens not only in legal terms but also in relation to performative and
imaginary forces, we cannot agree that hackers are only citizen subjects of
liberal democracies. Coleman notes this by emphasizing that there are
genres of hacking and that hackers embody enormous political, regional,
national, and cultural differences. For example, southern European hack-
ers are more overtly political (leftist and anarchist) than their northern
counterparts. Similarly, while Chinese hackers are nationalistic,
Americans tend to be anti-authoritarian. Still, we need to recognize that
the effects of digital acts performed by hackers, not who they supposedly
are, is what distinguishes them from programmers.
What are the effects of digital acts of hacking? What conventions do
these acts break? What conventions do these acts resignify? They are as
broad as there are types of hackers. Take, for example, the difference
between ‘white hats’ and ‘black hats’. This difference pertains to whether
acts of hacking use legal or illegal actions. It can also refer to the extent to
which its collaborative conventions remain transparent. Those who main-
ly operate in the information security field are often called ‘infosec’ hack-
ers. Yet another group called ‘antisec’ hackers are against just about all
security measures on the Internet and aim to dismantle them. Among
these groups various actions, such as deliberately releasing security vul-
nerabilities, are debated passionately. We want to consider these com-
bined and diffuse effects of acts of hacking in terms of actions against
closings such as filtering, tracking, and normalizing. These actions that
feed the imaginary force of acts of hacking perhaps explain the joy of the
deep hack mode that Coleman documents. Yet a generalized conclusion
cannot be reached because hackers can create dangerous effects that also
participate in closings of the Internet.54
These actions are becoming intensified around the question of encryp-
tion, which is not simply a technology of being able to keep digital infor-
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mation secret but also one of being able to communicate without incrimi-
nation and with privacy, confidentially, and, if one chooses, anonymous-
ly. The battle over encryption is the link between hacking and hackti-
vism. Many readers will be already familiar with BitTorrent, Tor, and
cypher (an algorithm for encrypting and decrypting digital data): tech-
nologies that enable people on the Internet to perform various actions,
from communicating to downloading, privately and anonymously.55 Al-
though these can be used for actions such as ‘illegal’ downloading
through Pirate Bay, these technologies have also facilitated WikiLeaks
and dissident communication throughout the world.56 Through these
technologies, many activists are able to circumvent authorities and their
filtering and tracking. When Iran or Turkey blocks communication plat-
forms, for example, hacktivists are able to bypass such blocks through
these technologies. These technologies of evasion have profound implica-
tions for privacy, anonymity, and access to the Internet. It would not be
an exaggeration to say that the main battlefield of cyberspace is these
technologies of evasion.57 A fascinating example of a new convention is
DissidentX, which is being developed by the creator of BitTorrent, Bram
Cohen, and being watched carefully or anxiously, depending on who is
watching.58 This algorithm offers the ability to conceal a message inside
another message. The point of communication is to conceal that there is a
communication by including in it various messages that can also be red
herrings. Sharing a sound file, for example, can involve sending a mes-
sage. Apparently inspired by a pioneering algorithm by Julian Assange,
the invention of this convention on the Internet can have major conse-
quences.59 For this reason, perhaps, Assange argues that today’s hackers
are cypherpunks.60
At any rate, this brings us to the second group we mentioned previ-
ously: hacktivists. The term is not an elegant one, and it has had a limited
traction, probably for that reason. But it introduces a vital distinction in
terms of understanding the effects of what hackers do in or by saying
something and thus doing something with code. Jordan and Taylor cap-
tured this vital difference by designating hacktivists as rebels with a
cause and yet posing this statement with a question mark to indicate that
the effects are not straightforward to interpret. For example, they admit
that although hacktivism arises from hackers, it is difficult to draw the
line between the two: ‘Because hacktivism uses computer techniques bor-
rowed from the pre-existing hacker community, it is difficult to identify
definitively where hacking ends and hacktivism begins.’61 They under-
stand hacktivism as ‘the emergence of popular political action, of the self-
activity of groups of people, in cyberspace. It is a combination of grass-
roots political protest with computer hacking.’62 Jordan and Taylor also
provide a historical overview of dissent and civil disobedience as reper-
toires of politics, which we would call ‘acts of digital citizens’. They dis-
cuss how, for example, electronic civil disobedience by Zapatistas, the
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Mexican dissident group, changed the terms of policies by engaging in-
cipient Internet technologies in the 1990s to argue that Zapatismo—the
convention combined of grassroots and electronic activism—was in
many ways the birthplace of hacktivism as a disruptive convention.63
Many forms of activism that followed in subsequent decades bear the
marks of the convention that emerged during the Zapatista uprisings.
One of its activists, for example, already suggested in 1998 that the state
was intent on capturing the dissemination and exchange of information
on the Internet, especially among activists:
We must begin to invent other methods of Electronic Civil Disobedi-
ence. . . . The Zapatista Networks, in the spirit of Chiapas are develop-
ing methods of electronic disturbance as sites of invention and political
action for peace. At this point in time it is difficult to know how much
of a disturbance these acts of electronic civil disobedience specifically
make. What we do know is that neoliberal power is extremely con-
cerned by these acts.64
The virtue of hacktivism is that it reminds us that activism on the
Internet and the political cyberspace that it creates share a lineage with
especially the social struggles against racism, misogyny, inequality, ex-
ploitation, xenophobia, homophobia, and other forms of oppression and
injustice that defined the twentieth century. If indeed the nineteenth cen-
tury was defined by the struggles between working classes and privi-
leged classes of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy, a result of which was the
expansion of modern citizenship to nonpropertied classes, we have wit-
nessed these struggles of the twentieth century as the expansion of the
meaning and function of citizenship rights.65 If we say that we have
inherited the figure of citizen as a subject of power, this was possible
because of the activism of the working classes and their organizations in
the nineteenth century. Similarly, we inherit from the twentieth-century
civil rights movements, women’s movements, queer movements, envi-
ronmental movements, and social justice movements. Seeing hacktivism
connected with these movements and their extension to a new site of
politics that hitherto did not exist has the advantage of maintaining a
vital and crucial perspective on the effects of the acts of hacking. As
Marianne Franklin reminds us with Donna Haraway, being able to differ-
entiate between hacking for and without a cause is as important as ever
for enacting political subjectivity.66 So when we see Russian women tak-
ing on an oppressive regime with an act of singing (Pussy Riot) or Turk-
ish women taking on a misogynist political establishment by performing
massive Twitter laughter, these acts both resignify conventions and iter-
ate a struggle that is already in our imaginary.
Hackers thus contribute to upholding the subversive image of being
digital citizens, but by doing so they also painstakingly make rights
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claims through cyberspace as a commons. This leads us to the last explo-
ration of acts in this chapter.
COMMONING
We mentioned free software and open-source software developers and
the hacker cultures that they come from. We also mentioned one of the
significant accomplishments, Linux, an operating system developed by
the contributions of thousands of developers. Another aspect of this de-
velopment is its distribution, which has challenged the convention of
copyright and the development of the idea of digital commons. It is
worth briefly reflecting on copyright law as a modern invention to under-
stand how the digital commons creates a direct challenge to copyright’s
hegemony. Copyright derives its legal force from laws that protect exclu-
sive rights to and control of intellectual property. Even if its origins can
be traced to early modern Europe (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries), it is
modern in the sense that the formation of intellectual property—that is,
the conversion of creative products such as words, data, images, and
sound into property for exchange—is a result of the accumulation of
capital in modern societies. This is what Lyotard highlighted as the com-
modification of knowledge in what he then called ‘computerized soci-
eties’. The conversion of intellectual or, more broadly, cultural capital
into economic capital is possible under the protection of copyright laws.
This is the force of copyright law. Because it introduces a tension between
creativity and calculability, it is doubtful that copyright law either pro-
tects or encourages creativity. Instead, creativity is commodified by copy-
right. The performative force of copyright is that both the creator and
consumer must—knowingly and unknowingly—repeat and iterate it.
The force of copyright law would be nothing if it were not performed.
That is the reason why maintaining its imaginary force requires enor-
mous energy: Copyright mobilizes massive efforts to maintain its legal,
performative, and imaginary force. If creativity were not commodified,
copyright would not exist. Commodification transforms the use value of
things into exchange value for being sold and bought.
For many scholars, this snippet on copyright will be too simple.67
They will argue that originally copyright laws did indeed favour creators
and that it was for their protection. That intellectual property actually
predates modern societies and that it is only very recently—perhaps with
the rise of the digital economy—that copyright laws became (marginally)
counterproductive and restrictive. All is well taken. After all, copyright
law and intellectual property laws are among the most debated contem-
porary issues. Yet the digital commons—the rise of an international
movement to create, contribute, share, and distribute digital objects—is a
more fundamental challenge than a reaction to the more recent restric-
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Openings: Witnessing, Hacking, Commoning 139
tions of copyright law. The challenge is against the relentless drive to
convert knowledge into capital over the past two centuries.68
The Internet, however, disrupted more than the convention of copy-
right. As we discussed, acting through the Internet has raised political
questions about anonymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity. The pro-
duction and dissemination of digital words, data, images, and sound
intensified these questions. Arguably, one action more than any other
indicates how the legal, performative, and imaginary force of copyright
has been severely disrupted: it is ‘copying’. The digital has made copying
an obsolete act. Instead, the digital always involves replication, remixing,
mashing, and recombining of the original. That’s why Walter Benjamin’s
celebrated reflections on art in the age of mechanical reproduction be-
came a source of inspiration in the age of digital replication.69 As Law-
rence Lessig puts it starkly, ‘Every act on the Internet is a copy. Every act
in a digital network produces a copy.’70 This results in the creation of
something called ‘digital commons’: a commons produced by the partici-
pation of creators and commoners.71 The very principle that creates digi-
tal commons also creates tendencies against commodification; its very
production entails creators contributing resources without the direct mo-
netization of their contributions and commoners enjoying the benefits of
these resources. Thus, digital commons constitutes a major challenge to
the commodification of creative or immaterial labour, and this is why the
battle over intellectual property law has become decisive.72
The alternative and challenging conventions against copyright law are
many. Perhaps the two best known are copyleft, which concerns open-
source software, and creative commons, which concerns broader creative
production in digital commons. There is also a more recent convention,
which is a digital or crypto-currency, especially Bitcoin. We briefly dis-
cuss all three conventions because they resignify conventions by which
software, creativity, and money are respectively valued.
To start with, copyleft is significant because it arises from a particular
political struggle around software production and dissemination on the
Internet. In the 1980s, copyright laws quite dramatically changed in the
United States and Europe. The gist of these changes was that intellectual
property became much more exclusive and controlled with the extension
of rights to their creators. From an original fourteen-year protection of
intellectual property rights throughout the 1980s and 1990s, US law in-
creased to fifty and then fifty plus seventy years, which in effect made it
impossible for intellectual rights to pass into the public domain. At the
same time, an increased concentration in media ownership meant that a
huge proportion of intellectual production remained in the hands of a
few conglomerates.73 While much of the focus on the digital commons
has focused on it as the cause of intellectual copyright problems, argu-
ably it is the other way around: digital commons arose as a challenge to
this concentration and usurpation of creative production. How rapidly
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this concentration happened over three decades and how the digital com-
mons emerged as a challenge to this oligopolistic system is a significant
aspect of understanding acts of commoning.
The first such act was performed by the invention of copyleft. It was ‘a
brilliant notion given that the accepted convention at the time was pro-
prietary software code, and in most instances, licenses placed strict limi-
tations on software users as to where the software could be installed.’74
Instead, copyleft granted liberties to remix, reuse, and repurpose soft-
ware but mandated that such liberties continue to be inherited by future
versions of the software.75 The inventor of the idea, software program-
mer Richard Stallman, argued that ‘copyleft is a general method for mak-
ing a program free software and requiring all modified and extended
versions of the program to be free software as well.’76 For Stallman, ‘the
simplest way to make a program free is to put it in the public domain, un-
copyrighted. This allows people to share the program and their improve-
ments, if they are so minded.’ But the problem with this approach was
that ‘it also allows uncooperative people to convert the program into
proprietary software. They can make changes, many or few, and distrib-
ute the result as a proprietary product. People who receive the program
in that modified form do not have the freedom that the original author
gave them; the middleman has stripped it away.’77 So the problem that
copyleft solved was how to provide free software but maintain its free-
dom. The idea of copyleft became the foundation of a general public
licence known as GPL and spurred global free software and open-source
software movements.78 As Stallman puts it, the GPL’s aim was ‘to give all
users the freedom to redistribute and change GPL software. If middle-
men could strip off the freedom, we might have many users, but those
users would not have freedom.’ For Stallman, the core idea was that
‘anyone who redistributes the software, with or without changes, must
pass along the freedom to further copy and change it. Copyleft guaran-
tees that every user has freedom.’79 This licence was mobilized by hack-
ers who eventually became the creators of successful operating systems
such as Linux, especially the Debian version, which we mentioned previ-
ously, and web server software such as Apache. It is not an exaggeration
to say that the Internet, and especially the infrastructure of digital com-
mons, is mostly run by open-source software such as WordPress, Wiki-
media, Joomla, and Drupal, which are the results of the contributions of
many programmers. Open-source software repositories such as GitLab,
Savannah, Ourproject.org, and SourceForge, to give just a few examples,
are a testimony to the resilience of the digital commons. It is no wonder,
then, that it would be the subject of intense political economy analyses of
its gift economy and also its ethics and aesthetics.80
The copyleft convention was taken in another direction by the found-
ing of Creative Commons. Arguing that the debate (or battle) over copy-
right in the 1990s was being increasingly polarized into ‘all rights re-
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served’ versus ‘no rights reserved’ extremes, Lessig and his colleagues
founded the Creative Commons convention in 2002 to enable digital crea-
tors to maintain certain rights for their intellectual labour while provid-
ing its dissemination and circulation.81 Although it has its critics (who
argue that it reproduces the flaws of copyright laws), Creative Commons
is an ingenious convention that ruptures (resignifies radically) a copy-
right convention and provides various actions by which a creator is able
to specify rights that he or she wants to retain by visiting its site, making
his or her choices, creating code and embedding it in his or her code, and
thereby setting the terms of the distribution and circulation of his or her
digital labour—and thus enacting himself or herself as both a creator and
commoner of the digital commons. Of course, being founded in the Unit-
ed States, Creative Commons was limited by being a representative and
expression of a US approach to digital creativity. But it soon spread to
other countries through the iCommons moniker and now constitutes an
international movement for creative freedom.82
Another fascinating convention was invented in the digital commons
in 2009. In that year, a person with the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto
announced a new convention by which person-to-person payments could
now eliminate the third party, such as a bank, from a transaction. Naka-
moto called this convention ‘Bitcoin’. Although immediately defined as a
‘digital currency’, Bitcoin is different. Nakamoto also posted the details of
this convention in a brilliant eight-page document.83 Nakamoto defined
his proposal as ‘a system for electronic transactions without relying on
trust’.84 What Nakamoto meant is the absence of a third party. Clearly,
for any digital transaction to be possible between two parties there has to
be a third party which both parties trust and which underwrites the
transaction. This usually means a financial institution. For Nakamoto,
what was needed was ‘a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash
[that] would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to
another without going through a financial institution.’85 How Nakamoto
achieves this is beyond our comprehension, but the effects of this conven-
tion are radical. If there were a way to bypass existing financial institu-
tions and achieve person-to-person payments, it would be a more radical
invention than the invention of money. Bitcoin not only resignifies ano-
nymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity of a digital act but also rup-
tures the existing monopoly over transactions held by financial institu-
tions. The interesting aspect of the system is that it requires keeping all
transactions on a public ledger because this is the only way to maintain
proof of its work. Yet although all transactions are public, the parties in
these transactions remain anonymous, represented only by public en-
cryption keys. Bitcoin has been followed by thousands of other ‘crypto-
coins’ and new ones are planned such as Facebook’s Libra and China’s
national crypto-currency.86 Yet, in the decade since publication of Satoshi
Nakamoto’s proposition, and while becoming more accepted, the actual
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usage of crypto-currencies has remained niche despite being promoted as
the most efficient way to transfer value across national borders.87
The potential of this resignification of a convention can be found in
the example of the WikiLeaks release of Iraq war documents in 2010,
which lead to international financial institutions freezing its accounts and
all donations to it.88 This action was later interpreted as an instance of
how international financial institutions can collude with national author-
ities to charge someone or something as guilty before or until proven
innocent. Through a convention such as Bitcoin, not only WikiLeaks but
other bodies can bypass such collusion. There is, of course, concern that
not only legal but also illegal transactions of payments will happen
through Bitcoin. As some scholars say, ‘In the world of Bitcoin, there are
goldbugs, hippies, anarchists, cyberpunks, cryptographers, payment sys-
tems experts, currency activists, commodity traders, and the curious.’89
There is also concern about misuses of the system that will seek to de-
fraud it. But its ‘practical materialism’, or what Nakamoto calls its ‘un-
structured simplicity’, depends on more honest nodes in the system than
dishonest ones.90 We do not understand how this is achieved technically,
but theoretically it is not an unreasonable assumption. But the real inter-
est in this convention, whether it is Bitcoin or any other digital currency,
is what, once again, it demonstrates: that in the digital commons there is
an inexhaustible ingenuity, and people are willing to contribute to its
expansion and maintenance as a public domain. To do so, they are resig-
nifying conventions using open-source software, and with these conven-
tions, they are inviting others to transform cyberspace for digital citizens
committed to the digital commons.
CLAIMS
Witnessing, hacking, and commoning are three digital acts that have be-
come possible over the past few years and have created openings for
being digital citizens in or by making rights claims. The resignification of
existing or the introduction of new conventions made these acts possible:
Bitcoin, copyleft, Creative Commons, Digg, GitHub, GNN, GNU, Wiki-
Leaks, and many others. No doubt some of these conventions will be
replaced or displaced by others. Some will become defunct. Some will
perhaps persist as a testament to the digital commons. There will certain-
ly be new conventions. What endures is the performative force that has
gone into making these openings possible. If we understand cyberspace
as a space of relations between and among bodies acting through the
Internet, witnessing, hacking, and commoning resignify or invent con-
ventions and make possible the emergence of new ways of being citizen
subjects in cyberspace. Emergent ways of being citizen subjects include
digital acts that resignify a well-known convention, that of the hashtag.
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Whether referred to as hashtag activism or hashtag publics, the conven-
tion exemplifies how citizen subjects act in relation to specific sociotech-
nical arrangements that embody norms, values, affects, laws, ideologies,
and technologies. Although a hashtag is intended as a metatag to make it
easier to find posts on social media, the convention has been mobilized to
organize events, amplify issues and form new associations and iden-
tities.91 For Baer’s analysis of the hashtags #YesAllWomen and
#Aufschrei (outcry), the convention ‘has altered, influenced, and shaped
feminism in the twenty-first century by giving rise to changed modes of
communication, different kinds of conversations, and new configurations
of activism across the globe, both online and offline’.92 For Rambukkana,
‘political use of hashtags helped ignite a global reflection on race, the
policing of Black bodies, and the militarization of police’ in response to
the killing of unarmed teenager Michael Brown on 9 August, 2014 in
Ferguson, Missouri.93 While the portable video camera was crucial in the
aftermath and fallout from the Los Angeles Police Department beating of
Rodney King in 1991, the hashtag played a significant role in resignifying
events in Ferguson. There are many more examples. What we seek to
highlight here is how our theoretical framing can be taken up to interpret
these and other emerging digital acts as rights claims that enact people as
citizen subjects.
As we discussed previously, just as many efforts are being expended
on closings as on these openings, by cajoling and coercing citizen subjects
to be submissive and generally blocking possibilities. The digital com-
mons is certainly a new frontier for struggles over commodification.94
The main challenges to these creative forces emanate from state-security
apparatuses and commercial-legal apparatuses. We have covered some
of these closings, but here we want to restate the importance of open
versus closed conventions of the Internet. Much has been said about
Facebook, Flickr, Instagram, Pinterest, Google, Tumblr, Twitter, and You-
Tube and their activities for tracking the conduct of people for advertis-
ing revenues and collecting big data. Let us emphasize that among one of
the most important reasons that both state and corporate apparatuses are
able to do this is because these are designed as proprietary and closed
conventions. Unlike open conventions such as WordPress or Wikimedia,
these conventions require submitting to end-user licences and user
contracts that not only severely restrict actions but also appropriate their
results as data. There is a massive difference between the digital com-
mons created by open-source code and its increasing zoning, appropria-
tion, sequestration, and enclosure through closed conventions.
In the next chapter, we focus on making digital rights claims to draw
out both our theoretical and empirical interventions. Let us remember
that cyberspace is a fragile if not a precarious space. This makes its pro-
tection as an open-source digital commons a political question—a ques-
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tion that those who are making digital rights claims are enacting with
increasing effectiveness but also with urgency.
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SEVEN
Making Digital Rights Claims
Three rights—expression, access, and privacy—have emerged as the
most often debated digital rights. To these, openness and innovation
have recently been added. All together, these five rights have come to
constitute digital rights in cyberspace.1 Yet cyberspace is undoubtedly a
complex space, which we defined as a space of relations between and
among bodies acting through the Internet. It is even more complex for
understanding the birth of the citizen subject in or by making digital
rights claims. By focusing on digital acts that constitute cyberspace, we
have reoriented the theorizing of cyberspace and its politics towards digi-
tal acts and making rights claims. Not surprisingly, then, much of our
attention has been on exploring digital acts in relation to the constitutive
forces that we designated as legal, performative, and imaginary. We have
given an account of how callings interpellate subjects to act through the
Internet, how these callings create openings and closings that configure
cyberspace, and how these dynamics create citizen subjects in or by their
making of rights claims. Although expressed as separate, these rights are
undoubtedly related. The right to equal access to the Internet, for exam-
ple, may appear a more fundamental right than freedom of speech be-
cause without access there can be no speech. But since cyberspace is a
space of relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet,
access can take different forms. Although the right to access the Internet
evokes the image of a smooth cyberspace of flat hierarchies where every-
one can enjoy that access without fetters, it turns out to be more compli-
cated than that. The term ‘equal access’ stands as both a normative claim
and want. We have argued that such a smooth cyberspace probably nev-
er existed except in its imaginary force; rather, cyberspace has always
been striated because it is neither separate nor an independent space
from the power and knowledge relations that constitute it.
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We could, of course, continue here and discuss these five digital rights
and the tensions that arise from their advocacy.2 We could, for example,
discuss the tensions that arise between the right to own and use the big
data generated in or by saying and doing things through the Internet and
the right to create knowledge that contributes to a cyberspace commons.
We could discuss the tensions that arise between claims such as the right
to be forgotten versus calls for a collective memory and archive.3 These
tensions are undoubtedly intense and the object of debates (and political
struggles) over the conventions and governance of the Internet. They are
debates that are already well under way. But we now want to return to
the question we alluded to in chapter 3: Who is the subject of these digital
rights? Since we are interested in the processes through which these
rights are enacted rather than their substance, our question of ‘who’ con-
cerns that of political subjectivity through the Internet.4 As we have ex-
pressed it in various ways, ‘who’ does not correspond to an already
formed political subject but a figure: How is a political subject being
constituted as a claimant of digital rights? We have illustrated through-
out this book that digital acts traverse multiple national borders and legal
orders. Yet making rights claims that traverse borders is often addressed
through sovereign regional or national legal orders and their understand-
ing of rights.
So the question of ‘who’ is the subject of digital rights is both an
analytical but also an urgent political question that requires addressing. If
we use ‘citizen’ as the subject of these rights, clearly it does not capture
how both the enactment of the political subject and of cyberspace cut
across national borders and legal orders. Today, the citizen functions as a
member of a nation-state, and there are no corresponding rights and
obligations beyond the nation-state that can govern subjects whose acts
traverse international spaces.5 Yet if we use the ‘human’ to denote the
subject of these rights, clearly this is a subject as yet without digital rights.
To clarify this problem, we first turn to the ‘digital rights movement’. If
indeed it is possible to identify a social movement around digital rights,
we want to see how the movement envisages and negotiates between the
figure of the citizen and the human. We then turn to Jacques Rancière’s
thoughts concerning ‘who is the subject of rights’ and Jacques Derrida’s
thoughts on the performativity of declarations, bills, charters, and mani-
festos to think about digital rights. What we gather from Rancière and
Derrida is the importance of refusing to make a choice between the citi-
zen and the human as the subject of digital rights. Instead, we anticipate a
new figure of a citizen yet to come as the subject of digital rights.
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WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF DIGITAL RIGHTS?
What was described at the end of the twentieth century as ‘electronic civil
disobedience’ was transformed into a veritable ‘digital rights movement’
in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Appealing to the concept of
‘civil disobedience’ has been a common trope since the beginnings of
Internet activism. The Critical Art Ensemble (CAE), a collective of politi-
cal art performers, produced arguably one of the most prescient state-
ments about ‘electronic civil disobedience’.6 Their view on electronic civil
disobedience was predicated on the decentralization of power in contem-
porary societies and the ineffectiveness of traditional civil disobedience.7
For the collective, it was no longer effective to focus on streets and
squares as the sites of civil disobedience because power was dispersed
elsewhere through information networks. If there is to be disruption of
this dispersed power of information networks, acts of disobedience, too,
must be dispersed and seek power disruption in these networks. The
dispersal of power was such that ‘if mechanisms of control are chal-
lenged in one spatial location, they simply move to another location. As a
result, CD [civil disobedience] groups are prevented from establishing a
theater of operations by which they can actually disrupt a given institu-
tion.’8 For the collective, ‘nothing of value to the power elite can be found
on the streets, nor does this class need control of the streets to efficiently
run and maintain state institutions.’9 The collective understood cyber-
space as a separate and independent space from physical space and
argued that the ‘degree of access to the information located in cyberspace
suggests how institutions are configured in real space.’10 For this reason,
‘blocking information access is the best means to disrupt any institution,
whether it is military, corporate, or governmental. When such action is
successfully carried out, all segments of the institution are damaged.’11
Having settled the issue of how power was exercised in contemporary
societies (dispersed, informational, and cybernetic), the pressing issue
then was who was the subject of ‘electronic civil disobedience’: who
could be capable of disrupting this dispersed power? For CAE, the
emerging culture of hackers was at once a promise and a problem for
political activism. The promise was that hackers understood better than
anybody else how and where power was dispersed. The problem was
that most, if not all, of these hackers were US teenagers who ‘work out of
their parents’ homes and college dormitories to breach corporate and
governmental security systems. Their intentions are vague. Some seem to
know that their actions are political in nature.’12 It was concluded that
‘the problem of letting children act as the avant-garde of activism is that
they have not yet developed a critical sensibility that would guide them
beyond their first political encounter. Ironically enough, they do have the
intelligence to realize where political action must begin if it is to be effec-
tive—a realization that seems to have eluded leftist sophisticates.’13
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Two decades later, CAE’s view on electronic civil disobedience seems
both prescient and naïve.14 It seems prescient in face of the emergence
and transformation of hacktivist groups such as Anonymous, Demand
Progress, and WikiLeaks, which have developed new political subjectiv-
ities. Also, it can hardly be said that such hacking remains the domain of
‘teenagers’, let alone US teenagers.15 CAE’s idea that a technocratic
avant-garde may emerge as a political subject has also been borne out in
some ways. Their idea of small cells of subjects of politics can also be said
to anticipate the emergence of hacktivist groups, composed of ‘activist,
theorist, artist, hacker, and even a lawyer . . . knowledge and practice
should mix’.16 Yet it seems naïve at the same time for its rigid turn away
from streets and squares as sites of dissent. Time and again, contempo-
rary events have shown us the importance of streets, squares, and inter-
sections for enacting dissent, and even simply mentioning Tahrir Square,
Taksim Square, Tiananmen Square, Tamar Park, Maidan Square, Occupy
Wall Street, or Puerta del Sol immediately emphasizes this point without
belabouring it. Moreover, as we have argued throughout this book, to
imagine cyberspace as separate and independent from an ostensible
physical space is both empirically questionable and theoretically indefen-
sible. Nevertheless, the CAE also ushered in a different way of conceiving
performing politics and must be a precursor to the subsequent develop-
ment of digital political activists as subjects of a new politics of dissent.17
Today, using the term ‘digital rights movement’ to replace ‘electronic
civil disobedience’ can be misleading. It may imply that all the struggles
of cyberspace concern copyright and downloading. Although the digital
rights movement includes these struggles, today it is broadly conceived
to include the rights to produce, disseminate, and share digital informa-
tion.18 If there is indeed a digital rights movement, it is itself dispersed,
decentralized, and heterogeneous, involving many groups, tactics, vi-
sions, and demands. Although its activists are increasingly coalescing
around specific claims, including privacy, anonymity, sharing, and access
by engaging people through instituting and enacting changes, it also
spawns contradictory imaginary and performative forces. We want to
read the emergence and transformations of the digital rights movement
from the perspective of digital acts as one of the necessary elements for
making digital rights claims. Whether these acts cumulatively constitute
a digital rights movement comparable to other social movements will
concern scholars in the foreseeable future, and we cannot address that
question here. Instead, we want to gather from disparate and dispersed
digital acts the recognition of a dimly emerging figure as the subject of
digital rights. It is the emergence of this specific political subjectivity
around digital rights and the claims through which it has emerged—and
the openings and closings it has instigated—that forms the central ques-
tion of this book. Understood as both an individual and collective politi-
cal subjectivity, it has been enacted over the past two decades. But as we
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have already intimated, to address this enactment is not as straightfor-
ward as it may seem. For that reason, we will step back to briefly consid-
er the political subjects who have brought themselves into being with
both performative and imaginary force.
Julian Assange, who began his active life as a hacker, became a con-
duit to some of the most significant revelations of state secrets in history
through a platform called WikiLeaks. He languished from 2012 to 2019 in
the Ecuadorian embassy in London and was found guilty of breaching
the Bail Act and on 1 May 2019 sentenced to fifty weeks in prison in the
United Kingdom.19 Aaron Swartz began his active life as a hacker and
transformed himself into a digital rights activist through various involve-
ments and organizations and released a trove of academic articles into
the public domain. In the face of an unrelenting force of the law, he
ended his own life.20 Edward Snowden, a security operative working as
an employee and subcontractor for the US Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), released classified information from the National Security Agency
(NSA) about how state agencies are involved in massive surveillance and
are spying on their own and other countries’ citizens with impunity at a
scale hitherto unknown. Since 2013 he has been in exile in Russia and
expects to be so for many years to come.21 Laura Poitras became a digital
exile in Berlin after making a film about Snowden.22 Chelsea Manning
served a jail sentence from 2012 to 2017 for leaking military secrets, re-
vealing the impunity with which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
been conducted. Manning was again jailed in 2019 for refusing to testify
to a grand jury investigating WikiLeaks.23 Peter Sunde, who co-founded
Pirate Bay for free culture, co-invented a digital payment system (Flattr),
and created an end-to-end encrypted messaging system (Hemlis), served
several months of a prison sentence for being a conduit in downloading
copyrighted material.24 Ilham Tohti, a former economics professor at
Minzu University of China in Beijing, began a website in 2006 that re-
ported the oppressions of Uyghur people, was closed in 2008 by the
Chinese government; he was sentenced to life imprisonment for inciting
youth online with the aim of making domestic issues international.25
Christopher Wylie, former research director at Cambridge Analytica
(CA), turned whistle-blower in 2018 and provided documents to The
Guardian newspaper about CA’s exploitation of Facebook data.26 We can
add to this list of names those figures who continue to have force, such as
Richard Stallman, who founded the free software movement; Jimmy
Wales, who not only founded Wikipedia as a free encyclopaedia but has
waged a resilient battle to keep it that way by organizing hundreds of
thousands of contributors; Jacob Appelbaum, who campaigned for anon-
ymous browsing for privacy and security with the Tor Project; and Phil
Zimmerman, who made possible end-to-end encryption in email by
fighting off the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) best efforts to
stop his inventiveness.27 That almost all these individuals are men says
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much about how the heroic figure of digital rights claims is gendered. But
this list is a fraction of the countless and diverse Internet activists who
through sheer inventiveness, creativity, and autonomy make digital
rights claims in or by saying and doing something through the Internet. It
is tempting to interpret them as the members of an emerging avant-garde
technocracy. It is also tempting to interpret them as hacktivists. But when
we interpret their digital acts through the Internet, they embody all the
characteristics of citizen subjects: they enact citizenship as subjects of
power with responsibility in ways that are instantly recognizable and yet
cannot be bounded by their identity as military or security personnel. If
the performative force of their code is louder than their words, the imagi-
nary force of their words is not so weak, either.
These observations practically apply to all political subjects that the
digital rights movement has spawned. Anonymous, a collective group
that began its existence as hackers intent on pranks, quite rapidly trans-
formed into a hacktivist group with political subjectivity.28 Remarkably,
the public image of hackers has an inverse relationship to their acts.
When hackers were more intent on ‘we do because we can’ politics, their
public image was mysterious, revered, and appreciated. Yet once hackers
turned into hacktivists with political subjectivity, their public image suf-
fered, and it became tainted with criminality. There is a lesson to be
learned about how new political subjects encounter criminalization when
both the performative and imaginary force of their acts come up against
the force of law. Yet it is not only Anonymous or Lulzsec, its breakaway
version, that the digital rights movement has produced as its collective
subjects. The number of nongovernmental and activist organizations
dedicated to various digital rights, from anonymity to privacy and access,
is staggering. They range from advocacy and lobbying organizations
such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Open Rights Group to
activist groups such as Riseup.net and the Tactical Technology Collective.
The large number of digital rights organizations—large and small—is
probably already beyond the climax of ecological rights or animal rights
movements and is yet to be collectively researched and interpreted.
Taken together, these individual and collective bodies begin to give a
glimpse of the incipient political subject of digital rights. Can we say
something general about the political subjects that spawn making digital
rights claims? Our question here deliberately echoes a question Jacques
Rancière asks about the rights of humans.29 His critique of the difference
between the rights of humans and the rights of citizens in French (and by
extension in US and British) declarations of rights in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries resonates with our concern here. Rancière’s take on
the figure of the citizen as we have inherited it echoes with ours, but we
read Rancière through performativity. Rancière’s take is that what makes
the subjects of politics cannot be described independently of how those
subjects perform themselves as subjects of politics, and politics itself
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should be defined through that performance. Rancière does not use our
language of the legality, performativity, and imaginary aspects of politi-
cal subjectivity, but the spirit, if not the letter, is similar.
Rancière proposes to resolve the so-called paradox of the subject of
rights introduced by Hannah Arendt.30 Rancière argues that Arendt is
perplexed about human rights precisely because they are understood
only in legal and not performative terms. The assumption that there can
be no human rights without citizenship rights is a trap that neglects how
rights can be brought into being performatively.31 Arendt, Rancière says,
assumes that ‘either [human rights are] the rights of those who have no
rights or the rights of those who [already] have rights [who are citi-
zens]’.32 Instead, Rancière proposes that ‘the rights of [hu]man[s] are the
rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights
that they have not.’33 The proposition has two parts. The first is those
rights that are enacted by subjects who are not included in what counts as
subjects of these rights. The second concerns those rights enacted by sub-
jects who are counted in what counts but who do not have the rights that
they are supposed to have. In our words, we would describe the first as
the imaginary force of rights and the second as the performative force of
rights. First, when subjects are acting as political subjects, it is not even
imagined or imaginable—given how a society is instituted—that they
have a right to do so. Second, only when subjects perform themselves as
political subjects do their acts become political. Politics, then, is about
bringing both imaginary and performative forces into being. In our
words, when citizen subjects claim ‘I, we, or they have a right to’, they are
claiming both rights they do not have and rights that they have. Rancière
illustrates this with women’s rights. First, women demonstrate that they
are denied the rights that they have by referring to the declaration of
rights. This is to say, if indeed rights are universal (as affirmed by declar-
ations), then women (should) have a right to count themselves in those
rights. Second, women can also enact rights that are already in the declar-
ation naming them. So Rancière says that ‘[women] could act as subjects
of the rights of [hu]man[s] in the precise sense that . . . they acted as
subjects that did not have the rights that they had and had the rights that
they had not.’34 Rancière calls bringing these two aspects of rights togeth-
er as dissensus. It is dissensus rather than consensus because politics is
always a contestation over who is counted and what counts. For Rancière,
a political subject involves the capacity for staging such scenes of dissen-
sus. Thus, ‘political subjects are not definite collectivities. They are sur-
plus names, names that set out a question or a dispute about who is
included in their count.’35
Conceiving the enactment of rights as dissensus is more powerful
than understanding dissent as civil disobedience. For all its illustrative
history, civil disobedience still evokes a reactionary politics, whereas dis-
sensus is creative and affirmative. Although significant as a specific act,
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civil disobedience is rather too narrow to understand political acts in
general. Staging dissensus brings into play the imaginary, performative,
and legality of rights all at once and constitutes subjects as citizen sub-
jects of power. Assange, Snowden, Anonymous, Swartz, and Open
Rights are not only definite individuals or collectives of civil disobedience
but also stand for a political subjectivity enacting rights as the staging of
dissensus. This is what we gather from their acts. When they enact rights
that they do not have and the rights that they should have, they bring
into being political subjects who cannot be known in advance. Their acts
are contestations over who is counted as political and what counts as
politics. To put it slightly differently, the performative and imaginary
force of rights lies in the double movement between their inscription and
enactment. For Rancière, ‘these rights are theirs when they can do some-
thing with them to construct a dissensus against the denial of rights they
suffer.’36 And, perhaps more importantly, ‘there are always people
among them who do it.’37 That there will always be a Swartz or an As-
sange should not undervalue the courage summoned by Swartz or As-
sange in staging the scenes of dissensus that they have enacted. Without
the courage of their bodies, neither the force of their imaginary nor per-
formativity alone could stage dissensus against the force of law.
The proliferation of making digital rights claims through the Internet
has produced a multitude of acts in or by saying and doing something.
We do not mean that these acts are intentional claims, but the acts them-
selves produce effects of making rights claims. So what brings these citi-
zen subjects into being are the digital acts that they enact as dissensus. A
parallel development to the emergence of these citizen subjects has been
the proliferation of declarations, manifestos, bills, and charters that make
specific claims to cyberspace. The aim of these declarations, bills, char-
ters, and manifestos has been to constitute various ‘universal’ subjects of
rights in or by saying something, and we next discuss a select few to
interpret the subject of digital rights incipient in them.
BILLS, CHARTERS, DECLARATIONS, AND MANIFESTOS
We have witnessed numerous bills of rights, charters of demands, declar-
ations of principles, and manifestos as callings on the Internet that it is
about time we ask what they repeat, cite, iterate, and eventually resig-
nify. It is important to consider them as speech acts and ask what claims
they bring into being in or by making declarations about rights. It is easy
to dismiss these declarations that the Internet has occasioned, but they
also require critical examination. Some dismiss them for their ostensible
ineffectiveness, but this is understood in terms of constative rather than
performative effects. The question we’d rather ask is what, if any, imagi-
nary and performative if not legal force do they have? We have previous-
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ly discussed John Parry Barlow’s ‘the declaration of independence of
cyberspace’. Although it is perhaps the best-known declaration, it is
astounding how many more declarations have been proclaimed. It is
worth recalling that for Barlow, cyberspace was ‘a world that is both
everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live’; this may not
have had much legal or even performative force, but it certainly had an
imaginary force.38 This declaration has been followed by numerous other
declarations and various bills of rights that, taken together, provide a
glimpse into how making digital rights claims has evolved over the past
twenty years. Yet we have been unable to find a repository or catalogue
of such bills, charters, declarations, and manifestos. The most prominent
have been declarations on cyberspace, various hacker manifestos, numer-
ous bills of rights, charters of rights, and supplements to the existing
conventions of human rights.39 Now, we do not want to imply that we
will treat them as a homogenous group. On the contrary, each of these
declarations belongs to speech situations: after all, a UN resolution is
radically different from a hacker manifesto. However, the relation of eth-
ics to politics in summoning a political subject—though it has not been
expressed this way—has been an important element across all these dec-
larations. So we are going to mention a few almost arbitrarily, and then
we will begin to differentiate them. With Derrida, we will then see how
we can interpret their imaginary and performative force in summoning a
political subject yet without a name.
It is difficult to know where to start, but Richard Stallman’s manifesto
for free software proved resilient in its imaginary force. Stallman argues
that a ‘golden rule’ requires ‘that if I like a program I must share it with
other people who like it’.40 For Stallman, ‘software sellers want to divide
the users and conquer them, making each user agree not to share with
others.’ By contrast, Stallman ‘refuse[s] to break solidarity with other
users in this way. [He] cannot in good conscience sign a nondisclosure
agreement or a software license agreement’.41 That Stallman acts with
conscience and declares solidarity with users is the imaginary force of
this declaration and has retained its resilience remarkably well over the
past twenty-five years.42 One feels this force when Poitras credits various
free and open-source software for making possible her film on Snowden,
Citizenfour.43
One also feels this force in Snowden’s open letter to explain his act
when emphatically stating that ‘citizenship carries with it a duty to first
police one’s own government before seeking to correct others.’44 Obvi-
ously, Snowden is not speaking here as a US citizen as such. Yet the
source of authority for enacting this citizen subject is ambiguous. When
Snowden continues to declare that ‘I understand that I will be made to
suffer for my actions, and that the return of this information to the public
marks my end. I will be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal
pardon, and irresistible executive powers that rule the world that I love
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are revealed for even an instant.’45 This is, then, roughly the ethical
stance of that ambiguous citizen subject who speaks. Similarly, when
Swartz states in his Guerrilla Open Access Manifesto that ‘there is no
justice in following unjust laws’, one feels that he is moved by this imagi-
nary force. For Swartz, ‘all of this action [of sharing] goes on in the dark,
hidden underground. It’s called stealing or piracy, as if sharing a wealth
of knowledge were the moral equivalent of plundering a ship and mur-
dering its crew. . . . There is no justice in following unjust laws. It’s time
to come into the light and, in the grand tradition of civil disobedience,
declare our opposition to this private theft of public culture.’46 US legal
authorities apparently used this manifesto to lay charges against him.47
It is noteworthy that these declarations have similar imaginary but
different performative force from those of collective declarations. A re-
cent and powerful Declaration of Internet Freedom states, ‘We stand for a
free and open Internet.’48 Its signatories include Swartz, Ai Weiwei, Am-
nesty International, Digital Sisters, Electronic Frontier Foundation, John
Perry Barlow, openDemocracy, Tim Berners-Lee, and hundreds more
signers. It declares five principles as digital rights: ‘Expression: Don’t
censor the Internet. Access: Promote universal access to fast and afford-
able networks. Openness: Keep the Internet an open network where eve-
ryone is free to connect, communicate, write, read, watch, speak, listen,
learn, create and innovate. Innovation: Protect the freedom to innovate
and create without permission. Don’t block new technologies and don’t
punish innovators for their users’ actions. Privacy: Protect privacy and
defend everyone’s ability to control how their data and devices are
used.’49 The declaration rejects singularizing itself and recognizes that it
is a reiteration in the sense that ‘[w]e are not the first nor will we be the
last to attempt to articulate basic principles to guide Internet policy and
promote the rights of Internet users around the world. This Declaration
of Internet Freedom is part of that ongoing global conversation, and we
recognize and rely on these previous efforts.’50 This sensibility is also a
key to understanding how these declarations are cumulatively bringing a
political subject, yet unnamed, into being.
Does involving more than five hundred of the world’s leading authors
in signing an open letter that requests the passing of a bill of digital rights
for the Internet have any performative force?51 To whom is it addressed
when the letter declares that ‘WE DEMAND THE RIGHT for all people to
determine, as democratic citizens, to what extent their personal data may
be legally collected, stored and processed, and by whom; to obtain infor-
mation on where their data is stored and how it is being used; to obtain
the deletion of their data if it has been illegally collected and stored’?52
When it calls on states and corporations to respect these rights and on the
United Nations to acknowledge the importance of protecting these civil
rights through an International Bill of Digital Rights, who is the demo-
cratic citizen it is summoning?
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As we mentioned, these individual and collective declarations—of
which we could give many more examples—are often dismissed for their
lack of legal, if not performative, force. We believe that their imaginary
force should not be so easy to dismiss. They not only create a cumulative
force but also disseminate this force into other practices and acts. A case
in point is the growing political struggle over governing the Internet
pursued through international law and institutions. Often named as
‘governing the Internet’, scholars have focused on sovereignty games,
including those among states staking their claims to the Internet, the
actions of international bodies, and negotiations over various protocols.53
It is well worth considering the international digital rights regime that
has been emerging, especially over the past decade and especially cen-
tred on the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), both organized by the United Na-
tions.54
The WSIS, held in December 2003 in Geneva, is widely recognized as a
‘constitution for cyberspace’.55 The importance of WSIS is that it draws
its imaginary force from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) and institutes parallels between those rights and digital rights.56
The organization of the summit and the declaration of its principles were
the results of years of work. Its sixty-seven principles have more clauses
than many constitutions include. It is an ambitious document, and its
first principle affirms that
We, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in Gene-
va from 10–12 December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit
on the Information Society, declare our common desire and commit-
ment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented
Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and
share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities
and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustain-
able development and improving their quality of life, premised on the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and re-
specting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The most important principles that evince digital rights involved rights:
connectivity, access, capacity, security, governance, equity, and diver-
sity.57 The document does not specify digital rights as such, but impor-
tantly it recognizes that what was then called ‘the information society’
constitutes an international resource and that this calls for international
responsibility. In subsequent initiatives and declarations, these rights
have become building blocks of claiming digital rights.
Although the WSIS declaration in 2003 in Geneva was a pivotal mo-
ment, the struggles leading up to and at the 2005 assembly in Tunis were
transformative moments in the emergence of a new political subject of
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digital rights. As Marianne Franklin has documented, in Tunis WSIS be-
gan involving a much broader spectrum of civil society organizations
where local activists presented alternative programs and dissenting dec-
larations to those from the official proceedings.58 This broader involve-
ment was then reflected in the makeup of the IGF, which followed the
2005 Tunis meeting. The WSIS meetings in 2003 and 2005 as well as the
constitution and meetings of the IGF, which followed, can be said to have
eventually spurred the Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the
Internet.59 The charter builds on the WSIS Declaration of Principles of
Geneva and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, which both
articulated emerging digital rights. Like the WSIS declaration, the charter
draws parallels with fundamental human rights that are enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The charter includes nineteen rights and one set of duties, which are
important to outline.60 The charter rights include right to access to the
Internet (choice, inclusion, neutrality, equality); right to non-discrimina-
tion in Internet access, use, and governance; right to liberty and security
on the Internet (protection); right to development through the Internet
(sustainability and development); freedom of expression and information
on the Internet (freedom to protest, right to information, freedom from
censorship, freedom from hate speech); freedom of religion and belief on
the Internet; freedom of online assembly and association; right to privacy
on the Internet (anonymity, freedom from surveillance, freedom from
defamation); right to digital data protection (protection of personal data,
use of personal data, obligations of data collectors); right to education on
and about the Internet; right to culture and access to knowledge on the
Internet; rights of children and the Internet; rights of people with disabil-
ities and the Internet; right to work and the Internet; right to online par-
ticipation in public affairs; rights to consumer protection on the Internet;
right to health and social services on the Internet; right to legal remedy
and fair trial for actions involving the Internet; and right to appropriate
social and international order for the Internet (governance, multilingual-
ism, pluralism). The duties and responsibilities include respect for the
rights of others and the responsibilities of power holders.
The charter is clearly an ambitious and comprehensive claim to digital
rights. It has the advantage of gathering the experience of the past twenty
years concerning not only the usage of the Internet but also how states
and corporations have staked their claims to cyberspace. Much can be
discussed about each of the claims to digital rights and the subjects that
these claims call on. The charter addresses itself to states and individuals
as it argues that ‘human rights govern the relationship between the State
and the individual, so human rights obligations bind states.’61 It claims
that because the charter is based on human rights, its provisions would
be binding on states. It recognizes that the charter does not and cannot
address violations of rights claimed in the charter, but it cites the UN
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‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework as a mechanism to address
those violations. We will shortly discuss the legal, performative, and
imaginary force of the charter, but first, let us consider the following two
charter initiatives.
The first is a joint academic initiative to develop a bill of rights for the
Internet in 2007 advanced by Italian and Brazilian scholars.62 This Inter-
net Bill of Rights argued that it was not to be conceived as a transposition
of the traditional logic of international conventions to the Internet. In-
stead, it argued, a bill of rights for the Internet must conceive of genuine-
ly digital rights that are not covered by traditional conventions.63 Recog-
nizing that such a bill will not have the force of law, it argued that the
Internet constitutes a world without borders and will require a new cul-
tural model of making digital rights claims from the bottom up. This
initiative was developed further in Brazil's charter of civil rights for the
Internet, the Marco Civil da Internet. Passed in 2014, it was ‘acclaimed as
a template for national Internet policy elsewhere in the world’.64 Hoskins
argues that the framing of civic rather than human rights was significant
as it acknowledges local political-economic and sociocultural realities of
rights rather than treating them as static and universal. Although its pro-
visions corresponded to digital rights legislation elsewhere in the world,
it diverged significantly to address endogenous factors that were critical
to the aggressive and successful campaigning of civil society groups. A
US scholar and blogger also proposed a bill of rights for cyberspace based
on this model, which is the second charter initiative.65 Combining princi-
ples and rights, Jeff Jarvis proposed that any bill of rights should include,
‘We have the right to connect. We have the right to speak. We have the
right to speak in our languages. We have the right to assemble. We have
the right to act. We have the right to control our data. We have the right
to our own identity. What is public is a public good. The Internet shall be
built and operated openly’.66 In 2018, following scandals such as the
Facebook data breach and CA, US Democrats developed a list of princi-
ples on issues such as privacy, net neutrality, and discrimination. Re-
ferred to as a ‘Bill of Rights for the Internet’, principles included the right
to have access to and knowledge of all collection and uses of personal
data by companies and the right to opt-in consent to the collection of
personal data by any party and to the sharing of that data with a third
party.67
It is worth mentioning the Deauville Declaration proclaimed at the G8
meeting in Paris in 2011. Although criticized by civil society groups for
not explicitly adopting a human rights perspective, the declaration never-
theless presents access to the Internet as a fundamental aspect of its com-
mitment to freedom and democracy. The German minister of foreign
affairs, in addressing freedoms in cyberspace, proposed that access to the
Internet should be now considered a human right.68
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Against the background of these developments—albeit related to
them and perhaps spurred by them—the UN Human Rights Council
gradually assumed an active (though limited) role in establishing digital
rights as human rights. In 2009, the special rapporteur issued an impor-
tant report raising concerns about privacy on the Internet and concluded
that ‘the Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is flexible enough to enable necessary, legitimate and proportion-
ate restrictions to the right to privacy’.69 In 2010, the Human Rights
Council followed this up by documenting ‘good practices’ in protecting
privacy.70 In 2011, the UN report of the special rapporteur on the promo-
tion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
followed WSIS.71 This report goes beyond privacy and argues for ‘the
right of all individuals to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds through the Internet’.72 The report emphasizes the unique
and transformative nature of the Internet to enable individuals to exercise
not only their rights to freedom of opinion and expression but also a
range of other human rights. It reports on the applicability of internation-
al human rights norms and standards on the rights to freedom of opinion
and expression on the Internet as a communication medium and sets out
the exceptional circumstances under which the dissemination of certain
types of information may be restricted. It highlights two aspects of access
to the Internet: access to content and access to connectivity. It then re-
ports how states are increasingly censoring information online through
arbitrary blocking or filtering of content, criminalization of legitimate
expression, imposition of intermediary liability, and disconnecting users
from Internet access, including the basis of intellectual property rights
law, cyberattacks, and inadequate protection of the right to privacy and
data protection. This report was debated at the seventeenth session of the
UN Human Rights Council in June 2011. On 5 July 2012, the UN Human
Rights Council also adopted a resolution on the promotion, protection,
and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, affirming that human
rights apply to both online and offline activities.73 This unanimously
adopted resolution to protect the free speech of individuals on the Inter-
net is the first such UN resolution of its kind.74 The Human Rights Coun-
cil continued to be active and issued two further reports in 2013 and 2014
that led to other resolutions in 2014. The first report investigated the
impact of the surveillance of communications on the exercise of the hu-
man rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression.75 It
identified an urgent need to revise national laws regulating surveillance
practices in line with human rights standards. The second report practi-
cally enjoined Snowden’s revelations and investigated the impact of mass
surveillance.76 This came during the same year when the UN Human
Rights Council adopted a resolution on ‘the right to privacy in the digital
age’.77
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As these bills, charters, declarations, and manifestos gather momen-
tum, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a joint project to monitor and report
on Internet filtering and surveillance practices by nations that we dis-
cussed in chapter 5, has demonstrated that cyberspace is being increas-
ingly closed. By deploying sophisticated filtering and blocking technolo-
gies, many states are both conducting surveillance of their citizens and
determining their citizens’ access to the Internet.78 The sovereignty
games of states are constantly reterritorializing cyberspace along state
territories.79 Some may see the openings and closings of the Internet as
related developments, a sign of social and political struggles over its
control. Others may dismiss these bills, charters, declarations, and mani-
festos for their lack of legal or even performative force. They may argue
that regardless of such declarations, or even perhaps in the face of them,
states and corporations continue to colonize cyberspace and play sove-
reignty games.80 They may argue that it is no longer just states such as
China, which pioneered filtering and blocking (euphemistically called the
‘Great Firewall’), but also a huge range, including the United Kingdom,
United States, and European states that are engaged in this battle for
control.81 Moreover, this is not a struggle between states and their citi-
zens but a struggle involving the collusion and complicity of especially
US corporations in various roles as service providers or consultants for
filtering, blocking, and censoring.82
These criticisms have considerable merits. It is true that any human
digital rights-based declarations would suffer from the same criticisms as
other human rights declarations, such as their lack of enforceability (per-
locutionary force) and effectiveness (illocutionary force) to influence
states. The adoption of international legal and human rights declarations
may not lead to changes in state practices.83 Moreover, human rights also
suffer from a performative contradiction in that they end up reinforcing
the very system of states that they seek to protect people from while often
leaving corporations largely outside their purview.
We, of course, agree with these concerns. But our primary concern is a
different one. The figure of the citizen, which is a fundamental figure for
conceiving politics and rights in cyberspace, is practically absent from the
digital rights discourse. The key question, ‘Who is the subject of digital
rights?’ goes amiss. We have mentioned that the bills, conventions, char-
ters, and declarations claiming rights—with all the symbolic dates asso-
ciated with them of 1689, 1776, 1789, 1835, 1948—are largely about enact-
ing repeatedly the legality, performativity, and imaginary of rights as a
contested field of social and political struggles whose both cause and
effect are the figure of the citizen. Yet, ironically, this figure disappears
from the charters claiming digital rights and instead is replaced by the
human rights of ‘individuals’. We think that this is radically reducing the
imaginary force of these declarations to affirm and assert the figure of the
citizen as both the subject and agent of these rights, not merely as a
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subject of nationality (nation-state), a subject of humanity (human rights),
or a bearer (or holder) of rights but as a historical subject that we inherit
and who has a right to claim rights.84
Some may object to this by saying that ‘we’ inherit this as European or
Euro-American subjects and that its universalism should be called into
question. We previously quoted Mark Poster, ‘Western concepts and po-
litical principles such as the rights of [hu]man[s] and the citizen, however
progressive a role they played in history, may not provide an adequate
basis of critique in our current, increasingly global condition.’85 By ad-
vancing the figure of the citizen that we have inherited, are we not risk-
ing using ‘Western’ concepts? This is, of course, a legitimate objection
and requires a response. When we use ‘we’ as the subject who is inherit-
ing the figure of the citizen subject, we have in mind a broader concep-
tion than a European or Euro-American conception. Although we give
seemingly European and US events—1689, 1776, 1789, 1835, 1948—for its
formation, it depends on how we understand those events that makes
them belong to European or world histories. Clearly, it is beyond the task
of this book to address that issue. Our argument here is that bills, char-
ters, declarations, and manifestos ought to not only enact universal prin-
ciples but also require regional enactments. There must be a reflexive
sensitivity about differentiated experiences, and it should guide our
understanding of digital citizens.86 One of the weaknesses, then, of the
contemporary digital rights discourse is precisely in not articulating the
subject of these rights as a citizen—albeit a different, if not alternative,
one than that which we are accustomed to as a member of the nation-
state. Where, or perhaps more importantly, how do we look for the figure
of a citizen subject of cyberspace?
We are concerned that the divide between the enactment and inscrip-
tion of digital rights remains dangerously open. Those whose attempt to
inscribe rights in law work with the assumption that their enactment will
follow their inscription. Those whose acts enact digital rights work with
the conviction that their inscription will follow their enactment. With
Rancière, we can say that their inscription is a prelude to their enactment,
whereas their enactment inspires their inscription. Those who are making
digital rights claims in saying something (inscription) are on a separate
but necessarily related path from those who are making digital rights
claims by saying something (enactment). Let us consider more closely
making rights claims in saying something and by saying something.
For this, Derrida’s remarkably short piece on the Declaration of Inde-
pendence is again close to the spirit, if not the letter, of our interpreta-
tion.87 It was Derrida who thought that such declarations as speech acts
could be considered in their performative force for the effects that they
create.88 He thought that a declaration such as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence cannot be read as a constative speech act describing the state of
affairs of which it speaks but as a performative act, which ‘performs, it
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accomplishes, it does what it says it does; that at least would be its inten-
tional structure’.89 The question that concerns Derrida is ‘Who is the
actual signer of such acts?’90 If indeed a declaration constitutes a claim ‘I,
we, they have a right to’, by what right do these signatories constitute
themselves as political subjects becomes the question. When a declaration
such as this is claimed, one cannot know whether its performative force is
able to produce the effect that it promises, that of instituting a political
subject of rights. Even if it is done in the name of the people, a declaration
has no way of guaranteeing that in fact its people exist or will exist as a
fact. Rather, and this is Derrida’s intervention, the act brings the people,
its political subject, into being through the act. The people a declaration
names do not exist. Derrida writes, ‘[People] do not exist as an entity, it
does not exist, before this declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself,
as free and independent subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in
the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer.’91 That the
signature invents the signer can be easily misinterpreted to mean that
before the signature, the signer does not exist; but for Derrida it means
that ‘there was no signer, by right, before the text of the Declaration
which itself remains the producer and guarantor of its own signature.’92
On the contrary, the signature gives itself a name, a name by which a
people, a political subject, is named. The force of a declaration, its perfor-
mative ‘force makes right, founds right or the law, gives right, brings the
law to the light of day, gives both birth and day to the law’.93 By bringing
into play a chain of events, delegation, representation, naming, signature,
and citations, a declaration enacts a signature that restores, by right, to
political subjects their subjectivity.
Derrida’s take on declarations as performative acts reminds us of two
important lessons about the proliferation of declarations, bills, charters,
and manifestos on the Internet and its subjects. First, it is undecidable
whether an act is indeed capable of producing a subject that it names. For
that reason, without guarantees, it must be done regardless of its actual
effects, for the effects of citation and iteration are as much about bringing
the political subject thus named into being as about making an attempt to
remind ourselves that ‘I, we, they have a right to’ must be performed.
Second, without naming the political subject, without citing and iterating
yet again that ‘I, we, they have a right to’, its eventual effect will not be
accomplished, that is, bringing the force of law into being. With Rancière
we can say that staging this dissensus brings together the two necessary
aspects of a declaration as a performative act that bridges the gap be-
tween inscription and enactment. So although we said that bills, charters,
declarations, and manifestos enact an imaginary force by which political
subjects are named and claims made, we must now admit that indeed
without the imaginary force of these bills, charters, declarations, and
manifestos, there can be no performative or legal effects that bring its
political subjects into being.
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Our argument is that bills, charters, declarations, and manifestos
would have stronger imaginary force if they also derived their performa-
tive force from everyday acts through the Internet: how people uptake
positions as citizens of cyberspace, how they respond to callings to partic-
ipate in cyberspace, how they create openings for constituting themselves
differently, how they struggle for and against closings, and how they
make digital rights claims in or by performing digital acts.94
They would also have more performative if not legal force if they
arose from not only a universal commitment but also regional commit-
ments to understanding how the figure of the citizen is being articulated
differently in cyberspace and how this figure is essential for bringing the
force of law into being. The most significant space for thinking about the
politics of the Internet and the political subject it has given rise to—the
digital citizen—is the space between the inscription of rights and their
enactment. Those who imagine the inscription of digital rights—privacy,
access, protection—often assume that the fact of this inscription is also
their guarantee. This may not be stated explicitly, but the discourse on
inscribing digital rights as human rights in international human rights
law often assumes that the force of such laws will guarantee that individ-
uals, states, corporations, and other bodies will perform them. This as-
sumption fails to recognize that how people experience being digital citi-
zens and how they perform rights by bringing them into being through
enacting themselves are the grounds on which rights will be guaranteed.
How people experience performing rights is the key to understanding
how they inhabit that space of rights and develop a political subjectivity
necessary to making rights claims ‘I, we, they have a right to’. Without
such understanding and without developing concepts and methods ap-
propriate to such an understanding, most efforts to inscribe rights, we are
afraid, would remain inadequate because these would be rights without
political subjects. Conversely, the same can be said for those who assume
that the enactment of rights, of imaginatively and performatively bring-
ing rights into being, would guarantee their inscription. Without under-
standing the legality of claims and their scope or substance, such enact-
ments would remain inadequate, too. Without the force of law, this
would amount to subjects without political rights. It is that space be-
tween inscription and enactment that provides clues to understanding
how digital citizens are emerging as political subjects of our era and those
whose politics side with either inscription or enactment are somewhat
missing the significance of that relation.
THE FIGURE OF A CITIZEN YET TO COME
There is then no reason to separate political subjects who make digital
rights claims in or by acting through the Internet from those who make
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digital rights claims in and what they say through bills, charters, declara-
tions, and manifestos. These are two moments of dissensus, and without
each other, neither would be possible or practicable. As we have illustrat-
ed, if no people were acting by witnessing, hacking, and commoning, it
would be well-nigh impossible to articulate by what performative force
they are making claims to ‘I, we, they, have a right to’. Conversely, with-
out declarations, bills, charters, and manifestos, it would be impossible to
call on the multitude of people to act in certain ways, give meaning and
imaginary force to their actions, and enable the articulation of the figure
of citizen as a subject of politics.
What is the force of law that guarantees, then, the imaginary and
performative force of digital acts of making rights claims? There is also
no reason to assume that the subject of rights is a citizen as we know it—a
member of a nation-state. As Franklin says, ‘State actors such as the Unit-
ed States, China, United Kingdom, South Korea, or India, for instance,
have markedly different ideas about who should control the Internet,
however defined, and on whose terms web-based goods and services are
to be made available to their citizens.’95 Moreover, as Deibert has shown,
states and corporations on grounds of security and profits are not exactly
impeccable guarantors of rights.96 Yet we would err to assume that the
subject of digital rights is only a subject of nationality or human rights.
What the emerging citizen subjects are bringing into being by enacting
their rights through traversing state and national boundaries is precisely
a figure of a citizen yet to come. We cannot decide in advance what figure
of citizen they are bringing into being when the political subjects of cy-
berspace enact ‘I, we, they have a right to’ claims. To think that digital
rights in cyberspace can be guaranteed and secured by inscription in
charters, declarations, and manifestos of rights is to neglect that the daily
enactment of rights is a necessary but not sufficient guarantee. Converse-
ly, to think that the daily enactment of rights in cyberspace is the guaran-
tee of freedom is to neglect that without inscription, enactment would not
have its performative force. Being digital citizens requires staging scenes
of dissensus by acting as subjects that do not have the rights that they do
and have the rights that they should. The most effective guarantee of
rights is both their inscription (citation, repetition, and iteration in declar-
ations) and enactment (resignification through acts).
What the figure of the citizen—as we inherited and as yet to come—
accomplishes is the bridging of these two forms of politics that has
emerged in the enactment of cyberspace: those who enact themselves as
political subjects and make digital rights claims in or by saying and doing
something through the Internet (enactment) and those who make digital
rights claims in or by what they say in bills, charters, declarations, and
manifestos (inscription). Having distinguished themselves from hackers,
hacktivists—those whose acts disrupt corporate, governmental, and mili-
tary organizations—by acting through the Internet continue to imagine
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themselves as enacting freedom, privacy, and anonymity. Similarly, hav-
ing distinguished themselves from libertarians, advocates of human
rights for the Internet imagine themselves to be entrenching rights for
already existing subjects. But rarely does the question appear: Where
does the right to freedom come from? Where does the freedom to say ‘I,
we, they have a right to’ come from? Can we found a politics on our
supposed impulse for freedom by forgetting that this freedom has a his-
tory—or, better, multiple histories? Making rights claims in or by saying
and doing ‘I, we, they have a right to’ is not founded in isolation or as if it
sprang from nowhere: citizen subjects are often ordinary rather than he-
roic subjects who have struggled to articulate, claim, and make these
rights through multiple and overlapping legal orders. The disappearance
or absence of the figure of a citizen that we have inherited and who can
make claims to ‘I, we, they have a right to’ is not simply a politics of
tradition; it is also a politics of a citizen to come.
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EIGHT
Digital Citizens Yet to Come
We discussed the figure of the digital citizen throughout this book as
inherited and yet to come. The legality, performativity, and imaginary of
this figure traverses two forms of politics we identified that have
emerged in the making of cyberspace: those who make digital rights
claims in or by what they say in bills, charters, declarations, and manifes-
tos (inscription) and those who enact themselves as political subjects and
make digital rights claims in or by saying and doing something through
the Internet (enactment). Chapter 7 examined how the former who, hav-
ing distinguished themselves from libertarians, advocate human rights
for the Internet and imagine themselves to be inscribing rights for already
existing subjects. This chapter examines how the latter who, having dis-
tinguished themselves from hackers, enact rights such as freedom, priva-
cy, ownership, and anonymity by disrupting corporate, governmental,
and military organizations in and by acting through the Internet. The
question for this chapter is how such acts bring new political subjects into
being and the emerging legal, performative, and imaginary forces that
are making these political subjects possible. We address this question by
examining how making rights claims by acting through the Internet in-
volves a tension between acts of closing that give control over the con-
ventions of the Internet to governments and technology corporations and
acts of opening through which people invent new conventions, repeat,
iterate, cite, or resignify old conventions and the performative force of
these acts. We do this by considering various acts where citizen subjects
have made digital rights claims by saying and doing ‘I, we, or they have a
right to’ and, in turn, have brought about collective political subjects (a
terminology we return to in this chapter). In doing so, citizen subjects
resist and resignify conventions of the Internet and through repetitions,
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iterations, and citations both digital citizens and cyberspace are being
formed and transformed.
The acts that we examine come from research published in the past
five years on digital and data activism. They are examples from a grow-
ing body of research on how people act through the Internet to intervene
in the sociotechnical arrangements that make it up by making claims for
data and digital rights and justice.1 There are a number of converging
concerns across this research about how people constitute themselves as
political subjects in and by making these claims. We first outline these
concerns before examining ‘data activists’ and ‘digital activists’ to ad-
dress the question whether they signify the emergence of the figure of
digital citizens yet to come. We then discuss several acts of closing such
as datafication, tracking, trolling, stalking, misinformation, deception,
and identification that have achieved unprecedented reach, foreclosing
possibilities of dialogue, negotiation, and generally the capacity to be and
engage with others without coercion and manipulation. We conclude
with accounts of acts of opening such as collaboration, mobilization,
sharing, evasion, intervention, and counter-hegemonic data production
that illustrate considerable creativity, inventiveness, and autonomy in the
formation of digital citizens yet to come.
TOTALIZATION, ONLINE/OFFLINE, ATOMISM
Critical scholars of digital politics or data politics broadly share three
concerns: the increasing popularity of totalizing narratives about what
the Internet means for people and societies; the persistence of language
that conceives of online and offline politics as separate and different
spaces; and, the insistence on individualizing or atomizing solutions to
data and digital rights rather than understanding the subject of politics
who acts through the Internet as a collective political subject.
The first concern is that totalizing utopian or dystopian ideologies
about the Internet, and the ostensible passivism or activism of people
acting through it, are concealing the ways people are performing effec-
tive and creative politics. Typically, utopian ideologies extoll the virtues
of the liberating aspects of the Internet and how data or digital citizens
are creating new worlds of value. These also extoll the virtues of how
new forms of data accumulation could solve global challenges such as
climate change, global health and global development, and indeed global
inequality. Claims are made that big data, for example, can solve global
problems such as climate change through geoengineering, managing
planetary urbanization and migration through smart cities, and global
health through monitoring—just to mention three areas.2
In contrast, dystopian ideologies characterize technology corporations
as new hegemons who are capable of both exploiting people for data
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accumulation and using this data for either behaviour modification or
mass political manipulation. Although there is considerable evidence of
technology corporations and their subsidiaries and networks accumulat-
ing data through predatory means, the claims made about behaviour
modification and political conduct are not borne out of substantial evi-
dence. The ability of technology corporations to modify and shape the
behaviour of the masses is considerably exaggerated and claims that they
do so serve to glorify these corporations when aiming to vilify them.3
Many scholars are critical of both utopian and dystopian ideologies,
and indeed emphasize how they serve the interests of technology corpo-
rations and state bureaucracies. This is not to say that critical scholars and
activists ignore the increasing domination of technology corporations in
data accumulation or their collusion with state authorities. Instead, they
emphasize the importance of documenting how state and corporate
agencies are violating or abusing rights such as expression, access, open-
ness, innovation, privacy, and ownership. By focusing on specific rights,
and the ways in which they are being violated, researchers and activists
have documented how the closings and openings that data accumulation
through the Internet enables provide possibilities of resistance through,
for instance, creative and subversive uses of data for articulating claims
for data justice.
The second concern is the persistence of an artificial difference and
separation between online and offline struggles over social, digital, or
data justice. For some scholars, this is expressed in the use of language
that describes data and digital activists as working in hybrid spaces that
combine both the online and offline.4 Yet, there is enough evidence to
show that people acting through the Internet to make rights claims con-
duct themselves in, and create, a continuous space rather than hybrid or
combined spaces. The social movements that lead such struggles, and the
Internet platforms that facilitate and configure them, constitute a continu-
ous space of action that we have named ‘cyberspace’. As we discussed in
chapters 2 and 3, the Internet facilitates transversal acts through its ano-
nymity, velocity, extensity, and traceability. So, although useful, meta-
phors such as hybridity are inadequate and continue to separate online
and offline or even consider digital acts as ‘local’ or ‘global’ in assess-
ments of their reach or effectiveness. Instead, we suggest that by under-
standing acts as transversal means that the borders and orders that they
traverse can only be known by tracing the kinds of solidarities and affin-
ities they build and the kinds of rights that they assemble in making their
claims. But the importance of making this distinction is not only to chal-
lenge the reductionism that underpins the language of hybrid, combined,
or separate spaces, but it is also to draw attention to a substantive matter.
Often, the rights claims that people make when they act through the
Internet are not confined to digital or data rights (as we will discuss), but
conventional civil, political, social, cultural, sexual, and economic rights.
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As such, understanding these claims as part of the making of a continu-
ous space is critical if we are to understand how political subjects come
into being through making both non-digital (i.e., civil, political, social,
cultural, sexual, economic, etc.) and digital (i.e., ownership, access, priva-
cy, anonymity, etc.) rights claims.
The third concern is that of individualism or atomism.5 Many of the
critics of the enslaving aspects of the Internet call on people to find indi-
vidualized solutions to them. Whether it is privacy or access, as we dis-
cussed in chapter 5, the problems of the Internet are framed as individual
responsibilities. This is one of the key reasons we insist on calling the
political subject yet to come as a ‘citizen’ because, by its very nature, the
citizen is a collective political subject that requires being and acting with
others. That increasingly calls for practices such as the regulation and
control of closed platforms and funding, enabling, and empowering open
platforms as a collective right.
Taking our responses to all three concerns into account, we want to
focus not on totalizing narratives about the Internet but on specific claims
that people make to both digital and non-digital rights, how those rights
are bound up together and performed by acting transversally through the
Internet. What then are the acts through which digital rights claims are
being made and how do those claims both enable and are enabled by
non-digital rights claims? To answer this question, we first return to the
issue of the subjects of digital rights.
THE SUBJECTS OF DIGITAL RIGHTS
We have seen how making rights claims takes the form of ‘I, we, they
have a right to’ and by acting through the Internet, political subjects and
cyberspace are brought into being. Over especially the last five years,
these new political subjects have mostly been named ‘data activists’ or
‘digital activists’.6 The scholars who study these activists often focus on
their actions in various areas such as media, health, and welfare and
study their claims against datafication.7 Such data activism is described
as involving counter-hegemonic tactics against the ways data is accumu-
lated from the digital activities of people and the ways data are put to use
to accumulate various forms of capital, often described as datafication.8
Many scholars also argue that the political subjects that emerge from
these struggles that involve digital acts are not much different from those
subjects we have been accustomed to in studies of social movements:
workers, women, children, refugees, queers, blacks, minorities, and in-
digenous peoples who have raised questions about and mobilized
against datafication.9 These and other political subjects have identified
various tensions involved in organizing themselves and making rights
claims through digital acts: although enabling social movements to have
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unprecedented reach and scale, digital acts also implicate them in profil-
ing, identification, and tracking technologies that are then used against
them.
Consider, for example, how the rights of children are now deeply
implicated in digital rights. In a series of studies, Veronica Barassi illus-
trates this in her examination of how children have been subjected to
datafication:10 ‘What is becoming obvious is that children's personal in-
formation is being collected, stored, archived and profiled in ways that
were not possible before, and that parents’ digital practices are directly
related to this transformation. In the last few years, we have thus seen the
emergence of research that has looked at children's data.’11 Barassi draws
attention to a paradoxical situation: while children or their parents may
be making rights claims for data justice through their social media digital
practices, in the process, children are also being datafied through such
claims-making practices.12 Barassi concludes that activating citizenship
through social media leaves digital traces, and thus, activism may also
lead to the accumulation of more data about subjects.13 This illustrates
the importance of considering how making rights claims through digital
acts to raise issues about data justice or digital rights are related to claims
for social justice and non-digital rights.
This becomes an acute, if not urgent, issue when social activists use
social media to do what is broadly called ‘digital storytelling’. Mona
Baker and Bolette Blaagaard illustrate how citizen journalists, as alterna-
tive if not radical digital storytellers, occupy actual and virtual worlds
simultaneously as they perform themselves as dissenting citizens.14 Yet,
digital storytellers also expose themselves in unprecedented ways in and
by making rights claims that require privacy or anonymity. This not only
concerns such rights in the Global North but also the Global South. El-
ham Gheytanchi shows how the effective use of social media by activists
of the Green Movement in Iran has proved that ‘a new wave of social
movements is in the making in Iran in which human rights violations,
arrests, and political repression will not go unnoticed in the international
community.’15 Yet, Iranian authorities also take notice, track, profile, and
persecute by taking advantage of digital storytelling which is, by its very
modality, an act of opening. These struggles demonstrate the vital impor-
tance of anonymity and privacy on the Internet as fundamental rights.
For the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, Shane Wes-
brock and colleagues argue that ‘unless digital activism, involving collab-
orative displays of collective knowledge, is complemented by many
offline strategies that invoke collective action, the impact of such grass-
roots sanctions will be limited.’16 The reason for this is that traditional
mobilizing for building collective political subjectivity assumes even
more significance given how digital storytelling and mobilizing now ex-
poses citizen subjects.
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Black Feminist mobilizing in the United States is another example of
how effective digital storytelling can also become implicated in exposure
to not only tracking and profiling but also trolling. Sherri Williams says:
‘Once the story of Renisha McBride, a nineteen-year-old black woman
who was fatally shot in the face near Detroit after she knocked on a white
man’s door for help, faded from the national news cycle, black feminists
kept her story alive on social media with #RememberRenisha.’17 Similar-
ly, ‘the #FreeCeCe hashtag was used to bring attention to the case of black
transgender woman CeCe McDonald who said she defended herself
against a violent transphobic and racist attack that led to her manslaugh-
ter conviction.’ She adds ‘months before hashtags supporting Jada
emerged, black feminists used #FastTailedGirls to create a discussion
about the hypersexualization of black girls and the dismissal of sexual
attacks against them.18 Yet, these non-digital actions performed in and by
acting through the Internet also exposed the activists—precisely because
digital rights are not secured or sanctioned—to surveillance and trolling.
Thus, making rights claims inescapably involves both digital and non-
digital rights simultaneously. This is an example of the danger of think-
ing that making rights claims now happens online or offline.
The dangers of using closed platforms such as Facebook and Twitter
for digital acts are serious and how women become political subjects in
China and the Middle East through evasive acts is instructive. Jia Tan
shows how performative digital masquerading serves young feminists
well in evading the attentions of security apparatuses.19 Tan explores the
practices of the Youth Feminist Action School and how they evade cen-
sorship with tactical ingenuity, resignify women’s bodies through virtu-
alization techniques, and create multiple images of women in public.20
Tan shows that the role of open media in this new wave of feminist
activism can be better understood as a form of ‘digital masquerading’ in
various ways. Such evasive counter-hegemonic tactics are also spreading
in the Middle East. Anabelle Sreberny illustrates that through the use of
social media, or in our words through digital acts, women in the Middle
East are developing effective ways to dissent from oppression of all
forms, political, sexual, cultural, and religious.21 Her conclusion is that
‘the region manifests vividly the standoff between Clay Shirky’s uber-
optimism and Evgeny Morozov’s uber-pessimism about the possibilities
of online activism to produce systemic change.’22 Yet, as we witnessed
during the democracy protests in Hong Kong, dangerous collusions
among corporations, states, and activists can happen across borders and
orders. When a group of developers submitted an iOS app to Apple,
Apple apparently rejected it before reversing its decision and accepting
it.23 The app HKmap.live, which crowdsources the location of police and
anti-government protesters, was used by activists to outmanoeuvre and
evade police tactics with live data. Yet this reversal brought Apple face-
to-face with the Chinese state when People’s Daily criticized it for glorify-
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ing protest and hurting the feelings of Chinese citizens. The intrigue here
is that platforms monopolized ways of acting through the Internet to
such an extent that now they simultaneously act as both the judge and
jury for what constitutes not only ‘free speech’ but also democracy and
politics.
We also witness digital acts resignifying political subjects such as mi-
grants and refugees enabling them to perform as citizens yet to come.
Lilie Chouliaraki and Myria Georgiou examine a similar paradoxical situ-
ation where a discourse constitutes refugees as both requiring care and
discipline at the same time.24 This contingent and contradictory address-
ing of refugees as both subjects of care and discipline constitutes Eu-
rope’s borders as a space of humanitarian ethics and politics of security
through a communication infrastructure. Similarly, Rafal Zaborowski
and Myria Georgiou show that this communication infrastructure creates
a visual grammar thereby interpellating European citizens to see refugees
as incompatible strangers.25 Martina Tazzioli shows how, through the
use of two systems of tracking and visualizing migrant movement in the
Mediterranean, that of Jora and Eurosur, the EU builds a risk space for
governing people.26 Tazzioli demonstrates how ‘migration movements
are simultaneously the objects of an archival function, real-time monitor-
ing and future-oriented risk analyses: migrants are spied upon, tracked
and archived through mapping monitoring software in order to open up
future spaces of intervention to make migration a governable phenome-
non.’27 Tazzioli also documents various acts of subversion by migrants to
evade and deceive these systems.28 Koen Leurs also illustrates how
young refugees resist this sociotechnical infrastructure by making com-
munication rights claims.29 Leurs shows that through various devices
and platforms, young refugees establish effective digital archives as an
alternative knowledge production by doing digital storytelling about
themselves and their conditions.30 Ludek Stavinoha joins Leurs in em-
phasizing communicative acts of citizenship performed by refugees at
Europe’s borders and how they practically perform themselves as politi-
cal subjects.31
These are just a few examples of the emerging subjects of politics who
act through the Internet: data activists and digital activists who struggle
to challenge systems and technologies that are being developed to track,
troll, visualize, control, discipline, and surveil their acts and actions.
Their attempts to perform acts of opening against injustice, oppression,
repression, and domination are countered with acts of closing to crimi-
nalize, deceive, exclude, discriminate, intimidate, and eliminate. These
are the tensions between closings and openings that citizen subjects en-
gage with in the play of obedience, submission, and subversion. What we
have highlighted is that data and digital activism make people subject to
more data accumulation and visibility and that digital and data rights are
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bound up with social justice rights more generally, and yet subjects are
creatively working with these tensions to claim rights.
DIGITAL ACTS OF CLOSING
During the last five years, much attention has been paid to what in chap-
ter 5 we call ‘acts of closing’ the Internet. We have given several examples
of such acts of closing ranging from the acts of corporations, states, and
subjects such as those disclosed in Edward Snowden’s revelations about
the collusion between states and corporations in accumulating, harvest-
ing, and mining data. In relation to his 2019 book, Snowden has sug-
gested that despite warnings that his disclosures would cause harm, even
former critics now suggest ‘we live in a better, freer and safer world’
because of his revelations.32 At the same time, Snowden notes that ‘the
greatest danger still lies ahead, with the refinement of artificial intelli-
gence capabilities, such as facial and pattern recognition’. In comparison,
the revelations about Cambridge Analytica have alerted people to how
this data might be used to shape and influence collective behaviour or
public opinion. As previously noted, we remain rather unconvinced
about the claims being made on behalf of what states and corporations
can do to affect behaviour change and political opinion.33 We do not
think that data accumulated from the Internet and ubiquitous devices,
especially through closed platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, or Insta-
gram, can translate into such powerful techniques so as to influence elec-
tions, shape public opinion, or indeed modify collective behaviour.34 This
is not to deny such attempts are being made and that revelations of these
practices can lead to people boycotting or challenging platforms. Rather,
it is because cyberspace does not exist independently from cultural, so-
cial, or political spaces, and people are thus much more resistant and
resilient to such authoritarian fantasies. Social, cultural, and political col-
lectives are far too complex to allow for such mass manipulation. Gilead
or The Borg Collective remind us about such fantasies, but they are cau-
tionary tales and not actual effects.
Another form of closing we cited in chapter 5 and that has multiplied
is the regulatory pressure on closed platforms such as Google, Twitter,
Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and the like to control speech acts per-
formed through their protocols (search, exchange, share, post, etc.). In
addition to calls that platforms such as Facebook ‘should be regulated
like a cigarette company, because of the addictive and harmful properties
of social media’, closed platforms are increasingly under pressure to
monitor and regulate what is sayable and doable through the Internet.35
That Twitter moved to ban political advertising ‘globally’ for ‘all election-
eering ads, as well as ads related to political issues’ points to a fundamen-
tal question we are raising.36 Should Google or Apple determine what
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constitutes ‘good’ journalism, or Twitter ‘good’ communication, or Face-
book ‘good’ behaviour, or Instagram ‘good’ aesthetics? Would such regu-
latory power vested in them not serve to strengthen their monopolies in
the production of data subjects who are locked into their ecosystems? By
ceding more control to these monopolies, states (who are losing their
monopoly of knowledge of subjects) would perhaps inadvertently, if not
perversely, further empower these closed platforms that function across
borders.37 This conceals the absence of a political order appropriate to the
regulation of Internet platforms.
Closings include myriad other state acts that deploy digital technolo-
gies to identify, track, monitor, and police subjects. Consider how China
is reportedly using facial recognition technology to oppress its Uyghur
minority in the Xinjiang region.38 By using deep censorship to, on the one
hand, close open online platforms and, on the other hand, to introduce
identification technologies to profile, arrest, detain, and incarcerate
masses of Uyghurs, Chinese authorities are using a combination of an-
cient and modern technologies of biopolitics and population manage-
ment.39 Artificial intelligence companies are in the forefront of making
this happen for Chinese authorities.40 Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur
to the United Nations has called it a genocidal strategy.41 Once such
technologies are used for certain purposes, they can also be transferred or
travel to other sites and applications.42 These travels of technologies of
domination and oppression are the developments that are being revealed
and fought against. A case in point is Google’s entry into urban develop-
ment.
What appears to be on the other side of the spectrum, and for osten-
sibly benign reasons, is Google’s proposal to build a smart city in Toron-
to, Canada, where its inhabitants are expected to willingly allow massive
amounts of data to be accumulated about their movements and interac-
tions to make the city operate efficiently. In response to opposition both
in Toronto and internationally, Google claims that ‘Sidewalk Labs has
solicited an unprecedented range of feedback from residents, researchers,
community leaders, and government agencies, including in-person con-
versations with more than 21,000 Torontonians’ and as a result its propo-
sal has been shaped by them.43 Google boasts that the resulting city
would set a new standard for urban life in the twenty-first century. But it
asks, ‘Does Sidewalk Labs plan to sell personal information?’ Its answer
is no:
Sidewalk Labs has committed that it would not sell personal informa-
tion to third parties or use it for advertising purposes. It also commits
to not disclose personal information to third parties, including other
Alphabet companies, without explicit consent. Finally, Sidewalk Labs
has proposed that an independent, government-sanctioned entity will
approve proposed collections and uses of urban data—information
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gathered in the city’s physical environment—in the project area by all
parties, including Sidewalk Labs.44
Yet, Google conveniently overlooks that the issue is not only privacy.
Obviously, aggregate data would have to be accumulated, analysed, and
interpreted with unprecedented levels of detail about people’s move-
ments, activities, and transactions. Without legal ownership rights and a
social and political culture that understands these rights as digital citizen-
ship rights, there are no guarantees that such data will not be deployed
for objectives other than those stated. To reduce data rights to only priva-
cy, technology companies conveniently distract people from fundamen-
tal issues that arise with data accumulation. They do so by forcing people
into submission to provide data without ownership rights or a culture of
knowing how to use the data.
It may appear controversial to suggest that the Chinese and Google
initiatives—both which could be understood as building ‘smart’ cities to
serve specific purposes—are on a spectrum where there are differences in
degree but not in kind. It may sound alarming to suggest that building
detention centres to force a people into obedience and building a city to
force a people into submission are based on similar principles. As we
have argued throughout the book, the lines among obedience, submis-
sion, and subversion are easily crossed and the habitus-forming data
practices in one can surprisingly and unexpectedly produce results in
another.45 This is where David Lyon’s argument that surveillance has
become a way of life rather than an exception because it pervades social
and political life under different names, is more than a cautionary tale. It
captures how concerns about measuring success in academic careers and
physical activity to monitoring home safety operate according to similar
logics, affects, techniques, and relations.46 The pervasiveness of these
concerns enable transferring technologies from domains that are in-
tended for sinister to benign objectives but also the production of subjects
who are accustomed to their effects.47 What these transferences remind
us is that people do not need to be voluntarily or involuntarily online to
be on the Internet. The ubiquity of data accumulation ensures people are
captured as objects and subjects of data. The political subjectivity that
either produces obedience or submission will not easily cultivate subver-
sion as a key aspect of being a citizen. Rather than assuming the way
things are arranged can produce effects without intervention, becoming
citizens will always involve acts to resist and question why things are the
way they are, the technologies of domination that they generate and de-
ploy, and imagining how they can be different.
This can be illustrated through the example of an incident in 2019
when it was revealed that facial recognition had been used to track tens
of thousands of people at London’s King’s Cross Central, a recently rede-
veloped 67-acre area.48 The redevelopment includes several office build-
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ings including Google’s UK headquarters, Central Saint Martins college,
schools, and a range of retailers. It was revealed that multiple cameras set
up to observe visitors were also being used for facial recognition. Those
familiar with the area, and especially urban activists, had already been
raising questions about the area’s privatized security and cameras pre-
cisely because the area is also a major public space. It includes squares,
playgrounds, street markets, and promenades that are designated for
public use yet under private ownership. Argent, the area’s developer,
was quoted as saying ‘these cameras use a number of detection and track-
ing methods, including facial recognition, but also have sophisticated
systems in place to protect the privacy of the general public.’49
This case raises far more questions than we can address here such as
the regulation of cities through public-private partnership developments
and questions of the right to the city as a fundamental right.50 Yet the
collusion between development and data accumulation and the right to
privacy in public spaces underscore the comparison we discussed previ-
ously: from China’s detainment centres to Toronto’s smart city and Lon-
don’s mass facial recognition technology, there is a pattern of normaliz-
ing surveillance through data accumulation. As further details became
known, Argent admitted that ‘it used the system to “help the Metropoli-
tan Police and British Transport Police prevent and detect crime”.’51 If we
also consider the developments in predictive policing that Claudia Ara-
dau and Tobias Blanke have explored, then the collusion is not only
between public and private securitization, but also between intelligence
and policing.52 That Argent later announced the withdrawal of this pro-
gramme does not really address the issue.53 How many more of such
collusions exist of which people may or may not be aware? In an unrelat-
ed case, a UK court found that using facial recognition technology in
public places, while interfering with privacy rights, is consistent with
three requirements of the Human Rights Act and data protection legisla-
tion and, thus, is lawful.54
All these acts of closing by both states and corporations inhibit the
cultivation of activist citizenship and may appear daunting. Given that
now many states are imagining or attempting to create sovereign territo-
ries in cyberspace, or as Ronald Deibert and Louis Pauly have shown,
imposing existing state territories onto cyberspace, the possibilities of
such activist citizenship may have reached its limits.55 However, the chal-
lenge extends beyond these attempts to impose sovereignty on cyber-
space to attempts to control and shape narratives by using closed sys-
tems. China’s diba (a Chinese nationalist platform) and Fangirls (mostly
young women mobilizing around idols but clearly nationalist) are exam-
ples of trying to take control of the narratives on Hong Kong’s democracy
movement.56 There is evidence that both are cultivated and supported by
China’s ‘online army’.57 There is also evidence that China’s online army
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crosses its own firewall and infiltrates Facebook and Twitter, which have
responded by closing massive state-backed advertising.58
Another form of closing noted in chapter 5 concerns the acts of sub-
jects who engage in forms of trolling, abuse, and swarming. Just as citizen
subjects who act through the Internet to make rights claims expose them-
selves to state and corporate surveillance, they also open themselves to
the acts of others who seek to intimate, threat, and silence them. Sahana
Udupa and Matti Pohjonen note this contradictory character of different
forms ‘digital communication’ with examples from the Global North and
South. From countries in North America and Europe to those in Asia or
Africa, they refer to ‘extreme speech’ as a way to interpret ‘the expansion
of online vitriol and its political consequences in different regions of the
world’.59 Rather than a clear-cut normative binary between a liberal cen-
tre and extreme periphery, they argue that extreme speech involves polit-
ical inclusions and exclusions that are configured across a range of spaces
and cultural and political registers. However, they note that extreme
speech introduces a ‘deep ambiguity’: if it is understood as a form of
transgression from mainstream norms (in ways Judith Butler theorized
about gender), then speech can be both progressive and destructive de-
pending on the relations and contexts in which it is uttered. For this and
other reasons, Udupa and Pohjonen argue against blanket proclamations
about extreme speech and instead call for studies that examine the specif-
ic contexts and situations that facilitate and signify extreme speech as
violence. In our words, speech acts performed in and by saying or doing
something through the Internet must be seen in relation to the subjects
that they produce and effects that they create. By defining all speech acts
that deviate from norms and giving control over to closed platforms to
regulate them is probably among the most dangerous developments at
present.
That cyberspace has become a key site of struggle over rights means
that most, if not all, social movement and political acts traverse it. Mobil-
izations of acting through the Internet provide ample evidence against a
conclusion that cyberspace is now dominated by states and other actors
that seek to close or enclose it. Acts are being performed through the
Internet that make rights claims and take the form ‘I, we, they have a
right to’. They are articulating, building, and creating enduring, affective,
and effective solidarities, platforms, sources, and networks. To appreciate
and recognize these digital acts of opening, we explore some examples.
Before that, however, two points are in order. First, as we have
argued, these acts are transversal in their reach or scale. They are not
global. In fact, speech acts, in the way in which we theorized them in this
book, are never global in their scale and reach. They are transversal in the
sense that they produce intensities in specific places and times and trans-
mit these effects through resonances and reverberations throughout so-
cial bodies. Just because dominant media give attention to or report an
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act does not make it global in its reach and effects. The intensities, reso-
nances, and reverberations of these acts must be studied empirically. To
speak of ‘global’ or ‘local’ effects of digital acts through the Internet is to
neglect this transversal character. Second, the legal, imaginative, and per-
formative forces of digital acts cannot be read off totalizing narratives
such as ‘communicative capitalism’, ‘digital capitalism’, ‘surveillance
capitalism’, ‘neoliberalism’, or any such grand narrative.60 To think that
digital acts either derive from or react to a singular logic, however theor-
ized, is to miss the multiple, contradictory, overlapping, and transversal
logics that are operating through the Internet. Instead, we attend to digi-
tal acts of opening and how these produce collective political subjects and
effective politics.
DIGITAL ACTS OF OPENING
We have introduced how various political subjects are being brought into
being in and by performing digital acts that make rights claims. We now
want to discuss some examples of those digital acts, which challenge
dominant and grand narratives. There are numerous studies of different
forms of digital and data activism from around the world that now cov-
ers an impressive range of countries and movements. We could discuss
the use of the Xnet platform for acts during the Spanish Indignados
movement; acts of hacking CCTV cameras deployed during protests in
the United Kingdom; resistance to and through algorithms in acts of civic
hacktivism, platform cooperatives, and cloud protesting; digital storytell-
ing acts by undocumented young DREAM activists in the United States;
the counter-gaming practices of Tin Hat, which is managed by a collabo-
rative independent organization that re-appropriates digital platforms to
perform subversive and spectacular acts; or counter-surveillance acts in-
volving the recording of police violence during the Gezi resistance in
Turkey.61 We could discuss how so-called gig economy workers are orga-
nizing through the very same technologies used to track, monitor, and
evaluate their performances.62 We could also discuss how the radical
political subjectivity of ‘data citizen’ is emerging through the articulation
of data rights as human rights.63 We are inevitably selective here and
focus specifically on those acts that have had promising enduring qual-
ities and may become repertoires from which future digital citizens will
draw inspiration. The three that we will discuss in greater detail are
#NiUnaMenos (Not One Woman Less), Ushahidi, and Citizen Sense.
Jean-Marie Chenou and Carolina Cepeda-Másmela examine the
#NiUnaMenos (Not One Woman Less) movement in Argentina that
builds a counter-hegemonic national index of male violence.64 Argentina
has a veritable history of social movements and mobilizations with
strong feminist repertoires of direct action. Like their historic precedents,
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the campaign against male violence began on Plaza de Mayo with bomba-
chazo (panties [bombachas] with slogans), on 6 November 2012.65 A read-
ing marathon followed this act on 26 March 2015 in Buenos Aires where
journalists, writers, activists, and friends and families of the victims of
domestic violence gathered.66 It is at this point that data activism entered
the scene in the form of rights claims to the collection and presentation of
data about violence against women. Chenou and Cepeda-Másmela argue
that by gathering information to understand the structural nature of vio-
lence against women, and equipping the women’s rights mobilization
with verifiable empirical content, data activists made rights claims for
social change.67 Between 2015 and 2017, the articulation of claims to data
became increasingly specified and resulted in the development of the
index of male violence. The initiative ‘Argentina cuenta la violencia machis-
ta’ (Argentina reports on misogynist violence) was launched.68 The index
in turn had a considerable performative force in articulating claims and
demands about the right to know and right to protection. The creation of
a single official register of the victims of violence against women outside
the state apparatus of data collection and presentation challenged pro-
duction of knowledge that treats women as objects of violence. The regis-
ter arguably transformed women into subjects of violence and enabled
them to make claims as citizens against femicide. The register was fol-
lowed by a three-month-long survey through which 59,380 cases were
documented.69 As Chenou and Cepeda-Másmela argue ‘the creation of a
male violence index “from below”, without the participation of state en-
tities or private companies, represents an important case of data activism
in the South as it uses both some tenets of the mainstream sociotechnical
imaginary and some big data techniques.’70
Ushahidi was launched as a platform in Kenya in 2008 by several
activists to map and report instances of electoral turmoil and violence.
Miren Gutiérrez provides an analysis of the platform from its origins to
its transformation into an effective international platform used for data
activism projects to map and report disasters.71 It has enabled activist
citizens to map and report incidences outside of established state and
media channels.72 Originally inspired by open-source software data acti-
vists in Kenya who created a platform to map and report election vio-
lence, Ushahidi invited Internet programmers around the world to par-
ticipate in its further development. Some 125 programmers responded to
the call to tweak and refine the platform.73 When a major earthquake hit
Haiti in 2010, the platform was intensely used for humanitarian aid. After
2010, activists established a standing task force to deploy and tweak the
platform as and when the need arose. It was not long before it was
brought into action in Colombia during a fire and Libya during the war.
Within a few years, the platform was used by the United Nations and
several other countries for crisis mapping and reporting, which relied on
both its platform technologies and also data collection techniques using
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localized mobile technologies.74 As Gutiérrez reports, ‘by 2017, Ushahidi
boasted 120,000 deployments, 10 million testimonies and 25 million peo-
ple reached in critical situations’.75 Ushahidi essentially works as a wit-
ness coordination and reportage platform. It organizes reports submitted
by witnesses, verifies them, aggregates, tags, and classifies them, and
reports and visualizes results. Gutiérrez argues that although there are
tensions in the way the platform now provides commercial services and
at the same time continues to host various witnessing projects, it ‘is dis-
ruptive in that it obstructs the normal course of events and, in doing so, it
has revolutionised pre-existing power structures and dynamics in hu-
manitarianism through innovation, social progress and new ideas’.76 Gu-
tiérrez suggests that perhaps ‘Ushahidi constitutes a challenge to hege-
monic narratives and can be considered a manifestation of a subaltern
counter-public’.77 Ushahidi may or may not be a ‘liberation technology’
or ‘subaltern counter-public’, but it has certainly provided an open plat-
form through which to act through the Internet for making rights claims
to alternative knowledge, truth, and accounts of events whose interpreta-
tions disseminate so rapidly through mostly closed platforms.
Environmental activism is among the most prominent social move-
ments since the mid-twentieth century not only in the Global North but
also and perhaps especially so in the Global South. The movement has
raised many fundamental questions about how we produce and consume
products, how we work, play, commute, and travel, and their conse-
quences. It has also raised fundamental questions about the ways in
which the economy is understood as a growth machine and its inevitable
consequences. Although the right to clean air and water are being articu-
lated as ‘human’ rights, as movements and activists from Extinction Re-
bellion to Greta Thunberg become its mobilizers, the survival of the plan-
et is at stake in the age of the Anthropocene and human-made climate
change. Under these conditions, that datafied citizens have challenged
geotechnical engineering and data-based solutions to articulate demands
and make rights claims for clean air and clean water is an epic struggle.
Yet, as Jennifer Gabrys shows, even under these conditions, ‘citizen mon-
itoring of air quality, and the citizen data that it generates, then become
ways to challenge, contest and account for harmful environmental condi-
tions and to pursue the right to clean air.’78 Drawing from a southeast
London project called ‘Citizen Sense’, Gabrys illustrates how citizens use
low-cost digital sensor technologies to monitor air quality and in doing
so produce knowledges and new kinds of evidence about air pollution
and its class, gender, and racial consequences. The account that emerges
from research is not simply that already existing ‘citizens’ collect data to
produce evidence about air pollution but also that they articulate them-
selves as data and environmental citizens simultaneously making a rights
claim to the city itself. She suggests that ‘this is a particular way of under-
standing the right to the city through the right of citizens to generate,
Being Digital Citizens, Second Edition OPEN ACCESS PDF from Rowman & Littlefield
Chapter 8188
collect, analyse and communicate data that can dispute and question
official accounts of problems such as air quality in relation to urban pro-
cesses. Through these data practices, distinctive modes of data citizens
that claim a right to the city could materialize’.79 She provides an account
of how data sensors called ‘dustboxes’ were created in collaboration with
neighbourhood residents.80 By creating a network of residents to use the
sensors and developing a platform to share the data called ‘Airsift’, par-
ticipants also became real-time analysers of data that they themselves
collected. These practices led to digital storytelling about air pollution
that resulted in Deptford Data Stories, which documented and analysed
the collected data.81 Gabrys emphasizes that citizen data collected and
analysed by data citizens does not attempt to replicate or replace official
stories told about air pollution but creates counter-hegemonic narratives
by those who are especially exposed to the effects of the pollution that
they record. There are of course multiple questions that arise about the
accuracy of devices, the people who can produce evidence with sensor
data, and the procedures and protocols that ensure the validity of citizen
data. But, in a strong sense, these questions also pertain to official data,
too, and, hence, transform data subjects who might passively accept offi-
cial data into data citizens who can ask experiential and grounded ques-
tions about data.
What the openness of these three acts illustrates is that each embraces
multiple borders and orders that they traverse and produce citizen sub-
jects across and beyond them with solidarities they enact and affiliations
that they inscribe.
DIGITAL CITIZENS YET TO COME
How can we argue that the political subjects we have discussed—e.g.,
guerrilla engineers, feminist masqueraders, cyborg activists, video sur-
veillance hacktivists—are citizens, let alone digital citizens? How can we
argue that acts through which these subjects make rights claims through
the Internet—e.g., hacking, mapping, reporting, witnessing, commoning,
monitoring, sensing—are digital acts? How can we argue that the rights
claims being made by these political subjects are producing rights that
are rights of citizens?
There are two reasons why we call for a digital citizen yet to come as
the political subject of digital acts that make rights claims. First, in the
growing body of literature on digital and data activism, the figure of the
citizen remains an ambiguous figure. It is either not used at all or, if used,
signifies an underspecified subject of rights whose legitimacy and au-
thority remain uncertain. As we mentioned, precisely because digital acts
are transversal, it is crucial to consider which legal orders they challenge,
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which performative forces they generate, and which imaginaries they
mobilize before we name the collective subjects that these acts produce.
The second reason we call for a digital citizen yet to come is to main-
tain that making rights claims signifies openings rather than closings.
That citizenship is a political subjectivity and expresses being with others
means that it involves and provokes the cultivation of openness against
closings. A right-wing murderer who kills people in a mosque or another
murderer who beheads a captive victim in the name of a religious state
and uploads videos of their acts to Internet platforms are performing
digital acts, but we cannot designate their acts as ‘acts of digital citizen-
ship’. These are acts based on racial, religious, ethnocentric, and national-
ist ideologies that are attempts at closings: of dialogue, of association, of
deliberation, of negotiation, and of being citizens as being with others.
There are data and digital activists who perform digital acts through the
Internet by mobilizing against racism, misogyny, sexism, xenophobia,
Islamophobia, and other ideologies. By explicitly calling for and signify-
ing them as ‘digital citizens’ means to draw a line between acts of closing
and acts of opening. Without doing so, we would be, at least analytically,
unable to distinguish between making rights claims against injustice, re-
pression, and domination and making ethnocentric, nativist, misogy-
nous, racist, sexist, and xenophobic claims that perform and enact such
injustices and domination.
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